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Industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have 
evolved from operating in a relatively trusting environment to the current prevalence of public 
networks. Cyber-threats are evolving to become more sophisticated. The Stuxnet malware brought 
home how vulnerable ICS/SCADA systems potentially are. There is no or limited information 
available as to the current state of ICS/SCADA in South Africa including the factors influencing 
ICS/SCADA and how they are secured and governed. Due to the nature of the systems, ICS/SCADA 
cyber-security and governance faces additional challenges compared to the corporate networks, and 
critical systems may be left exposed. There exists control frameworks internationally, however there 
are new South African legislation that needs to be taken into account. South Africa is also falling 
behind in cyber-security, therefore there is a concern in securing ICS controlling key infrastructure 
critical to the South African economy as there are little known facts about this. 
This aim of the study is to assess the current state of ICS/SCADA in South Africa, determine the main 
governance frameworks employed, and to develop a control framework addressing the shortfalls. 
Elements of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
are used to guide the study. Quantitative methods are used to determine the perceived susceptibility, 
security confidence, and governance for ICS/SCADA environment. Qualitative methods were used to 
review the current control frameworks, standards and legislation relevant to this environment. 
The study found that the top threat/risk for ICS/SCADA are malware and the top vulnerability is 
unpatched systems. Furthermore, the framework used most in South Africa to secure and govern 
ICS/SCADA environments are Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) 
and from the document analysis the best suited framework overall is Centre for the Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI). Taking these frameworks into account as well as relevant risks, threats 
and vulnerabilities, a consolidated framework aligned to South Africa were developed suggesting 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Cyber-espionage and cyber-attack tools have been evolving to become more sophisticated, resulting 
in the increased speculation over nation-sponsored malware and campaigns. An increase in cyber-
criminal gangs and other groups increases the complexity of the threat landscape. Industrial control 
systems (ICS) and supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have evolved from 
operating in a relatively trusting environment to the current prevalence of public networks. In 2010 
Stuxnet brought home how vulnerable control systems potentially are. There have been subsequent 
cases where advanced cyber-attack and cyber-espionage tools have targeted ICS/SCADA, and there 
are numerous examples of compromises of such systems. Due to the nature of the systems, 
ICS/SCADA security and governance faces additional challenges compared to the corporate networks, 
and critical systems may be left exposed. This research explored the increasingly complex cyber-war 
and cyber-espionage threat landscape, and illustrate cases where South Africa has been affected. 
Vulnerabilities and threats related to the ICS/SCADA environment in South Africa are discussed, 
compared to international vulnerabilities and threats. Suggested controls for addressing risks, 
vulnerabilities and threats relevant to ICS/SCADA in South Africa are discussed. Figure 1.1 is a 
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Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of Chapter 1 outline 
1.2 Background of the Study  
According to Stouffer, Falco and Kent (2006), Industrial control system (ICS) is a common name for 
various types of control systems which include Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems. ICS/SCADA systems are computers that control transportation systems, water and sewage 
systems and other critical infrastructure and industrial plants.  
A number of security incidents relate to ICS/SCADA world-wide. These incidents increased and 
became more sophisticated by the introduction of Stuxnet in 2010. Stuxnet exposed how vulnerable 
control systems are when it bypassed a number of security controls to cause physical damage to an 
Iranian nuclear facility. Recently more variants of Stuxnet, namely Flame, Gauss, Duqu (Nakashima 
& Warrick 2012; Nakashima, Miller & Tate 2012; Rodionov 2012) have been found as well as new 
malware including Havex/Dragon fly (Walker 2014) which are more advanced.  
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South Africa is lacking in cyber-security, and it is a growing risk to business in South Africa. Neither 
the government nor business are adding adequate resources to combat it (Jones 2014). State Security 
Minister David Mhlobo announced in 2015 that cyber-security and the government’s ability to combat 
cyber-crime would be a top priority in 2015 (Davis 2015). 
Internationally there are control frameworks in place, however in South Africa new legislation is being 
released e.g. POPI as well as existing legislation and frameworks such as the King III Report and 
requirements for Public Sectors such as the Minimum Information Security Standard (MISS) that 
needs to be taken into consideration. South Africa is falling behind in cyber-security, therefore there 
is a concern in securing ICS controlling key infrastructure critical to the South African economy.  
1.3 Research problem and aim of study 
There is no or limited information available as to the current state of ICS in South Africa including 
the factors influencing ICS and how they are governed. This research assessed the current practices 
and environment of ICS in South Africa, to develop a consolidated framework aligned to South Africa 
with consideration to new and existing legislation. There are limited academic studies done for South 
Africa by Chileshe and van Heerden (2012) and Wolfpack (2016) therefore this study will fill this gap. 
1.4 Justification 
ICS/SCADA Security is still a growing field in South Africa and has not as yet been fully established. 
As mentioned in Section 1.3, this study is intended to fill a gap of limited academic studies done in 
the South African context. This study assessed what the current state of ICS/SCADA Security in South 
Africa is and develop an ICS/SCADA control framework to address common concerns by taking into 
account new and existing legislation. This ICS/SCADA control framework will enable organisations 
to improve security and governance of their ICS/SCADA systems which will lead to greater 
availability and reliability of computer systems running their operations. 
1.5 Research Questions and Objectives 
The aim of the research is broken down into the following research questions and objectives. 
1.5.1 Research Questions 
The research questions underpinning this study are: 
 What are the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing ICS/SCADA security in South 
Africa?  
 What are the best measures to govern these factors that influence ICS/SCADA security in 
South Africa?   
 What is the impact of non-governed ICS/SCADA? 
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 How are ICS/SCADA secured and governed? 
 What are the perception of the suitability of the implemented controls/measures to mitigate 
the treats and risks? 
 What would an ideal framework be given the results of the previous question? 
1.5.2 Research Objectives  
The objectives of this study are: 
 To determine the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing ICS security in South Africa.  
 To determine what the best mitigating controls to govern and secure ICS/SCADA systems in 
South Africa are. 
 To determine the impact of non-governed ICS. 
 To determine how ICS in South Africa are secured and governed. 
 To establish if the confidence levels of implemented controls/measures mitigating the threats 
and risks are sufficient. 
 To develop a control framework addressing the shortfalls for ICS security in South Africa. 
1.6 Significance and Contribution of the Study  
This study provides a unique South African view point. ICS/SCADA security is still a growing field 
in South Africa and have not yet been fully established. As mentioned in Section 1.3, there are limited 
academic studies done in South Africa and this contributes by providing this knowledge.  A 
governance and security control framework taking into consideration the threats, vulnerabilities and 
risks related to ICS/SCADA in South Africa was proposed.  
1.7 Summary of Methodology 
Exploratory research and design research was used for the process of designing a control framework. 
A mixed methods approach was used underpinned by the research tools: quantitative instruments 
include questionnaire, system data, and secondary data from document analysis; and qualitative tools 
include document analysis and Shodan, an open source tool used as a search engine for internet 
connected devices. 
A cross-sectional study was done to determine the state of ICS/SCADA in South Africa at a single 
point in time. The sample size for the questionnaire was at minimum 30 people across various 
professional organisations and companies running ICS/SCADA systems, these include Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and a large State Owned Company (SOC). Data 
collected from questionnaires was analysed using descriptive statistics, and documents was analysed 
using thematic analysis. Shodan was used to collect data on ICS/SCADA systems. Tools such as Excel 
was used for the coding and summarising process. 
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The study used elements of the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Protection Motivation 
Theory (PMT) to develop a conceptual framework. The results of the questionnaires, questions, data 
analysis and decisions formed part of the input in the methodology to develop a control framework to 
address the gaps. 
1.8 Limitations 
It was difficult to determine the exact population as there are limited studies on governance and 
security of ICS/SCADA in South Africa conducted and difficult in determining the individuals with 
ICS/SCADA knowledge. The questionnaire was sent out to the broader community (refer to Section 
1.7) and a question was included upfront to determine the relevance of the respondents. From the 
document analysis, inconsistency of reports from Security vendors were discovered. This includes 
differences between current and previous year’s categories as well as different categorisation used 
between the various vendors. This complicated the overall analysis and could lead to some bias 
towards certain vulnerabilities and threats. Although this might have a small implication on the study, 
this might impact someone in the industry trying to use various reports to determine the top 
vulnerabilities and might wrongly place emphasis on non-prevalent vulnerabilities. 
1.9 Publications 
This is a Masters by dissertation, however the following publications emanated from the research:  
 Academic journal: Pretorius, B., & Van Niekerk, B., 2016, ‘Cyber-Security for ICS/SCADA: 
A South African Perspective’, International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism 
(IJCWT) 6(3), pp 1 – 16. Available from http://www.igi-global.com/article/cyber-security-
for-icsscada/159880; 
 Academic conference: Pretorius, B., & Van Niekerk, B., 2015, ‘Cyber-Security and 
Governance for ICS/SCADA in South Africa’, in The Proceedings of the 10th International 
Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security, Academic Conferences and Publishing 
International Limited, UK, pp 241-251; 
 Practitioner conference: Pretorius, B., & Van Niekerk, B., 2015, ‘Cyber-Security and 
Governance for ICS/SCADA in South Africa’, ISACA South Africa Annual Conference 2015; 
and  
 Invited presentation: Pretorius, B., & Van Niekerk, B., 2016, ‘Cyber-Security and Governance 
for ICS/SCADA in South Africa’, KPMG CIO Agenda June 2016. 
1.10 Structure of dissertation 
This dissertation consisted of seven chapters (including this chapter). This chapter introduced the study 
and described the research approach. Chapter 2 presented a literature review on ICS/SCADA. Chapter 
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3 discussed the research methodology and the research design that guided this study, while Chapter 4 
presented the quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Chapter 5 looked at various documents from 
local and international as well as network security device data and analysed and compared these. 
Chapter 6 presented a discussion based on the quantitative and qualitative data analysed and in relation 
to the secondary data analysis. Chapter 7 concludes the study by presenting the conclusions, the 
limitations, proposes areas for future research and a final conclusion. 
1.11 Summary 
Industrial control systems (ICS) and Supervisory, Control, and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems 
have evolved from operating in a relatively trusting environment to the current prevalence of public 
networks and evolving cyber-threat environment. ICS/SCADA is still a growing field in South Africa 
and no or limited information is available on the current state of these systems in South Africa.  This 
research aims at determining the factors influencing ICS/SCADA in South Africa, their impact, how 





Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory, control and data acquisition (SCADA) are terms that 
are often used to describe all forms of control systems and automation in industrial and process 
controls. However, this is not entirely accurate. It has been become practice that ICS is used as the 
general term, and SCADA is a subset of this and generally refers to systems that span a large 
geographic area (Byres 2012). These types of systems are often used in critical national infrastructure 
(Miller & Rowe 2012) such as pipelines and electric power generation and distribution (Chileshe & 
van Heerden 2012). These types of systems were being implemented using mechanical pneumatics 
prior to the advent of microelectronics, and the introduction of microcontrollers and microprocessors 
revolutionised the field (Byres). ICS/SCADA systems were originally separate from the corporate 
network and operated specialist communication protocols, however they slowly started implementing 
standardised protocols and were connected to the corporate networks and the Internet (Brodsky & 
Radvanovsky 2013; Miller & Rowe). Control systems were originally limited to a specific plant or 
site, however with the evolution of computing and networks there was a drive towards real-time 
monitoring and control of geographically separate sites. As the ICS/SCADA developed to 
interconnected systems with standard protocols, they became more vulnerable to attack (Brodsky & 
Radvanovsky; Krutz 2006). 
This chapter discusses information security and governance principles and incidents, then goes on to 
introduce ICS/SCADA environment and its components. International ICS/SCADA incidents are 
discussed as well as vulnerabilities and threats. The background of the research objectives, namely 
ICS/SCADA in South Africa is discussed as well as legislation and challenges. The chapter concludes 
by introducing a methodology on developing a control framework for ICS/SCADA in South Africa. 
The next chapter explores this methodology and the studies research methodology in more detail. 










































Figure 2.1: Graphical representation of Chapter 2 outline 
2.2 Information Security and Governance 
Security is when something is secured and free from risk or danger (Whitman & Mattord 2012:8). 
Security should similarly be applied to a company’s information assets which must be protected from 
all possible threats at all times in any form and in any condition. Protecting information from 
unauthorised use or access, interruption or destruction, alteration, leak, examination, or recording, 
regardless if it is electronic or physical, is also information security. 
Information Security refers to securing a company’s information assets. Securing information assets 
is not only about implementing usernames and passwords; it plays a significant part in the securing of 
a company’s intangible assets which also improves its business processes and increases stakeholder 
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confidence (Susanto, Almunawar & Tuan 2012: 67). Information security refers to the safeguarding 
of information, including critical elements such as systems, hardware, and storage of information, 
transport of information, people and processes involved. The safeguarding of information is achieved 
through the implementation of policies, procedures, awareness programs and training of users, as well 
as  information security tools or technology (Whitman & Mattord 2012:10). 
Information security requires a complete approach that includes every part of the company, (RSA 
2014). This can be achieved by performing active monitoring, detection of abnormal events and 
appropriate response to threats (Esri 2014:2). The following categories needs to work together to 
jointly secure a company’s information assets (Carroll, 2014: 12):  
1) Physical security and environmental controls: procedures to protect an organisation’s assets, and 
people from threats which include unauthorised physical access or natural disasters;  
2) Operations security: procedures to ensure the organisation can perform its operations with limited 
interruptions or compromises. This includes its ability to prevent, detect and recover from an incident 
or compromise such that normal operations can continue;  
3) Communications security: this include the protection of the organisation’s transport of data and 
media with supporting tools to enable its objectives;  
4) Network security: protection and monitoring of an organisation’s networks and devices to ensure it 
is used according to its purpose without compromise or downtime;  
5) Database security: protection of an organisation’s data stored in a database; and  
6) Storage security: this includes expert techniques to protect an organisation’s information in its 
storage area networks (Whitman & Mattord 2012: 8).  
Information Security Governance according to (Whitman & Mattord 2012:29-33), is agreed upon roles 
and responsibilities implemented by the board and executive management in order to provide and 
achieve strategic alignment of information security and business strategy, ensuring objectives are 
achieved and to mitigate and manage risks and threats to information resources. 
2.2.1 Information Security Triad 
Information Security is supported by the "CIA Model" or "CIA triangle" (Whitman & Mattord 
2012:11-13) that explains three aspects of information security that needs to be preserved. The 
following three aspects form the CIA Model: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I) and Availability (A). 
Confidentiality refers to the access of information or data (physical or electronic) and that only people 
that should have access to sensitive information or data and need to access it, have access. Anyone 
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else having access that should not have access is refer to as an unauthorised person. Confidentiality is 
breached when unauthorised persons either intentionally or unintentionally gain access to sensitive 
information that they should not have access to (Whitman & Mattord 2012:11-13). 
Integrity refers to the reliability of information or data (physical or electronic) which include complete, 
uncorrupted and uncompromised. The integrity of information or data is compromised when it is not 
complete or damaged, corrupted, compromised, or destroyed (Whitman & Mattord 2012:11-13). 
Availability refers to information or data being available to authorised users when required. This 
includes not only data but infrastructure as well. Availability is compromised when data, information 
or infrastructure is not available to authorised users when it should be (Whitman & Mattord 2012:11-
13).  
The CIA concepts needs to be taken into consideration when designing and building a secure system 
as well as improving existing systems. Depending on the type of information system, certain elements 
of CIA plays a more important role than others. For example, for operational systems availability is 
more crucial than confidentiality, where as a financial system, confidentiality and integrity is more 
crucial than availability. 
Mechanisms to ensure that user’s actions cannot be denied, is referred to as  non-repudiation, of which 
examples include sending an email, or signing a document. 
2.2.2 Vulnerability and Threats 
An organisation needs to identify risks, threats and vulnerabilities and adequately mitigate them to 
reduce the risk so that the organisation can have a successful information security strategy (Rhodes-
Ousley 2013). 
2.2.2.1 Vulnerability 
A vulnerability is a fault in a software program or program code that allows unauthorised modification 
or destruction of data, or single point of failure or misconfiguration which could result in the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information being compromised (Shahriar & Zulkcernine 
2012). 
2.2.2.2 Threat 
Exploiting a weakness in a current vulnerability is known as a threat (Dahbur, Mohammad & Tarakji 
2011:3). This could cause damage to the data and systems. A vulnerability could be used to gain 
unauthorised access to a company’s network, systems and ultimately sensitive data (Dahbur et al.). 
A company’s information assets are at all times under threat (Whitman & Mattord, 2012:11). An 
organisation needs to identify the threats and possible mitigating controls in order to reduce the risks 
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these threats represent to ensure correct balance of Information Security controls. Threats may differ 
from company to company and environment to environment. Threats should be classified, categorised 
and prioritised in order to adequately mitigate them. Someone who is acting out the threat is referred 
to as  a threat actor. 
2.2.2.3 Incident 
An incident is defined by Jones (2013:8-9) as an event that could include: 
 Unauthorised access to an organisation’s network and systems; 
 Unauthorised access to confidential information; 
 Virus/malware outbreak on an organisation’s systems or network; 
 Unauthorised interruption or denial of access to an organisation’s data or systems; and 
 Unauthorised or accidental destruction or altering of an organisation’s data. 
2.2.2.4 Risk 
According to the System Administration, Audit, Network and Security (SANS) SANS Institute (2006) 
risk is the possible damage that may arise from a current or future process. From an ICT perspective 
risk is the damage to a process or related information resulting from an intentional or unintentional 
event that negatively impacts the process or the related information. The process of understanding and 
responding to the factors that may lead to a failure in the Information Security triad or CIA of a system 
is called risk management. 
SANS Institute (2016) also defines Risk as a function of the likelihood of a given threat source’s 
exploiting a potential vulnerability, and the impact of that it has on an organisation. 
The general definition used to calculate risk is that risk is the product of the probability and impact 
(Boehm 1991):  
Risk = Probability x Impact 
The threats and vulnerabilities also need to be consider when calculating the risk. SANS Institute 
(2012) mentions that risk, threat and vulnerability needs to be used together and defines risk as 
follows:  
Risk = (probability x impact x threat x vulnerabilities)/countermeasures or controls 
2.2.3 Information Security Controls 
The following categories defined in Section 2.2, needs to work together to jointly secure the 
company’s information assets (Carroll, 2014: 12):  
 Physical security;  
 Operations security;  
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 Communications security;  
 Network security;  
 Database security; and  
 Storage security  
2.2.3.1 Types of Information security controls 
Information Security controls can be grouped into the following categories (Rhodes-Ousley 2013): 
 Preventative – This control will prevent threats before they exploit a vulnerability; 
 Detective – This control will discover or detect a threat that are busy occurring or have 
occurred; 
 Deterrent – These controls will discourage both insider and outsider attacks; 
 Corrective – Will restore the Integrity of information; 
 Recovery – Will restore the Availability of information; and 
 Compensative – Where another control fails, this control will protect. 
Multiple implementations of each of the information security control in the above categories needs to 
be considered in order to protect against different threats, (Rhodes-Ousley 2013): 
 Administrative Controls – Policies, procedures and standards defined and enforced by senior 
management; 
 Physical Controls – Controls that are physically present; 
 Logical/technical – Controls performed by software/technology; 
 Operational Controls – Control performed by people as part of operations; and 
 Virtual Controls – logical/technical controls that are triggered when certain situations occur. 
Table 2.1 provides examples of Information Security controls that fall within a particular category and 
method of implementation. 
Table 2.1 Information Security Control for different Threats 










Detective  Cameras, log 
book, alarm 





Deterrent Policies Signs, 
barbed wire 






Corrective HR penalties   Redundancy   






Compensative    Manual processes   
Adapted from: Rhodes-Ousley (2013) 
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2.2.3.2 Defence in Depth 
The basic principle of information security architectures is to implement layered security, this is 
referred to as defence in depth (Whitman & Mattord 2012). Defence in depth originated from a military 
term in which multiple layer of defence is used to protect something valuable from the enemy. This 
makes it more difficult for the enemy to attack. An example is a castle back in the medieval times. 
There are multiple layers used for defence. These include a moat, a draw bridge with water, high castle 
wall, a heavy steel gate and watchmen.  
This similar concept can be applied in securing sensitive information and protection a company’s 
information assets. It is an information security best practice to use Defence in depth. Defence in depth 
is achieved through implementing multiple layers of controls. Example data sitting in a database is 
encrypted with restricted access control via the application, the database and application is installed 
on a server running appropriate anti-virus software, the server sitting on a secure network behind a 
firewall and in a secure physical location. Figure 2.2 illustrates the Defence in depth concept. Rhodes-
Ousley (2013) also refers to this as the onion model. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Defence in Depth 
Adapted from: Sentrillion (2012) 
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2.2.3.3 Monitoring  
Threat management is a modern technique that is used every day to perform network security 
correlation. Data gathered from different sources needs to be correlated to identify relationships, 
patterns, and trends. A Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems of Security 
Intelligence Centre (SIC) can assist with this, can collect and aggregate the relevant data from the 
following sources: Firewall logs, Intrusion detection and prevention systems, Network device data and 
Operating system or application logs (Amoroso 2013). 
2.2.3.4 Capability Maturity Model 
Acohido (2015) states that a Capability Maturity Model (CMM) is generally used by a company to 
determine the maturity of their information security position and to improve their position. The CMM 
will determine the maturity of the processes and identify steps that are required to increase the maturity 
of these processes. There are normally five stages of the CMM (Acohido): 
 Level 1: Initial or Basic - Information security activities are ad hoc and in most cases, no 
formal information security program is in place. A very minimal or basic level of information 
security controls are in place; 
 Level 2: Developing or Evolving - Informal responsibilities are assigned to an individual who 
is developing an information security program, policies and procedures. Informal 
communication around information security issues are taking place. Information Security 
Controls are inconsistently applied; 
 Level 3: Defined or Established - Policies and procedures are defined, roles and 
responsibilities are defined but minimum accountability or enforcement; 
 Level 4: Managed or Advanced – Clear defined Information security roles and responsibilities 
with formal information security committee consisting of business and operations managers. 
Information Security Controls are consistently applied; and 
 Level 5: Optimising or Leading - Business have accepted the residual risk associated with 
their use of information and technology. Full accountability from business for information 
security failures or policy and procedure violations. There are continuous self-improvement 
processes in place that are regularly reviewed and updated. The company has an information 
security aware culture.  
CMM increases the efficiency and effectiveness of information security programs by focusing on 
comprehensive processes that can advance, develop to be more automated and become integrated into 




0 1 2 3 4 5
Initial Developing Defined Managed OptimisingNone
Current State Desired State
 
Figure 2.3: CMM example 
Adapted from: Acohido (2015) 
 
2.2.4 IT Security and Governance Frameworks 
Internationally there exist a couple of control frameworks to govern and secure IT in an organisation. 
The most common ones are: 
2.2.4.1 COBIT  
The Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) was first released by 
ISACA (2012) in 1996 to assist financial audit community to control and govern their IT 
environments. The latest version of COBIT, version 5 was released in 2012. This included a section 
on Information Security and how to oversee and manage it. 
2.2.4.2 ISO/IEC 27002 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) published the ISO/IEC 27002 as an information security standard to be used for 
corporate security (ISO/IEC 2013). According to Knapp (2011) that although the ISO/IEC 27002 
mentions protection of ICS/SCADA networks less specifically, it is useful as it maps directly to 
additional national standards of certain countries, including South Africa.  
2.2.4.3 ITIL 
The Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) was developed by the Central Computer 
and Telecommunications Agency (CCTA) as a set of best practices for IT service management.  
2.2.4.4 SANS 20 critical controls 
The SANS institute developed the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Critical Security Controls which 
are a list of recommended activities, which were developed from the most common attack patterns 
and provide exact and actionable ways to end the most persistent and dangerous attacks. The 
effectiveness of the controls has been tested across a comprehensive community of government and 
industry experts. (SANS 2016b) 
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2.2.5 Global incidents 
There have been a huge number of security incidents worldwide. The most notable ones in the last 
five years are: 
2.2.5.1 Sony 
Although Sony is more famous for the hack in 2014, the company was also compromised back in 
April and October 2011. Around 77 million users had their names, addresses and other personal, data 
stolen from the PlayStation Network and Sony Online Entertainment accounts (Quinn & Arthur, 2011) 
In November 2014, a devastating cyber-attack was launched on Sony Pictures. Malware written by 
hackers spread across Sony’s global network, destroying almost half of the network. The attackers 
even had an extraordinary deleting algorithm that overwrote the data seven different ways and the 
code destroyed each computer’s start-up software leaving the computer unusable (Elkind 2015). 
Valuable company data were stolen and leaked online. This included sensitive emails from executives, 
personal data from employees and copies of upcoming films. Sony’s co-chairman had to resign 
because of the hack (Groden 2015). 
2.2.5.2 Adobe 
In 2013 Adobe’s networks were breached by hackers. User information was stolen as well as the 
source code for certain Adobe programs. The user information includes email addresses and passwords 
for 150 million users, and credit card data for 2.9 million users (Howley 2015). 
2.2.5.3 Target 
In 2013, a Heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) contractor working within Target, had 
his credentials compromised (Riley, Elgin, Lawrence & Matlack 2014). The credentials were used by 
hackers to gain access to Target’s network resulting in over 40 million credit and debit card numbers, 
and 70 million consumer email addresses being stolen. The CEO Gregg Steinhafel resigned and Target 
had to settle a class-action lawsuit for $10 million. (Howley 2015) 
2.2.5.4 eBay 
In May 2014, hackers gained access to eBay’s network via compromised employee login information 
resulting in more than 145 million user data being stolen (Howley 2015). Although information such 
as login credentials, encrypted passwords, email addresses and physical addresses was stolen, no 
payment information was compromised (Groden 2015). 
2.2.5.5 Anthem 
In March 2015, a healthcare insurer, Anthem was hacked by suspected Chinese government-sponsored 
hackers (Howley 2015). Around 80 million customer’s Social Security numbers, employment details, 
and other personal information was stolen. Luckily no medical data was compromised. (Groden 2015). 
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2.2.5.6 Ashley Madison 
In August 2015, hackers stole and revealed online the information of 32 million users of a dating 
website for married people wanting affairs (Groden 2015). The site has a policy of not deleting users' 
personal information (names, addresses, credit cards and search history), which left many users fearing 
that they might be blackmailed or publically shame. Speculations are still out on how the site was 
breach. Day (2015) speculate that it was either an inside or external threat or most likely a cross-site 
scripting vulnerability.  
2.2.5.7 U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
In 2015 login credentials from the employee of a third-party government contractor were stolen by 
hackers, suspected to be Chinese government-sponsored, and used to gain access to the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management systems (Howley 2015). This resulted in U.S. government employees having 
their Social Security numbers and other personal information being compromised.  
2.2.6 South African Information Security 
Norton Rose Fulbright (2012) indicated there is an increase in Phishing attacks in South Africa. South 
Africa is the second most targeted country for such attacks. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
ranked South Africa 11th out of 50 countries that reported Internet based complaints in 2014 (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2014). Cyber-crime in South Africa is regarded as a priority crime by the 
Directorate of Priority Crime, also known as the Hawks (Hubeschle 2011). 
According to IT News Africa (2016), 8.8 million South Africans have fallen victim to cyber-crime 
and Vicente (2016) indicated South Africa is the top cyber-crime target in Africa. Cyber-crime has 
cost the South African economy around R35 billion in 2015 (Chiloane 2016) as South African 
organisations are unprepared and ill-equipped to handle emerging cyber-threats. They also rely on 
outdated protection strategies (Alfreds 2016). 
2.2.7 South African Incidents 
There have been numerous cyber-attacks or incidents in South Africa. Below some of the more notable 
ones in the last five years are discussed in this section: 
2.2.7.1 The National Department of Water Affairs 
In June 2011 the National Department of Water Affairs systems got hacked via password fraud causing 
the Department to lose R2.84 million (Patrick 2016). 
2.2.7.2 South African Postbank 
The South African Postbank’s financial systems was hacked in January 2012. R42 million was stolen 
via mule accounts (Rasool 2012). 
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2.2.7.3 South African Police Service 
The South African Police Service (SAPS) had their website hacked to reveal the personal details of 
almost 16 thousand whistle-blowers. This was in retaliation for the Marikana shootings. In addition, 
hundreds of SAPS personnel had their names, ranks and contact details leaked by the hacker (Roane 
2013). 
2.2.7.4 Gautrain Management Agency bank account 
In November 2014, the Gautrain Management Agency bank account was hacked and came close to 
being robbed of R800 million (Patrick 2016). 
2.2.7.5 Eskom’s payroll system 
Eskom’s payroll system was almost hacked in November 2014, by two of its employees but was foiled 
by the Hawks. (Patrick 2016). 
2.2.7.6 Road Traffic Management Corporation bank account 
In October 2015, the Road Traffic Management Corporation’s bank account was hacked and R8.5 
million was stolen by hackers (Mkhwanazi 2015). Five people believed to be part of a syndicate were 
arrested for fraud and corruption. 
2.2.7.7 Anonymous Africa DDoS 
A hacker called Anonymous Africa, performed a distributed denial of service DDoS attack on the 
African National Congress (ANC) and Independent Online (IOL) websites in June 2013 and the South 
African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) website in June 2016 by taking them offline (Vermeulen 
2016b). This was in retaliation over a decision by SABC not to broadcast violent protests and the ANC 
for being one of Mugabe’s “biggest enablers”.   
Also in June 2016, Anonymous performed DDoS attack on Gupta owned websites including The New 
Age (newspaper), ANN7 (news channel), and Sahara and Oakbay Investments (Solomon 2016). This 
was a statement by the hacktivist group against corrupt parties and corporations. 
2.2.7.8 Anonymous Operation Africa (#OpAfrica) 
The hacker group Anonymous hacked the Government Communications and Information Services 
(GCIS) database in early 2016. They hacker group released personal details of 1500 employees 
including their names, email addresses, phone numbers and password hashes as part of “Operation 
Africa” or #OpAfrica. The Operation Africa is said to focus on internet censorship and child labour 
(Vermeulen 2016a). In July 2016, Armscor, which is the acquisition organisation for the South African 
Department of Defence, was hacked. The hacker group Anonymous hacked their website to breach 
the settlement and invoicing system. Details of access to 19 938 supplier IDs, names and their 
passwords has been leaked (Fripp 2016; Van Zyl 2016). The hacktivists used a simple SQL injection 
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to hack and breach the data. This was part of the hacktivists plan to target corrupt African governments 
as Armscor was in the news related to a contentious tender for a VIP Aircraft for the South African 
government.  
2.3 ICS/SCADA environments 
This section provides an overview of ICS/SCADA systems and discuss the differences between 
ICS/SCADA environments and traditional IT networks. Previous versions of this section was 
published as an academic journal in the International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism 
(IJCWT) in July 2016 (Pretorius & Van Niekerk 2016) and the 10th International Conference on 
Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS) on 24 and 25 March 2015 (Pretorius & Van Niekerk 2015). In 
addition, aspects of this literature was also presented at the ISACA South Africa conference in August 
2015, and KPMG Chief Information Officer (CIO) Agenda in June 2016. 
2.3.1 Overview 
Industrial control system (ICS) is a common name for various types of control systems (Stouffer, 
Falco & Kent 2006), these include Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition or known as SCADA 
systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and other smaller components such as Programmable 
Logic Controllers (PLC). These systems are mostly found in the critical infrastructure and industrial 
sectors. ICS/SCADA are normally used in industries such as oil and gas, automotive, chemical, food, 
transportation, water, electrical, pharmaceutical, paper, and certain manufacturing. These systems are 
key and critical to the operations of these industries.  
According to Stouffer et al. (2006), SCADA systems are dispersed systems used to control 
geographically distributed equipment, sometimes scattered over couple of square kilometers, where 
data acquisition and control are centralised and critical to the operations. They are used to control 
systems such as transportation systems, electrical power grids, water and sewage systems, and 
pipelines transporting chemicals. 
2.3.1.1 ICS/SCADA components 
There are various devices within an ICS/SCADA environment that make up the system. These range 
from sensors in the field that collect data or information, the systems that distribute them and store 
them to systems that allow human or user interaction to monitor, change and control operations.  
Below are some of the more common components: 
 RTUs – Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is often housed in a substation or remote part of the 
plant. RTUs aim is to monitor field devices and transmit the data to next level device and 
finally to a central station that is monitored (Knapp 2011).  
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 MTU – Master Terminal Unit is a central located unit that collects data normally from RTU 
and feed it through to a central station (Knapp 2011). 
 PLCs – Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) is a specialised machine, similar to a 
computer, which are used to automate functions within an ICS/SCADA network. They are 
specially configured for specific inputs and outputs, generally from field devices (Knapp 
2011). 
 HMI - The Human Machine Interface (HMI) is a physical control panel that allows users to 
monitor, change or configure settings of the underlying process. (Stouffer, Phillitteri, 
Lightman, Abrams, Hahn 2015). 
 Supervisory workstations – These workstations run generally on Windows operating 
systems and give the user a graphical overview of the ICS/SCADA environment. These can 
sometimes be the central station from where operations are monitored and controlled (Knapp 
2011). 
 Data Historians – Data Historians are specialised software that stores the collected values 
and information in a database build for this purpose. Data points that are stored in the Historian 
are sometime referred to as tags. These can contain anything from frequencies of motors, 
temperatures to weights or cargo (Knapp 2011).  
 Other components – Field devices are sensor, devices in the field that provide input or output 
to either PLCs or RTUs. These devices can be anything from a sensor that measures weight 
or temperature to a motor that control the frequency of motors. These are also referred to as 
an intelligent electronic device (IED) (Knapp 2011). There are also other components such as 
industrial network switch which are used to convert industrial protocols to IT protocols. 
Physical access scanners, printers, routers, and wireless routers are also found in ICS/SCADA 
environments. 
    
2.3.1.2 ICS/SCADA Communication 
ICS/SCADA components are connected to each other through a local area network (LAN) and 
information or communication takes place via certain protocols. Certain protocols use designated 
ports. A port is an end point of network communication and has a close relationship with an IP address 
and communication protocol. Different services use different ports. In most cases the ICS/SCADA 
network protocols are not standardised and are considered to be manufacturer-proprietary (Project 
SHINE, 2014).  
ICS/SCADA protocols are real-time communication protocols, designed to interface and connection 
between ICS/SCADA systems and components via the designated ports. There are dozens of 
protocols, however the following protocols and ports are the most common: 
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 Modbus (Port 502) – Modbus is the oldest and most common used ICS/SCADA protocol. 
Modbus is commonly used for communication between PLCs and HMIs, however can be used 
between any I/O device, sensors and other communication devices. Modbus typically lacks 
authentication, encryption and checksum (Knapp 2011). Modbus uses the Transport 
Communication Protocol (TCP) and the port that is most often used is Port 502 (Project 
SHINE 2014). 
 Siemens/ICCP (Port 102) – The Inter Control Center Protocol (ICCP) is a protocol used for 
communication between control centers within the energy industry (Knapp 2011). ICCP also 
lacks authentication and encryption. Siemens use Port 102 for remote programming and PLC 
connections via the Ethernet (Project SHINE, 2014). 
 DNP3 (Port 20000) – The Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) us mainly used for 
communication between master control stations and remote or slave devices. It is more 
common in the electricity and water industries (Project SHINE 2014). The authentication and 
encryption is not inherent within DNP3. There are a number of vulnerabilities due to the 
complexity of the protocol. The Port 20000 is dedicated to DNP3 (Knapp 2011).  
 Ethernet/IP (Port 44818) – Ethernet/IP uses the standard Ethernet frames and combines it 
with the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) to communicate (Knapp 2011). Ethernet/IP is 
used in most industries including automotive, manufacturing, and hybrid (Project SHINE 
2014). Ethernet/IP is a real time Ethernet protocol and contains vulnerabilities. Ethernet and 
IP security, similar to that of an IT network, is required at the perimeter (Knapp). 
 BACNet (Port 47808) – BACNet is a protocol used for communication in building 
automation. This includes air conditioners and heating, light controls, access controls, and fire 
detection systems. It uses Port 47808 for communication between building automation 
devices.  
2.3.2 Differences between ICS/SCADA and Traditional IT Networks 
There are a number of differences between ICS/SCADA networks and traditional IT networks (those 
used in enterprises or corporations), which often result in challenges for managing the information 
security of the ICS/SCADA networks. The summary of differences described by Neitzel and Huba 
(2014) are in the sections 2.3.2.1 to 2.3.2.10: 
2.3.2.1 Different security objectives 
Ensuring confidentiality is often the primary focus on many IT networks whereas availability is the 
primary focus of information security in ICS/SCADA networks. 
2.3.2.2 Network topology and segmentation 
ICS/SCADA systems are usually much smaller than IT networks with static configurations instead of 
dynamic. Therefore, the use of Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP) and Wi-Fi is not encouraged. 
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ICS/SCADA networks should not have access to internet or email, and should be segregated from 
corporate IT networks, either standalone or via a firewall. Traditionally IT networks are segmented 
into subnets. 
2.3.2.3 Functional partitioning 
The bulk of corporate IT networks will be segregated by administration function (e.g. finance, HR). 
ICS/SCADA is partitioned into three levels:  
 The physical process; 
 The intelligent devices and sensors; and 
 The control systems which are described by the ANSI/ISA95 Purdue reference model (Control 
Global 2008).  
ICS/SCADA devices need to be in separate network zones according to their security and access 
requirements. 
2.3.2.4 Physical components and impact 
Although ICS/SCADA systems use standard operating systems and computer hardware to run 
software applications, they often fall outside the domain of IT. The ICS/SCADA applications are 
either custom built or vendor specific and could possible cause a conflict with the information security 
controls defined by IT security policies. This often requires the information security controls to be 
vendor specific.  
2.3.2.5 Default passwords 
Often it is found that default passwords are hard coded into applications or hardware, allowing easy 
access, but also opens a big security hole (Paganini 2013). A list of hardcoded and default passwords 
is freely available making it easier for threat actors or hackers to exploit the ICS/SCADA systems 
should passwords still remain default or appropriate controls not be in place. The list of hardcoded 
and default passwords was compiled by SCADA Strangelove (2015). This is discussed and analysed 
in Section 5.5. 
2.3.2.6 User account management 
Users of IT systems are often controlled by administrators through Active Directory or similar 
mechanisms which contain a specific list of users for the operating system and application. 
ICS/SCADA use more of a role-based type of access control to grant users access to ICS/SCADA 
systems, devices and data. Possible roles include maintenance engineers, process engineers and 




2.3.2.7 Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) 
Safety is an essential aspect of any plant operation, and these systems are responsible for ensuring 
safety by placing any process into a safe state if it is detected that the conditions of the process could 
threaten safety. SISs are distinct from ICS/SCADA systems but they can be integrated. The SIS 
network and components are proprietary and should be securely isolated or segmented from the ICS 
network. There is no equivalent system under traditional IT networks.  
2.3.2.8 Patch management and untested software 
ICS/SCADA systems are typically implemented to a specific operating system version and hardware 
configuration; changing either of these might result in the ICS/SCADA system not functioning 
properly. This requires all updates to be thoroughly tested with the ICS/SCADA system prior to 
approval for implementation. Similarly, patching and antivirus updates for ICS needs to be tested and 
approved. Due to the disruption to operations, scheduling and validation is also required to ensure safe 
and repeatable control. Updates and patching are therefore not done on operational ICS/SCADA 
systems at the same time as the IT patching schedule. There is also the problem that many ICS/SCADA 
systems are based on outdated operating systems such as Windows XP, where patches are no longer 
available as the operating system is no longer supported. The obsolescence stems from the fact that 
ICS/SCADA systems have a lifecycle of 15-30 years, which exceeds that of many commercially 
available computer operating systems (Pella 2013). 
2.3.2.9 Security inconveniences 
Information Security is more often found to be an inconveniences in the ICS/SCADA environment 
especially if it may result in a decrease in performance. Long passwords may hinder access in an 
emergency and Information Security should not affect alerts or alarms. The focus is more on 
Availability than on Confidentiality. 
2.3.2.10 Other differences 
Other differences between ICS/SCADA and IT networks include:  
 No clear ownership. ICS/SCADA is often not controlled by Information Technology (IT) 
department but by an engineering or maintenance department, often referred to as Operational 
Technology (OT). Often these parties do not communicate or collaborate information or 
leverage of each other’s skills. These two departments, IT and OT, work in silos, do not share 
knowledge with each other and do not trust each other. Both parties like to take credit for 
SCADA, but not ownership (Pretorius & Van Niekerk 2016);  
 Removable media (USB drives, DVDs/CDs, external drives) is part of daily operations in an 
IT department but pose a big risk when introduced to an ICS/SCADA environment. Amoroso 
(2013) indicates that removable media devices such as removable storage should be restricted 
in areas that have critical components of telecommunications infrastructure; similarly, 
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ICS/SCADA components of critical infrastructure should have limited exposure to removable 
media and mobile computing devices, as these could accidentally bypass security mechanisms 
and introduce malware or viruses. Most often ICS/SCADA systems does not have antivirus 
or have outdated antivirus and malware or viruses are not detected (Pretorius & Van Niekerk 
2016); 
 Inventory of ICS/SCADA components and network diagrams are generally outdated or not as 
comprehensive as IT network diagrams. In some cases, the networks, components, and safety 
systems are not even documented (Pretorius & Van Niekerk 2016); 
 Physical security and environmental for ICS/SCADA differ from traditional IT networks. 
ICS/SCADA equipment most often resides in operational areas such as substations, cranes, 
conveyors, and haulers, which do not conform to best practices for IT server rooms. There are 
also additional environmental elements that needs to be considered, such as dust and 
protection thereof (Pretorius & Van Niekerk 2016); and 
 Wireless communications are a point of debate: it is best to not use Wi-Fi for ICS/SCADA as 
these extents the range of attack, e.g. an attacker can sit outside the plant and hack the 
ICS/SCADA systems. However, in some ICS/SCADA environments there exist other 
wireless networks or wireless links, such as radio links and point to point wireless connections. 
Unfortunately, most of these wireless networks/link either use weak encryption mechanisms 
or old technology (Pretorius & Van Niekerk 2016). 
2.4 ICS/SCADA Governance and Security 
This section discusses the various ICS/SCADA governance and security controls and frameworks that 
exist, cyber-security incidents involving industrial control and related systems, the vulnerabilities and 
threats related to ICS/SCADA environments. Similarly to Section 2.3, aspects of this section were 
previously published or presented as outlined.  
2.4.1 ICS/SCADA Control Frameworks 
There are various international governance and security frameworks related to ICS/SCADA systems. 
This section provides a brief introduction to each security framework and are analysed in more detail 
in Section 5.4. The frameworks described in this section are:  
2.4.1.1 NIST SP800-82 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) special publication 800-82, published a 
Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security in 2006 (Stouffer et al. 2006). This provides 
guidance for establishing secure ICS/SCADA environments. The latest revision was released in 2015 




The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) published a standard 
called, Protecting Industrial Control Systems: Recommendations for Europe and Member States. 
(ENISA 2011). ENISA conducted a research and survey-based study to obtain the current perspective 
of ICS/SCADA protection for Europe, but including international environments. This includes threats, 
risks and challenges related to ICS/SCADA security. From the study they proposed seven 
recommendations for Europe and Member states in securing ICS.  
2.4.1.3 CPNI framework.  
The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is the United Kingdom government 
authority which provides advice on securing national infrastructure to organisations (CPNI 2008). The 
CPNI published a framework, Good Practice Guide: Process Control and SCADA Security, to provide 
best practice principles for process control and SCADA system security.  
2.4.1.4 Others 
 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks - The U.S. Department of Energy 
(2007) and President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board developed this guide 
containing 21 steps to assist any organisation to improve their security for ICS/SCADA 
networks; 
 NERC CIP – The North American Electric Reliability Corporation’s (NERC) Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) contains standards and security measures for protecting the 
North American bulk electric systems and it carry heavy fines for non-compliance (Knapp 
2011); and 
 Safeguarding Australia from Cyberterrorism: A Proposed Cyber-terrorism SCADA Risk 
Framework for Australia - Beggs and Warren (2008) propose a risk framework to assess 
Australian SCADA systems threats from cyber-terrorism. The framework integrated a cyber-
terrorism capability assessment model with Australasian standards for SCADA risk 
assessments. 
Figure 2.4 shows a high level comparison between the NIST, CPNI, and the frameworks from Section 
2.2.4, namely COBIT 5 and ISO/IEC 27002. This shows at a high level how they align and which 




Figure 2.4: Alignment of Information Governance and Security Frameworks for SCADA 
Source: Author compilation  
2.4.2 Threats, vulnerabilities and attack methods against ICS/SCADA 
In order to develop a comprehensive control framework that addressed the relevant risks, one has to 
look at the threats, vulnerabilities and risks related to the ICS/SCADA environment. The Centre for 
the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI 2008) list the following threat sources that should be 
considered at minimum:  
 Hackers;  
 Criminals; 
 Internal attackers;  
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 Staff undertaking unauthorised actions;  
 Disgruntled staff;  
 Illegal information brokers;  
 Corporate intelligence;  
 Terrorists; 
 Organised crime; 
 Foreign intelligence services; and  
 Protesters and activists (environmental, political, animal rights).  
The CPNI (2008) also list the following threat types that should be considered: Malware (including 
viruses, Trojans, worms, backdoors, bots and spyware); loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability 
(denial of service); hackers (internal, external, external with insider knowledge); and unauthorised 
control.  
The SANS Institute (2013) performed a survey and list the top 5 threat vectors as:  
 Malware;  
 Internal threats; 
 External threats;  
 Phishing; and  
 Industrial espionage. 
To determine if any vulnerabilities exist and to fully understand vulnerabilities, a detailed assessment 
of all the system components, (e.g. servers, workstations, network infrastructure) need to be performed 
(CPNI 2008). Table 2.2 provides a list of common vulnerabilities as listed by CPNI (2008), National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (2014) and Stamp, Dillinger, Young and 
DePoy (2003). These vulnerabilities relate to administration, network architecture, devices and 
platforms. If problems exist with the SCADA security policy, this could lead to poor administrative 
procedures and vulnerabilities in the SCADA system. Each vulnerability has a significant impact on 
the SCADA operations (Stamp et al. 2003).  
According to the 2014 and 2015 Internet Security Threat Reports, (Symantec 2014a, 2015), the 
number of newly discovered public SCADA vulnerabilities have decreased from 129 in 2011 to 85 in 
2012 and a significant decrease to 39 in 2013 and 35 in 2014. This decrease could be due to attention 
that has been placed on SCADA security following the discovery of the Stuxnet worm in 2010. Denial 
of service (DoS), buffer overflow and information disclosure vulnerabilities account for over 60% of 
the detected vulnerabilities in 2014 and 2015. Detailed analysis is discussed further in Section 5.2.1.  
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Table 2.2: Common Vulnerabilities 
Category  Vulnerability  
User and Device 
Access Management 
There are no password controls (password length, complexity, passwords don’t 
expire etc.) 
Passwords are often stored in plain sight near critical systems. 
Passwords are not encrypted in transit. 
Passwords are shared. 
Power-on and screen saver passwords are not used.  
Minimal administrative access controls are applied. Users have administrator 
privileges. 
Patch Management Operating System, Database and Application security patches are not updated. 
Configuration 
Management 
No backup or documentation of configurations for network device, equipment and 
platforms.  
No resilience and continuity of systems. 
Default Operating Systems, Databases and Application configurations are used, 
which enables insecure and unnecessary services. 
Network 
perimeter/Connections 
to other systems 
 
SCADA networks are directly connected to IT or corporate networks. Firewalls 
are non-existent or poorly configured at interfaces to IT or corporate networks. 
SCADA networks are used for non-SCADA traffic, e.g. CCTV.  
Dial-up access exists on individual workstations within the SCADA network. 
Monitoring & Logging  
System logs are neither collected nor reviewed. 
There is no security monitoring on the SCADA network.  
Firewall and router logs are neither collected nor reviewed. 
Remote Access  
Authentication for remote access is insufficient or non-existent.  
Remote access into the SCADA network uses shared passwords and shared 
accounts.  
Physical Security 
There is not proper physical protection of equipment (network, platforms and 
devices).  
Physical access to equipment is not restricted to critical personnel only. 
Environmental controls are not considered. 
Wireless Connections  
Wireless LAN technology used in the SCADA network do not have strong 
authentication. 
Wireless connections use default configuration/passwords and/or no data 
protection between clients and access points.  
Anti-virus/Malware 
Protection  
Antivirus software does either not exist or is outdated. 
Removable media is used and not scanned with antivirus or scan with outdated 
antivirus software.  
Adapted from: CPNI (2008), National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (2014), 
(Stamp et al, 2003) 
This shows the importance that the availability characteristic of information plays in the SCADA 
environment. SCADA systems can be classified as high availability systems. Availability enables 
SCADA systems to be provide information, when needed, without interference or obstruction to 
authorised users in the right format (Whitman & Mattord 2012). In order to ensure availability of 
SCADA systems, denial of service attacks must be stopped.  
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2.4.3 ICS/SCADA incidents 
A number of ICS/SCADA security incidents have been recorded. The most notable of these are: 
2.4.3.1 Malware  
In 2003 the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant’s Safety Parameter Display System and Plant Process 
Computers were disabled for a few hours due to a SQL Slammer infection as a result of an unpatched 
machine (Chileshe & van Heerden 2012; Miller & Rowe 2012). The CSX Corporation had a number 
of their systems shot down in 2003 due to the Sobig virus. This caused train delays and impact on the 
business (Miller & Rowe 2012). 
From 2010 to 2012 a series of malware variants, including the infamous Stuxnet and Flame malware, 
infected machines. These variants are reportedly related to Duqu and Gauss. Stuxnet affected 
programmable logic controllers, and resulted in physical damage to an Iranian nuclear facility 
(Nakashima & Warrick 2012; Nakashima, Miller & Tate 2012; Rodionov 2012). In June 2014 the 
Havex malware was reported to be collecting data from ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector 
(Walker 2014).  
The BlackEnergy malware was used to target the Ukrainian power grid and contained modifications 
to disrupt industrial control systems (Kovacs 2016). This was the first known instance where a cyber-
attack caused a blackout. The hackers gained access to the control systems via a SSH backdoor. 
2.4.3.2 Suspected foreign intelligence services  
 In 1982 a trans-Siberian pipeline exploded, alleged due to a logic bomb inserted into the control 
system design by the CIA. The explosion was reported to be 3kT TNT equivalent (Miller & Rowe 
2012; Weiss 2008; Andress & Winterfield 2011).  
Reports indicate that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline control systems were compromised in 2008, 
and this resulted in an explosion (Robertson & Riley 2014). Speciously hackers super-pressurised the 
crude oil in the pipeline and shut down alarms and communication to warn about this. They gained 
access to the alarm management system via a vulnerability in the camera communication software. A 
professor of the national security affairs at the US Naval War College stated this “rewrites the history 
of cyberwar.” 
2.4.3.3 Insider threat 
In 1992 an ex-employee who was fired, hacked into Chevron and disabled the emergency alert 
network. It was not detected until an actual emergency arose and the system failed (Miller & Rowe 
2012). In 1999 hackers with the aid of a disgruntled insider used a Trojan to access the controls for 
the Gazprom pipelines (Miller & Rowe 2012). 
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A disgruntled employee of the company supplying controllers to an Australian sewerage company, 
Maroochy Water System, gained remote access in 2000 to the sewerage system and released sewerage 
into the waterways in an attempt to get a job with the municipality (Abrams & Weiss 2008; Wyld 
2004). 
The Target breach was traced back to stolen third party credentials, where the vendor was a heating, 
ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) sub-contractor (Krebs 2014). This hack was discussed in 
more detail in Section 2.2.5. 
2.4.3.4 Hackers 
For over a month in 1994 a hacker used a dialup modem to gain access and install backdoors to access 
billing information of Salt River, however could also gain access to the monitoring and delivery 
systems for power and water. The attacker had a five-hour session connected to the canal control 
systems (Miller & Rowe 2012). 
In 2001 foreign hackers gained access to the California System Operator computer networks for two 
weeks, but were not able to access the PCS networks (Miller & Rowe 2012). Polish trams were 
derailed in 2008 due to a switching system being compromised and change using basic remote control 
electronics (Leyden 2008). Late in 2014 a blast furnace at a German steel mill was damaged after 
hackers obtained access to the mill’s control systems (BBC 2014). 
2.4.3.5 Vulnerabilities 
In September 2014 a vulnerability in the Bash shell of Linux was announced. This vulnerability 
allowed for remote code execution, and some SCADA systems were vulnerable. The full extent of 
device affected by the ShellShock bash bug is still not known. Siemens released an update for the 
SIMATIC PCS 7 to patch several vulnerabilities. The SIMATIC PCS 7 is affected by the 
vulnerabilities because of the software WinCC being incorporated into the product (Kovacs 2014). It 
was revealed in 2015 by researchers of the existence of vulnerabilities in SCADA components used 
in modern railways (Paganini 2016). 
2.4.3.6 Nuclear power plant 
The head of an international nuclear energy group indicated that a disruption at one of their nuclear 
power plants was caused by a cyber-attack (Brook 2016). 
2.4.3.7 Other incidents 
Whilst not necessarily compromising ICS/SCADA, have affected systems key to the operation of 
critical infrastructure and related organisations. These incidents include: 
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 Carmel Tunnels Toll Road – on 8 September 2013 a Trojan infected the Israeli toll plaza, 
specifically targeting the security camera system, hindering essential operations over two days 
and caused financial damage (Ashford 2013); 
 Saudi Aramco – on 15 August 2012 Saudi Aramco was forced to shut down its network due 
to a serious malware infection affecting approximately 30 000 machines, however the main 
operations systems were not affected (Leyden 2012; Mills 2012); 
 Conficker – in 2009 the Conficker worm affected a French military airfield, preventing aircraft 
from taking off, and British warships (Kirk 2009; Willsher 2009); 
 Antwerp port – in 2013 hackers used remote access devices to aid smuggling operations at the 
port; it is possible that the hackers could control the logistics system (Dunn 2013); 
 Oil rigs – in 2014 it was reported that an oil rig was disabled after hackers tilted it, and another 
was inoperable for 19 days due to malware infection (Wagstaff 2014); 
 Warsaw airport – in 2015 aircraft were grounded after a denial of service attack disrupted the 
network (Brook 2015); and 
 Researchers have demonstrated that many vehicles can be hacked if physical access can be 
gained, and once hacked some vehicles can be controlled (Higgins 2015). Another researcher 
reportedly compromised an aircraft’s controls by hacking the in-flight entertainment (Zetter 
2015). 
These incidents indicate that the threats against ICS/SCADA systems are real and not unnecessary 
panic. The following section outlines the vulnerabilities and the attacks methods that threats use to 
target them. 
2.5 ICS/SCADA in South Africa 
This section covers the ICS/SCADA implementations and relevant South African legislation and 
governance frameworks. Challenges in the South African environment are described. Similarly, to 
Section 2.3, aspects of this section were previously published or presented as outlined.  
2.5.1 SCADA Implementations in South Africa 
Chileshe and van Heerden (2012) listed where ICS/SCADA systems are implemented in South Africa 
and include Eskom, the mining and mineral processing industry, the sugar industry, and the Durban 
water recycling plant. Other ICS/SCADA environments include eThekwini/Durban Electricity 
(Online Tenders 2014), petro-chemical industry, the automotive industry, breweries, and transport 
industries (Gautrain, ports, railways and pipelines). The physical transport infrastructure also includes 
the airports operated by the Airports Company of South Africa, and the various toll roads, including 
e-Tolls. Krutz (2006) indicates that ports have SCADA systems in cranes, terminal equipment, and 
locks; railways contain signalling and control elements for waysides. 
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As many of these implementations are related to critical infrastructure upon which the South African 
economy is based, a major cyber-attack disrupting any of these process-driven industries could have 
drastic economic and secondary social consequences.  
In December 2009 a South Africa petro-chemical company’s SCADA systems were affected by the 
‘PE_Sality’ virus, resulting in the operators have to run the plant with limited of no visibility for eight 
hours before the infected servers were recovered (Cusimano 2010). 
The Wolfpack Information Risk team, recently conducted a survey in South Africa on Critical 
Infrastructure (Wolfpack 2016). This research was conducted independently and at the same time as 
this study was being conducted and the report, Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Report, 
was released in June 2016. A small section of the survey and report was dedicated ICS/SCADA 
systems while the rest of the survey and report was on Critical Information Infrastructure such as 
Information Security Governance and Risk Management, Legal Regulation and Compliance, Critical 
Access Management, Human Resource Management and Supplier Security, Physical (Environmental) 
Security, Security Architecture and Design, Telecommunications and Network Security, Access 
Control, Operational Security, Cryptography, Software Development and Application Security, and 
the National CII landscape. The Wolfpack survey was distributed to a different audience as this study 
and the number of participant related to the ICS/SCADA part could not be determined. The Wolfpack 
survey found that the top four threat vectors for ICS/SCADA systems are: Insider exploits, and 
combined secondly, External threats, Attacks originating within the internal network and Information 
security policy violations. Detailed analysis is discussed further in Section 5.2.5. 
2.5.2 South African Legislation and Governance Related to ICS/SCADA 
There are a number of legislation and governance frameworks specific to South Africa that relate to 
ICS/SCADA. The National Key Point Act deals with security of critical infrastructure or resources; 
there is a proposal to repeal this act and replace it with the Crucial Infrastructure Act. The Electronic 
Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act (Government of Republic of South Africa 2002a) sets 
out regulations for electronic communications, and provides outlines of basic security and prohibited 
actions. Prohibited actions include the intentional interference of electronic communications, which 
will apply to communications amongst SCADA systems and the various subcomponents.  
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information (RICA) Act (Government of Republic of South Africa 2002b) is also relevant to 
ICS/SCADA. Whilst the public focus of RICA has been on cellular phones, this act is applicable for 
ICS/SCADA environments where there are remote units that connect to the SCADA server via an 
Access Point Name (APN) or Virtual Private Network (VPN). As these units contain subscriber 
identity module (SIM) cards, they are required to comply with the RICA act. 
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The Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act (Government of Republic of South Africa 2013) 
requires the protection and safeguarding of personal as well as corporate data by ensuring safeguarding 
of the information. Certain ICS/SCADA systems host critical information on their databases and 
vendors may have access to this information or sensitive configuration information. In such cases it 
will be necessary for controls to be implemented to ensure compliance with the act. 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework provides for national and sector response teams, a 
National Cybersecurity Advisory Council, and other initiatives. Furthermore, a draft Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill (Government of Republic of South Africa 2015) has been released and could also 
have a potential impact on the ICS/SCADA environments in South Africa if enacted. King III is a 
corporate governance framework, which apportions accountability to the board and executives of the 
organisation. ICS/SCADA systems will need to be adequately governed in order to comply with the 
requirements. 
The acts discussed in this section may not be obliviously applicable to ICS/SCADA environments, 
however as is evident, under certain conditions they are applicable. Therefore, IT governance and 
security functions may in future be required to have more oversight into ICS/SCADA systems.  
2.5.3 Challenges  
The differences between SCADA and traditional IT discussed in Section 2.3.2 result in a number of 
challenges, which need to be taken into account when developing a control framework for South 
Africa. The outdated systems, particularly Windows XP which is no longer supported, makes 
implementing patching impossible, resulting in vulnerabilities that are difficult to mitigate. In addition, 
patching and security mechanisms often cannot be done on a live production environment, which 
limits the time period in which to do this. In some environments, there are only one or two days in the 
year in which the company’s operations or plant are not operational. 
ICS/SCADA often falls under the responsibility of engineering and not IT, therefore IT security has 
less influence over the systems. Therefore, there are extra challenges in achieving buy-off from all 
stakeholders, particularly given the other challenges and business impact described above. 
2.5.4 Framework development 
The framework development process consisted of a number of steps. The overall background needs 
to be understood, including the business environment, the systems, threats, and vulnerabilities (CPNI 
2008). The CPNI (2008) list the following steps in developing a framework: Understand the business 
risks → implement secure architecture → establish response capabilities → improve awareness and 
skills → manage third party risk → engage projects → establish ongoing governance. To fully 
understand the business risk, one has to understand the risks, threats, impact, and vulnerabilities.  
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The process can also be group together as displayed in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5: Framework development steps 
Adapted from: CPNI (2008) 
Before a control framework is developed, it is important for a company to understand the risk they 
face from likely compromises to ICS/SCADA systems. To fully understand the business risk, an 
organisation needs to start by understanding of the system or environment, then the threats, impact 
and vulnerabilities that could have an impact to the environment. Each of the steps from 
‘Understanding the business risks’ needs to be conducted as a step on their own. The following steps 
all from part of the framework development and is grouped thereunder: Implement secure architecture, 
establish response capabilities, improve awareness and skills, manage third party risk, engage projects 
and establish ongoing governance. This can be displayed in a process or methodology on developing 
a control framework, taking into account the above. The steps in the methodology is illustrated in 
Figure 2.6.  
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Figure 2.6: Framework Development Methodology 
Adapted from: CPNI (2008) 
 
2.5.4.1 Understand the system 
An organisation or company needs to conduct a formal inventory and analysis of the ICS/SCADA 
systems and components in the environment. This include the role of each system is, location, owner, 
management and support thereof, and business criticality CPNI (2008).  
2.5.4.2 Understand the threats 
The threats to ICS/SCADA environment needs to be fully evaluated. Examples include: hackers, 
viruses or malware, unauthorised control. Refer to Section 2.4.3 for list of threats to ICS/SCADA 
environment CPNI (2008). 
2.5.4.3 Understand the impact 
The impact and consequences that a threat could have to the ICS/SCADA environment should be 
understood and documented. This could include financial loss, loss of life, operations downtime, and 
reputational loss CPNI (2008). 
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2.5.4.4 Understand vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability assessments should be conducted for the ICS/SCADA environment to determine 
possible vulnerabilities.  Section 2.4.3 contains a list of possible vulnerabilities to ICS/SCADA 
systems CPNI (2008).  
2.5.4.5 Development of frameworks 
A control framework is developed based on the business risk assessment, which include the threats, 
impact and vulnerabilities to the ICS/SCADA environment. The framework should include technical, 
procedural and management controls to adequately protect the ICS/SCADA systems. The framework 
should also include: Implementation of secure architecture, establishment of response capabilities, 
improvement of awareness and skills, management of third party risk, project management and 
establishment of ongoing governance CPNI (2008). 
2.5.4.6 Review and monitoring 
It is important to regular review the above steps as any changes to systems, threats, impact or 
vulnerabilities will change the business risk and either render certain controls in the framework 
outdated or inadequate. Example an implementation of new technology such as LTE brings new risks, 
threats and vulnerabilities to the organisation and adequate mitigating controls needs to be 
implemented to cater for them. Ongoing monitoring of the environment needs to take place to identify 
any new systems changes, threats, vulnerabilities and corresponding update of the control framework 
should take place at minimum annually CPNI (2008).  
2.6 Summary 
Information Security, its risks and controls in general were discussed. Internationally cyber-crime has 
increased and in South Africa, millions have fallen victim to cyber-crime. Cyber-crime has cost the 
South African economy billions in 2015. The vulnerabilities and threats related specifically to 
ICS/SCADA were discussed. As is evident from the incidents that have already occurred, the 
ICS/SCADA environment can be targeted and can cause significant disruption.  
South Africa has a number of ICS/SCADA implementations in infrastructure that is crucial to the 
economy; it is therefore important that these are protected. Security in the SCADA environment face 
a number of challenges. There exist international control frameworks, which if organised with a 
defence-in-depth approach, may overcome these challenges and provide a sufficient level of protection 
to these ICS/SCAD systems. The methodology to develop control framework for ICS/SCADA was 




Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the research problem and the significance and contribution of the study. The 
research questions and research objectives are discussed. Methods of the research design are examined 
in relation to the research onion. The sampling strategies including the population, size, and data 
collection methods are explored. The data analysis and conceptual framework together with 
questionnaire design are mentioned.  Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of the outline of this 







































Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of Chapter 3 outline 
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3.1.1 Significance and Contribution of the study  
This study provides a unique South African view point. ICS/SCADA security is still a growing field 
in South Africa and has not as yet been fully established. There are limited academic studies done for 
South Africa (Chileshe & van Heerden 2012) therefore this study aimed to fill this gap.  
This study assessed the current state of ICS/SCADA security in South Africa and from the analysis 
an ICS/SCADA control framework was to address common concerns by taking into account new and 
existing legislation. This ICS/SCADA control framework will enable organisations to improve 
security and governance of their ICS/SCADA systems which will lead to greater availability and 
reliability of computer systems running their operations. 
3.2 Research Problem/Statement of the Problem  
There is no or limited information available as to the current state of ICS/SCADA in South Africa 
including the factors influencing ICS/SCADA and how they are governed. This research assesses the 
current practices of ICS/SCADA in SA, to develop a consolidated framework aligned to South Africa 
taken into account new and existing legislation.  
3.3 Research Questions and objectives 
3.3.1 Research Questions 
The research questions underpinning this study were: 
 What are the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing ICS/SCADA security in South 
Africa?  
 What are the best measures to govern these factors that influence ICS/SCADA security in 
South Africa?   
 What is the impact of non-governed ICS/SCADA? 
 How are ICS/SCADA secured and governed? 
 What are the perception of the suitability of the implemented controls/measures to mitigate 
the treats and risks? 
3.3.2 Research Objectives  
The objectives of this study were: 
 To determine the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing ICS/SCADA security in 
South Africa.  
 To determine what the best mitigating controls to govern and secure ICS/SCADA systems in 
South Africa are.   
 To determine the impact of non-governed ICS/SCADA. 
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 To determine how ICS/SCADA in South Africa are secured and governed. 
 To establish if the confidence levels of implemented controls/measures mitigating the threats 
and risks are sufficient. 
 To develop a control framework addressing the shortfalls for ICS/SCADA security in South 
Africa. 
3.4 Conceptual Framework 
Elements of Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
were used. TAM explains that technology cannot improve an organisations performance if they are 
not being used (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw 1989). This similar model relates to a governance 
framework, which cannot improve an organisations risk profile if it is not being used. In order to 
understand and predict user acceptance, one needs to better understand why technology/control 
frameworks are either accepted or rejected by people. TAM was previously used for cyber-security in 
a study by Cheng and Shi-bo (2014). 
The protection motivation theory was initially developed by Rogers (1975) to better understand the 
impact of fear appeals and how to cope with them. He later expand on the theory (Rogers 1983) where 
he expanded the theory to a general impact of persuasive communication. The PMT suggests 
protections based on the following factors: 
 The perceived severity of a threatening event (impact); 
 The perceived likelihood of the occurrence (probability) or threats and vulnerabilities; 
 The efficacy of the recommended preventive behaviour; and 
 The perceived self-efficacy. 
The protection motivation theory was used in a cyber-security study by Sommestad, Karlzen and 
Hallberg (2015) and recently in an information security study by Kinnunen (2016). 
The first two variables of PMT, (perceived severity of a threatening event and perceived likelihood) 
forming the Threat Appraisal and the latter (the efficacy of the recommended preventive behaviour 
and perceived self-efficacy) the Coping Appraisal. When combining this with the elements of TAM, 
the perceived usefulness (usability of security) and perceived ease-of-use (ease of use of security), the 
model as shown in Figure 3.2 is formed. In summary, the probability and impact (red blocks) and 
coping response (blue block) are from the PMT model. The usability of security (green block) from 






















Figure 3.2: Research Framework 
Source: Author compilation 
The general definition used to calculate risk is that risk is the product of the probability and impact. 
I.e. Risk = Probability x Impact. (Boehm 1991). The risk together with the threats and vulnerabilities 
(Red Blocks) creates the perceived susceptibility (Red Block). Combining the usability and the ease 
of use of security (Green Blocks) provides the security confidence (Green Block). The security 
confidence and perceived susceptibility is used to create the proposed coping response or ICS/SCADA 
control framework (Blue Block). 
3.5 Research Design 
3.5.1 Research Onion 
Researchers normally propose a piece of research to answer a question or address a problem. The 
researcher begins by determining what data are needed and then decide how they will obtain the data. 
Various techniques like questionnaires, observation and analysis can be used to obtain the data. The 
final decision about the overall research will only be represented by techniques used to obtain data, 
and the methods to analyse these data (Saunders & Tosey 2013). They used the representation of the 
‘Research Onion’ to illustrate how the final design (the inner layer of the research onion) needed to 
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be considered in relation to other design elements (the outer layers of the research onion). Figure 3.3 
is a representation of the proposed ‘Research Onion’ and the different design elements that were used 
to conduct this research. Each layer is discussed in Section 3.5.2. 
 
Figure 3.3: Research Onion for the Study 
Adapted from: Saunders and Tosey, 2013 
 
3.5.2 Research design 
The outer layers of the research onion consists of the exploratory research and design research. The 
design research, mainly focus on research around the process of design and developing from the work 
in the design methods. The concept is expanded to include research embedded within the process of 
designing a control framework. 
 A survey strategy is used. It offers a highly economical way of collecting large amounts of data to 
address who, what, where, when and how of the factors influencing the frameworks in South Africa. 
This strategy generated both rich and statistical data. 
A mixed methods approach was used for data collection and analysis, refer to research 
Approaches/Paradigms in Section 3.5.3. 
The next layer in the research onion is a cross-sectional study, which analyses data or responses from 
a survey at a specific point in time. This type of study is used as one of the research objectives is to 









determine the state of ICS/SCADA in South Africa and the cross-sectional study, which uses 
qualitative and quantitative research surveying both people and documents measured the state of 
SCADA/ICS in South Africa at a single point in time. 
The inner layer of the research onion includes decisions on the sample groups, and content of the 
questionnaires. The results of the questionnaires, questions, data analysis and decisions forms part of 
the input in the methodology to develop a control framework to address the gaps. 
3.5.3 Research Approaches/Paradigms 
There are two general categories of research methodologies; quantitative and qualitative. The first 
method, quantitative provides numerical predictions, percentages, frequency, occurrence, trends, and 
others (Patton 2005) whereas the latter, qualitative method describes data at an in-depth level, without 
data analysis or statistics and helps to understand how a person is thinking or why an event occurs. 
A mixed methods approach is used. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods are used in the 
process of the study, data collection and analysis. This includes questionnaires, systems data, results 
from Shodan and analysis of documents from security alerts and advisories. Using mixed methods 
assists to offset limitations and fill/predict gaps in data should these exist in the individual methods. 
A combination of exploratory and design research is used to develop the research or conceptual 
framework, refer to Section 3.4. 
3.5.4 Study Site  
South Africa is the area of study with specific focus on various professional organisations and 
companies running ICS/SCADA systems with a focus on South Africa. 
3.5.5 Data collection methods 
In the study, different documentary evidence was collected. Questionnaires was sent out using email 
to the target population, refer to Section 3.5.6. Documents such as existing frameworks, security alerts 
reports and trends was obtained. Data from Shodan (a tool to search for internet connected devices) 
and data from security systems was obtained and sanitised. The different collection methods are set 
out in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Data collection methods 
Source: Risk (Impact & 
Probability) 
Threat Vulnerability Security confidence (Ease 
of Use & Usability) 
Questionnaire Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Security system data  Yes Yes  
Shodan (open source 
tool) 
 Yes Yes  
Reports and security 
alerts and advisories 
 Yes Yes  
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3.5.6 Target Population 
The target population included information security, governance and SCADA/ICS professionals. The 
intent was to specifically focus on people with relevant SCADA/ICS experience in order to obtain 
valuable/useful information. The ISACA South Africa chapter, which is the largest IT security and 
governance professional body in the country, as well as a large SOC, both contain members with the 
relevant professional experience to participate in the questionnaires. The questionnaire was distributed 
to members of the ISACA community and the large SOC.  
3.5.7 Sampling Strategies 
A sample is a subset of the full population from which data is obtained by the researcher (Yin 2009). 
The sample of this study was selected from information security, governance and SCADA/ICS 
professionals who have experience with SCADA security. The questionnaire had a covering question 
to establish the experience of the respondent. 
As the number of organisations and professionals that have knowledge of ICS/SCADA systems was 
unknown, a sample size could not be determined upfront. A sample size for the questionnaires was 
anticipated to be at minimum 30 people across various professional organisations and companies 
running ICS/SCADA systems. These include ISACA and a large SOC, as mentioned in Section 3.5.6. 
These organisations were selected based on convenience of access. ISACA is the largest body of 
professionals with cyber-security and IT governance knowledge in South Africa and therefore there 
was a higher change of receiving valid responses.  
The sample for the document analysis was chosen by selecting common and freely available 
framework and standards related to Governance, Information security and ICS/SCADA. International 
best practices (e.g. standards from CPNI, COBIT) were used.  
3.5.8 Data Quality Control 
There are multiple methods that were used. The data triangulation brings together the data from 
multiple methods which complements each other and improves data quality. The data collected from 
the questionnaires and the document analysis was compared to ensure reliability and validity.  
3.5.9 Measurements 
A combination of sematic differential and Likert scales were used. The first to determine the 
population’s attitude toward ICS/SCADA security and the latter, Likert, to scaling responses from the 
questionnaires. Secondary data was measured as explained in Section 3.5.10. 
3.5.10 Data analysis 
The art of analysing raw data with the objectives of drawing assumptions about the information, is 
data analysis according to Rubin (2008). The systematic procedure for evaluating or reviewing 
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documents is defined according to Bowen (2009) as document analysis. Data was collected through 
questionnaires, and documents was analysed using thematic analysis method which identified themes 
within the data and reporting them. This is method is suitable as the analysis of the data using this 
technique consolidates or groups the data collected and then describes the data sets in detail.  
The data from questionnaires was analysed using descriptive statistics. Data collected from Shodan, 
reports and advisories, was also analysed using descriptive statistics which summarised and described 
the data to determine the perceived susceptibility. 
Data from multiple network security devices were obtained for a two-year period and anonymised. 
The data from the network devices was categorised into the vulnerability categories for further 
analysis. 
COBIT was initially selected as it is a well-documented control framework aligned with other 
frameworks. The relevant categories were divided into pre-determined categories based on 
Information Security controls as described in Section 2.2.3. As the other documents were analysed 
additional categories were included if they were not already considered. Microsoft Excel was used for 
the coding and summarising process. The coding was as follows: red if nothing is mentioned about 
the control, orange if the control is briefly mentioned, yellow if the control mentioned cannot be 
implemented immediately and require modification to align to an ICS/SCADA environment and green 
is the control is relevant to an ICS/SCADA environment 
Reports from security vendors was used as secondary data. Data from reports were categorised into 
various threat categories and compared to each other to determine the top threats and vulnerabilities. 
Descriptive statistics was used to analyse the data to show patterns and summarise the data to 
determine the perceive threats, risks and vulnerabilities to be in order to develop a control framework 
for ICS/SCADA in South Africa. Due to the author’s Honours Degree in Statistics, the statistical 
analysis was performed by the author. 
Correlation is used to determine the relationship between two variables. Where the correlation 
coefficient, r, is between example -0.3 to -0.1, the correlation is weak. A strong correlation is when 
the correlation coefficient, r, is between -1 to -0.5 or 0.5 to 1 (MathBits 2016).  
Using a combination of the various analysis enables data to be treated in a way that will make it 
possible to interpret the requirements to develop a control framework to address the short falls in 
ICS/SCADA security and governance.  
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3.6 Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire was one of the main research instruments. Closed-ended Likert scale questions were 
used in line with the study’s objectives. A covering question was asked to determine the experience 
of the respondent with ICS/SCADA systems. Those with no knowledge of ICS/SCADA systems was 
then further excluded from the study.  
Table 3.2 lists an outline of the questionnaire. The complete questionnaire can be found in Appendix 
A. Table 3.3 links the research objectives to the relevant questions. 
Table 3.2: Outline of questionnaire 
Section Details 
Section A Demographics 
Section B ICS/SCADA experience 
Section C Factors influencing ICS/SCADA 
Section D Best measures to govern and protect 
 
Table 3.3: Research Objective linked to Questions 
Research Objective Question reference 
RO1: To determine the factors (vulnerabilities and 
threats) influencing ICS security in South Africa 
Section C (C2, C4, C5) 
 
RO2: To determine what the best mitigating controls to 
govern and secure ICS/SCADA systems in South Africa 
are.  
Section C (C6) 
RO3: To determine the impact of non-governed ICS Section C (C3, C7, C8, C9) 
RO4: To determine how ICS in South Africa are secured 
and governed 
 
Section D (D1, D2, D3 (maturity)) 
RO5: To establish if the confidence levels of 
implemented controls/measures mitigating the threats and 
risks are sufficient 
Section D (D4, D5, D7) 
RO6: To develop a control framework addressing the 
shortfalls for ICS security in South Africa 
N/A 
 
3.6.1 Ethical and administrative consideration  
A research proposal was presented to the Higher Degrees Committee of the School of Management, 
Information Technology and Governance at University of KwaZulu-Natal. Comments and suggestions 
from the members were noted and incorporated. Refer to Appendix F for the approval letter. This 
dissertation was also send for language and technical editing, refer to Appendix E. 
Ethical approval for this research was obtained from the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics 
Committee, a gate keeper memorandum from large State Owned Company (SOC), who wished to not 
be named, and a gate keeper’s letter from ISACA South Africa. There is no impact on human dignity. 
Informed consent from respondents was obtained prior to them participating in order to allow them to 
make the decision to participate based on adequate knowledge of the study. All the respondents to the 
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questionnaire were anonymous. Any corporate data used in the study was anonymised and names were 
de-identified to ensure confidentiality and integrity. 
3.7 Limitations of the study 
This is unique to the South African situation, but can be generalised beyond South Africa. It was 
difficult to determine statistical reliability as there is uncertain population size, limited studies on 
governance and security of ICS/SCADA conducted in South Africa and difficult in determining the 
individuals with ICS/SCADA knowledge. The questionnaire was sent out to the broader community, 
refer to Section 3.5.7, and a question was included upfront to determine the relevance of the 
respondents.  
Inconsistency of reports from security vendors were discovered during the document analysis. This 
includes differences between current and previous year’s categories as well as different categorisation 
used between the various vendors. This could lead to some bias towards certain vulnerabilities and 
threats complicated the overall analysis. From the study’s perspective, this might only have a small 
implication, however this might impact someone in the industry trying to use various reports to 
determine the top vulnerabilities and might wrongly place emphasis on non-prevalent vulnerabilities. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter discussed the research problem and objectives and the research methodology that was 
used in the study as well as limitations. This study employed mixed methods that were discussed. The 
target population, sampling strategies, data collection and data analysis was described. A conceptual 





Chapter 4 Primary Data 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents analysis of the online questionnaire as described in Section 3.6. The sample of 
this study was selected from information security, governance and SCADA/ICS professionals who 
have experience with SCADA security. The online questionnaire was distributed via mail to members 
of two communities (ISACA South Africa Chapter and a large SOC). A covering question was asked 
in the questionnaire to establish the experience of the respondent and attempts to address the research 
objectives as mentioned in Section 1.5. The reliability tests in Section 4.8, show high internal 
















































The Demographics relates to the following questions in the questionnaire:  
 Question A1 Type of Organisation; 
 Question A2 Sector; 
 Question A3 Job Function; 
 Question A4 Number of Employees; 
 Question B1 What is your primary interaction with ICS/SCADA; and  
 Question B2 How many years of experience with ICS/SCADA systems do you have. 
4.2.1 Type of organisation 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the type of organisation to whom the respondents belongs to. The majority of the 
respondents (36 or 52%) were from a Public Organisation, 23 (33%) from a Private Organisation, 4 
(6%) from Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)/Non-profit organisation (NPO) and 6 (9%) from 
Other types of organisations. The large percentage of Public Organisations that responded are useful 
and strengthen the research as majority of critical infrastructure are managed by Public Organisations. 
 
Figure 4.2: Type of organisations 
 
4.2.2 Sector 
Figure 4.3 shows that 24 (35%) of respondents were from a Transport/Logistics sector; 10 (14%) from 
Government, 8 (12%) from Consulting, Finance and IT/Telecoms respectively; 2 (3%) each from 
Energy, Human Resources, Manufacturing and Other; while Education, Mining and Public services 
(Fire, Police, Health care) each was 1 (1%). The respondents from Human Resources are abnormal 
as there is not necessary ICS/SCADA systems used in Human Resources. However, when looking at 
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the rest of the questions answered by those from the Human Resources sector, they indicated they had 
no knowledge of ICS/SCADA systems. 
 
Figure 4.3: Sector 
 
4.2.3 Job function 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the job function the respondents have. The majority 34 (50%) of respondents 
shared between Management (17 or 25%) and Analyst/technical (17 or 25%), 12 (17%) from 
Risk/Governance/Compliance, 6 (9%) Senior Management, 4 (6%) IT administrator 
(System/Network/Database), 4 (6%) Engineering, 3 (4%) Consultant, 3 (4%) from C-level (CIO, Chief 
Information Security Officer (CISO), Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer(CFO)), 
and Operations, Maintenance and Other all 1 (1.33%) each. The split amongst the various job 
functions are suitable as the participants have different interactions with ICS/SCADA based on their 




Figure 4.4: Job function 
 
4.2.4 Number of employees 
Figure 4.5 indicates that 32 (46%) of respondents work at a company with 5,000 or more employees, 
18 (26%) at a company with between 1,001 to 5,000 employees, 7 (10%) at a company with 100 – 
1,000 and 12 (17%) at a company less than 100. The results make sense as one of the communities 
that the questionnaire was sent to is a large SOC. 
 




4.2.5 Primary interaction with ICS/SCADA 
Figure 4.6 indicates that 21 (30%) of respondents had No knowledge of ICS/SCADA, 15 (22%) 
interacted with ICS/SCADA via Audit/Consulting, 11 (16%) through IT, 7 (10%) through 
Governance/Risk/Compliance, and 12% split between Security 4 (6%) and Management of 
ICS/SCADA 4 (6%). From the respondents, 3 (4%) showed Some awareness of the risks/issues of 
ICS/SCADA, 2 (3%) interacted with ICS/SCADA through Engineering, 1 (1.5%) through Operations 
and through Academic research each. 
 
Figure 4.6: Primary interaction with ICS/SCADA 
After this question, the 21 (30%) participants that had No knowledge of ICS/SCADA were excluded 
from answering further questions. A summary of the respondents is listed in Table 4.1. 
4.2.6 Experience with ICS/SCADA 
Figure 4.7 depicts the number of years of ICS/SCADA experience the respondents have. 22 (32%) 
have None, which relates to the 21 (30%) of respondents that had No knowledge of ICS/SCADA. 15 
(22%) of respondents have 2 to 5 years of ICS/SCADA experience, 13 (19%) 1 to 2 years, 9 (13%) 5 




Figure 4.7: Experience with ICS/SCADA 
4.3 Factors influencing ICS/SCADA 
This section relates to the research objective to determine the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) 
influencing ICS security in South Africa.  
The responses received from the respondents for demographics in Section 4.2 included respondents 
with no knowledge of ICS/SCADA systems. The respondents with no knowledge of ICS/SCADA was 
excluded from this point. A summary of the respondent’s knowledge of ICS/SCADA are listed in 
Table 4.1. 
Respondent Number of respondents Result 
No knowledge of ICS/SCADA 21 Excluded from study 
Knowledge of ICS/SCADA 48 Included as relevant to study 
Total 69  
Table 4.1: Summary of respondent’s knowledge of ICS/SCADA 
4.3.1 Level of visibility of threats 
The respondents were asked how they would rate the level of visibility of threats in their ICS/SCADA 
environment or an ICS/SCADA environment that you have encountered. This relates to Question C1 
of the questionnaire. The results are displayed in Figure 4.8. A majority, 25 (52%) of the respondents 
had an Average/OK visibility of the threats in their ICS/SCADA environment and 12 (25%) Poor 
visibility. Only 6 (13%) and 1 (2%) had a Good or Very good/Excellent visibility of the threats to 
ICS/SCADA respectively. This indicates that there is still a third (or 33%) of respondents that had a 
Poor (25%) or Very poor (8%) visibility of threats on their ICS/SCADA environment which could 
indicate that these ICS/SCADA environments are not governed. This contributes to the research 
problem that there is no or limited information available as to the current state of ICS/SCADA systems 




Figure 4.8: Level of visibility of threats for ICS/SCADA 
4.3.2 Likelihood/Probability of Threats 
This relates to Question C2 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.9 shows the likelihood (probability) of 
threats occurring in ICS/SCADA environments. In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the 
responses were rated from ‘1’, Very low to ‘5’ Very High. Table 4.2 shows the frequency and full 
descriptive statistics of the threat rating from Very low (may only occur in exceptional circumstances) 
to Very high (Expected to occur frequently and in most circumstances). 
 
Figure 4.9: Threats related to ICS/SCADA environment 
From the responses, it was noted that the top three threats likely to occur are Malware with a mean of 
3.06 (Medium - expected to occur in some circumstances), Staff undertaking unintentional 
unauthorised actions with a mean of 2.96 (leaning towards Medium - expected to occur in some 
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circumstances) and disgruntled staff (intentional) with a mean of 2.71 (also leaning towards Medium 
- expected to occur in some circumstances). 





























































































































































































































Very low 19 14 9 8 9 13 19 16 19 3 14 14 
Low 15 15 11 9 20 15 13 12 9 10 15 10 
Medium 7 15 15 11 11 12 9 12 14 20 15 11 
High 7 4 11 17 8 7 6 7 6 11 3 10 
Very high 0 0 2 3 0 1 1 1 0 4 1 3 









































Skewness 0.67 0.21 
-
0.01 

















Rank   3 2      1   
  
The 95% confidence intervals for the top three threats are 0.30 for Malware, 0.35 for Staff undertaking 
unintentional unauthorised action and 0.33 for disgruntled staff (intentional). This indicates that with 
a 95% confidence, the population mean for each of the above are Malware with a population mean of 
between 2.77 (mean – confidence = 3.06 – 0.30) to 3.36 (mean + confidence = 3.06 + 0.30), Staff 
undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions with a population mean of between 2.60 to 3.31 and 
disgruntled staff (intentional) with a population mean of 2.38 to 3.04. 
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The bottom three threats likely to occur are: Individual Hackers/script kiddies with a mean of 2.04, 
Terrorist with a mean of 2.10 and Protesters and activists (environmental/political/animal rights) with 
a mean of 2.15 all leaning strongly towards Low (Expected to occur in a few circumstances).  
4.3.3 Top threats 
This relates to Question C4 of the questionnaire. The respondents were asked to indicate the top three 
threats by selecting only three of the threats on the list of the question. The top three threats are: Staff 
undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions (e.g. making changes without following change 
control process) which 32 (67%) of the respondents selected, Malware 
(worms/viruses/Trojans/spyware) 30 (63%) and disgruntled staff (intentional) 23 (48%). The results 
are displayed in Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10: Top threats related to ICS/SCADA environment 
Comparing the top three threats with the top three threats in Section 4.3.2, it is observed that the top 
three correspond with the previous question, however the order is slightly different. Staff undertaking 
unintentional unauthorised actions (e.g. making changes without following change control process) 
was second in the previous question and Malware (worms/viruses/Trojans/spyware) 63% came out 
first. The threat, disgruntled staff (intentional) remained third in both questions showing consistency. 
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4.3.4 Impact of threats 
This relates to Question C3 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.11 shows the impact of threats related to 
ICS/SCADA environments. Table 4.3 shows the frequency of the impact of the threat rating from Very 
low or no impact (e.g. no impact of service) to Very high impact (e.g. service disruption for significant 
time). In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the responses were rated from ‘1’, Very low impact 
to ‘5’ Very High impact. 
 
Figure 4.11: Impact of threats related to ICS/SCADA environment 
From the responses, the top three threats likely to impact ICS/SCADA systems are Malware with a 
mean of 3.88 (Medium impact – e.g. some service disruption, but also leaning towards High impact – 
e.g. service disruption), disgruntled staff (intentional) with a mean of 3.83 (also Medium impact - 
expected to occur in some circumstances, but also leaning towards High impact – e.g. service 
disruption), and Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions with a mean of 3.77 (Medium - 
expected to occur in some circumstances but also leaning towards High impact – e.g. service 
disruption). 
The 95% confidence intervals for the top three threats are 0.30 for Malware, 0.32 for disgruntled staff 
(intentional), and 0.31 for Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised action. This indicates that 
with 95% confidence, the population mean for each of the above are Malware with a population mean 
of between 3.58 (mean – confidence = 3.88 – 0.30) to 4.17 (mean + confidence = 3.88 + 0.30), 
disgruntled staff (intentional) with a population mean of 3.51 to 4.15 and Staff undertaking 

























































































































































































































Very low 5 6 2 1 1 7 4 4 8 1 3 5 
Low 12 10 5 6 12 11 6 4 8 4 7 12 
Medium 7 19 6 9 10 10 7 8 10 10 6 8 
High 13 7 21 19 19 15 15 22 14 18 14 19 



































0.32 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.30 0.37 0.35 
Rank   2 3      1 3  
The bottom three threats likely to have less impact on ICS/SCADA systems should they occur are: 
Illegal information brokers with a mean of 2.94, Foreign intelligence services with a mean of 3.00 
and Social engineering (phishing emails etc.) with a mean of 3.10 all leaning strongly towards Low 
(Expected to occur in a few circumstances).  
The top 3 threats are consistent with the answers received from the respondents in Section 4.3.3, 
although the order of the top three is slightly different. 
4.3.5 Vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA 
This relates to Question C5 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.12 shows the vulnerabilities related to 
ICS/SCADA environments. Table 4.4 shows the frequency and full descriptive statistics of the 
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vulnerability rating from very low to very high. In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the 
responses were rated from ‘1’, Very low to ‘5’ Very High. 
 
Figure 4.12: Vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA environment 
From the responses, the top three vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA systems are Patching 
(outdated or unpatched systems) with a mean of 3.27 (Medium), No or limited Monitoring with a mean 
of 3.23 (also Medium), and Access control (No or weak passwords) with a mean of 3.15 (Medium). 
The 95% confidence intervals for the top three vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA systems are 0.33 
for Patching, 0.31 for No or limited Monitoring and 0.36 for Access control (No or weak passwords). 
This indicates that with 95% confidence the population mean for each of the above are Patching with 
a population mean of between 2.94 (mean – confidence = 3.27 – 0.33) to 3.60 (mean + confidence = 
3.27 + 0.33), Monitoring with a population mean of 2.92 to 3.54 and Access control with a population 
mean of between 2.79 to 3.51 and. 
The bottom three vulnerabilities on ICS/SCADA systems are: Wireless connections – overlooked and 
poorly configured with a mean of 2.73, Network perimeter – Unsecure, firewall don’t 
exist/misconfigured, direct connections to internet with a mean of 2.77 and Remote access – 
authentication not secure/shared passwords for vendors with a mean of 2.94 all leaning strongly 






































































































Very low 4 4 6 8 2 7 7 9 6 
Low 13 8 11 13 11 11 11 12 10 
Medium 11 12 11 13 14 13 12 12 12 
High 12 19 16 10 16 12 12 13 14 
Very high 8 5 4 4 5 5 6 2 6 
Mean 3.15 3.27 3.02 2.77 3.23 2.94 2.98 2.73 3.08 
Std 
Deviation 
1.24 1.12 1.19 1.21 1.06 1.23 1.26 1.18 1.23 
Variance 1.53 1.27 1.43 1.46 1.12 1.51 1.60 1.39 1.52 
Kurtosis -1.06 -0.52 -0.96 -0.87 -0.69 -0.93 -1.01 -1.07 -0.94 




0.36 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.36 
Rank 3 1   2     
 
4.3.6 Do you have controls in place to mitigate the vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA? 
This relates to Question C6 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.13 shows the controls in place to mitigate 
the vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA environments. Table 4.4 shows the frequency and full 
descriptive statistics of the controls mitigating vulnerability. In order to generate the descriptive 
statistics, the responses were rated from ‘1’, Have not implemented anything to ‘5’ Implemented and 
operating effectively. The mean, etc. have been calculated by removing the N/A and Not sure 
responses. 
From the responses, it is noted that the top three controls mitigating vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA 
environments are Configuration (Default configuration, no backup of configuration) with a mean of 
3.91 (Partially Implemented/in progress, but leaning strongly towards Implemented control requires 
improvement), Physical security with a mean of 3.89 (Partially Implemented/in progress, but leaning 
strongly towards Implemented control requires improvement), and Network perimeter (Unsecure, 
firewall don’t exist/misconfigured, direct connections to internet) with a mean of 3.85 (Partially 




Figure 4.13: Controls mitigating vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA environment 
The 95% confidence intervals for the top three controls mitigating vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA 
environments are 0.39 for Configuration, 0.34 for Physical security, and 0.31 for Network perimeter. 
This indicates that with 95% confidence the population mean for each of the above, taking into account 
those who responded are Configuration with a population mean of between 3.53 (mean – confidence 
= 3.91 – 0.39) to 4.30 (mean + confidence = 3.91 + 0.39), Physical security with a population mean 
of 3.55 to 4.24 and Network perimeter with a population mean of between 3.54 to 4.16. This further 
indicates that the top three controls mitigating vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA environments are 
between Partially Implemented/in progress, and Implemented control requires improvement. 
The bottom three controls mitigating vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA environments are: Monitoring 
with a mean of 3.34, Patching with a mean of 3.39 and Wireless connections with a mean of 3.43 all 
Partially Implemented/in progress. The top three controls do not address the Top threats as mentioned 
in Section 4.3.3 as well as the top three vulnerabilities. The control for addressing one of the top three 
vulnerabilities, lack of Patching/inadequate patching, is one of the three bottom controls as indicated 









































































































Have not implemented 
anything 
4 6 4 1 4 1 1 4 3 
Plan to implement in 
the next year 




10 11 7 8 13 21 7 12 7 
Implemented control 
requires improvement 
13 13 11 18 12 7 13 14 19 
Implemented and 
operating effectively 
18 11 21 14 10 11 19 9 12 
Not sure 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 
N/A 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Count (n-N/A - 
Unsure/Unknown) 
47 46 46 46 47 44 47 44 47 
Mean* 3.83 3.39 3.91 3.85 3.34 3.52 3.89 3.43 3.66 
Std Deviation* 1.24 1.32 1.30 1.05 1.24 1.05 1.17 1.21 1.18 
Variance* 1.54 1.75 1.68 1.11 1.53 1.09 1.36 1.46 1.40 
Kurtosis* 0.13 -0.81 0.05 -0.06 -0.85 -0.62 -0.61 -0.50 -0.24 
Skewness* -0.95 -0.47 -1.05 -0.76 -0.26 0.06 -0.73 -0.50 -0.77 
Confidence Level 
(95.0%)* 
0.36 0.39 0.39 0.31 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.35 
Rank   1 3   2   
* The mean, Standard Deviation, Variance, Kurtosis, Skewness and Confidence Level have been 
calculated by removing the N/A and Not sure responses. 
4.4 Impact of non-governed ICS/SCADA  
This section attempts to address the research objective to determine the impact of non-governed 
ICS/SCADA should the factor materialise. 
4.4.1 Impact of non-governed ICS/SCADA systems 
This relates to Question C7 of the questionnaire. Figures 4.14 shows the impact of non-governed 
ICS/SCADA should these factors materialise. The Table 4.5 shows the frequency and full descriptive 
statistics of the impact of non-governed ICS/SCADA should these factors materialise rating from 
Insignificant (no impact on service/regulation), Minor (Slight impact on service/regulation), 
Moderate (Some service disruption/potential for adverse publicity), Major (Service 
disruption/adverse publicity not avoidable) and Extreme/Catastrophic (Service interrupted for 
significant time/major adverse publicity not avoidable).  
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In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the responses were rated from ‘1’, Insignificant (no 
impact on service/regulation) to ‘5’ Extreme/Catastrophic (Service interrupted for significant 
time/major adverse publicity not avoidable). 
 
Figure 4.14: Impact of non-governed ICS/SCADA environment 
From the responses, the top three impacts of non-governed  ICS/SCADA environments should threats 
and vulnerabilities materialise, are Loss of Availability/Denial of service with a mean of 3.67 which is 
Moderate (Some service disruption/potential for adverse publicity), secondly Loss of Integrity with a 
mean of 3.46 also Moderate (Some service disruption/potential for adverse publicity), and 
Unauthorised control with a mean of 3.44 also Moderate (Some service disruption/potential for 
adverse publicity). 
The 95% confidence intervals for the top three impacts of non-governed  ICS/SCADA environments 
should threats and vulnerabilities materialise are 0.32 for Loss of Availability/Denial, 0.29 for secondly 
Loss of Integrity, and 0.33 for Unauthorised control. This indicates that the population mean for each 
of the above, with 95% confidence, are Loss of Availability/Denial with a population mean of between 
3.34 (mean – confidence = 3.67 – 0.32) to 3.99 (mean + confidence = 3.67 + 0.32), Loss of Integrity 
with a population mean of 3.17 to 3.75 and Unauthorised control with a population mean of between 









































































Insignificant (no impact on service/regulation) 10 1 2 3 
Minor (Slight impact on service/regulation) 7 7 5 7 
Moderate (Some service disruption/potential for 
adverse publicity) 
9 16 13 12 
Major (Service disruption/adverse publicity not 
avoidable) 
15 17 15 18 
Extreme/Catastrophic (Service interrupted for 
significant time/major adverse publicity not 
avoidable) 
7 7 13 8 
Mean 3.04 3.46 3.67 3.44 
Std Deviation 1.38 0.99 1.12 1.13 
Variance 1.91 0.98 1.25 1.27 
Kurtosis -1.24 -0.42 -0.35 -0.43 
Skewness -0.23 -0.22 -0.53 -0.49 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.40 0.29 0.32 0.33 
Rank 4 2 1 3 
 
4.4.2 Materialisation of the threats  
4.4.2.1 Have any of the threats occurred in your organisation or an ICS/SCADA environment that 
you have encountered? 
This relates to Question C8 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.15 indicates that 37% of respondents did 
not have a threat occurred in their ICS/SCADA environment. 25% of respondents indicated that a 
threat did occur, 15% Can’t disclose, 13% are Not sure while 10% indicated Maybe. From this it could 
be concluded that only 37% did not have a threat occurred in their ICS/SCADA environment, while 
the remaining 63% might possibly have had a threat that occurred in their ICS/SCADA environment. 
This strengthens the need to secure ICS/SCADA systems as 63% of respondents might had a threat 




Figure 4.15: Threats occurred in ICS/SCADA environment 
4.4.2.2 How many times did such events occur in the past 12 months? 
This relates to Question C9 of the questionnaire. The respondents that answered Yes, indicating a 
threat occurred in Question C8 in Section 4.4.2.1 were further asked regarding the threat. Those who 
answered No, Maybe, Not sure or Can’t disclose were excluded from Questions C9 and C10. Figure 
4.16 indicates that 42% of respondents indicated that the threat/event occurred 2 – 4 times in the past 
12 months, 41% of respondents had a threat/event occurred Once and 17% of respondents had a 
threat/event occurred 5 – 10 times in the past month. This further strengthens the need of a control 
framework as 59% of respondents indicated that a threat occurred more than twice in the last 12 
months.  
 
Figure 4.16: No of time a threats occurred in ICS/SCADA environment 
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4.4.2.3 How long did it take to discover the threat? 
This relates to Question C10 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.17 indicates that 42% of those respondents 
that had a confirmed threat materialising took between one week to one month (7 – 30 days) to 
discover it. A quarter or 25% discovered the threat within one day, 17% took between 2 to 7 days, 8% 
between 1 to 3 months, and 8% were unable to answer.  
 
Figure 4.17: Time it took to discover a threats that occurred in ICS/SCADA environment 
 
4.5 Best methods to govern and protect  
This section of the questionnaires relates to the research objective to determine what the best measures 
to govern these factors that influence ICS security in South Africa are.   
4.5.1 How are ICS/SCADA systems secured and governed? 
This relates to Question D1 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.18 illustrates that the majority of the 
respondents (69%) indicated We have control frameworks in place. 17% of respondents indicated that 
ICS/SCADA is regulatory monitored, 8% were Not sure how ICS/SCADA systems are secured and 




Figure 4.18: How ICS/SCADA is governed 
4.5.2 Which of the following control frameworks do you make use of? 
This relates to Question D2 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.19 indicates the control frameworks used 
by the participants to secure and govern ICS/SCADA systems.  
 
Figure 4.19: Control frameworks used 
67 
 
From the responses it is noted that the top three frameworks used by the respondents to govern and 
secure their ICS/SCADA environments are COBIT, secondly ITIL and the ISO 27001 series. The 
three frameworks that used the least by the respondents to govern and secure their ICS/SCADA 
environments are ISA99, ENISA and CPNI. COBIT is suitable from a governance and security 
perspective, however ITIL is more suitable in standard IT environment as it focuses more on IT service 
management. The own develop framework might fit if it is adequately aligned to address threats, 
vulnerabilities and risks in the respondents’ environment. The CPNI is a framework used by UK and 
although suitable for ICS/SCADA systems, it might not be popular in South Africa, refer to Section 
5.4 for framework comparisons.  
4.6 Usability of governance and security controls for an ICS/SCADA environment 
This section of the questionnaire relates to the research objective to establish if the confidence levels 
of implemented controls/measures mitigating the threats and risks are sufficient. 
4.6.1 Maturity of governance and security 
This relates to Question D3 of the questionnaire. Figures 4.20 indicates how respondents see the 
maturity of governance and security for their ICS/SCADA environment. 38% of respondents indicated 
that the maturity of their ICS/SCADA environment is Established, 25% indicated the maturity of their 
environment is Evolving and 25% also indicated their environment is Basic. 10% of ICS/SCADA 
environments are Advanced and only 2% Leading. In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the 
responses were rated from ‘1’, Basic to ‘5’ Leading. 
Table 4.7: Frequency for Maturity of governance and security of ICS/SCADA environment 
 Frequency 
1 - Basic (Very minimal or basic level of controls) 
12 
2 - Evolving (Inconsistently applied controls) 12 
3 - Established (Controls in place, but there is a need 
for enhancement) 
18 
4 - Advanced (Control are consistently applied) 5 
5 - Leading (Controls are established, consistently 
applied, regularly reviewed and coordinated) 
1 
Mean 2.40 









Figure 4.20: Maturity of governance and security of ICS/SCADA environment 
From the responses, the mean for responses of the maturity of governance and security for 
ICS/SCADA environment is 2.40. 
The 95% confidence intervals for this is 0.30. This indicates that with 95% confidence, the population 
mean for the maturity of governance and security for the ICS/SCADA environment is between 2.10 
(mean – confidence = 2.40 – 0.30) to 2. 70 (mean + confidence = 2.40 + 0.30). This indicates that the 
population mean for the maturity of governance and security for ICS/SCADA environments, as per 
the CMM discussed in Section 2.2.3.4, is between Evolving (Inconsistently applied controls) leaning 
slightly towards Established (Controls in place, but there is a need for enhancement). The CMM is 
displayed in Figure 4.21. 














4.6.2 How effective are the following controls implemented in your ICS/SCADA 
environment? 
This relates to Question D4 of the questionnaire. In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the 
responses were rated from ‘1’, Have not implemented to ‘5’ Implemented and operating effectively. 
The mean, etc. have been calculated by removing the N/A and Unsure/Unknown responses. Table 4.8 
shows the frequency and descriptive statistics for effectiveness of controls implemented in 
ICS/SCADA environment for the Top three and bottom three, the full list is displayed in Appendix B.  

































































































Have not implemented 
12 2 4 11 9 2 
Plan to implement in the next 
year 
2 2 2 3 6 2 
Partially Implemented/in 
progress 
10 9 7 11 9 11 
Implemented but requires 
improvement 
15 14 14 15 15 11 
Implemented and operating 
effectively 
9 21 19 7 6 21 
Unsure/Unknown 0 0 2 1 2 0 
N/A 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
Count (n-N/A - 
Unsure/Unknown) 
48 48 46 47 45 47 
Mean* 3.15 4.04 3.91 3.09 3.07 4.00 
Std Deviation* 1.46 1.09 1.24 1.40 1.36 1.12 
Variance* 2.13 1.19 1.55 1.95 1.84 1.26 
Kurtosis* -1.21 0.80 0.46 -1.14 -1.15 0.32 
Skewness* -0.39 -1.11 -1.13 -0.36 -0.30 -0.96 
Rank 3rd last 1 3 2nd last last 2 
* The table of frequencies listed. The mean, Standard Deviation, Variance, Kurtosis, Skewness and 









































From the responses, as shown in Figure 4.22, the top three effective controls implemented in the 
ICS/SCADA environments are Physical access control with a mean of 4.04 (Implemented but requires 
improvement), secondly Firewalls in place with a mean of 4.00 (Implemented but requires 
improvement), and Environmental standards with a mean of 3.91 (Partially Implemented/in progress 
but leaning strongly towards Implemented but requires improvement). 
The 95% confidence intervals for the top three effective controls implemented in the ICS/SCADA 
environments are 0.32 for Physical access, 0.33 for Firewalls in place, and 0.37 for Environmental 
standards. This indicates that with 95% confidence, the population mean for each of the above are, 
Physical access with a population mean of between 3.72 (mean – confidence = 4.04 – 0.32) to 4.36 
(mean + confidence = 4.04 + 0.32), Firewalls in place with a population mean of 3.67 to 4.33 and 
Environmental standards with a population mean of between 3.54 to 4.28. 
The bottom three effective controls implemented in the ICS/SCADA environments are: Strategy of 
ICS/SCADA with a mean of 3.07, SIEM or security intelligence centre with a mean of 3.09 and Data 
encryption with a mean of 3.15, which all relates to Partially Implemented/in progress. 
4.6.3 How easy is it /was it to implement the following controls implemented in your 
ICS/SCADA environment? 
This relates to Question D5 of the questionnaire. In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the 
responses were rated from ‘1’, Very difficult to implement to ‘5’ Very easy to implement. The mean, 
etc. have been calculated by removing the N/A responses. Table 4.9 shows the frequency and 
descriptive statistics for effectiveness of controls implemented in ICS/SCADA environment for the 
Top three and bottom three, the full list is displayed in Appendix C. 
From the responses as see in Figure 4.23, it was noted that the top three easiest controls to implement 
for the ICS/SCADA environment are Physical access control with a mean of 3.59 (Implement with 
some challenges), Environmental standards with a mean of 3.48 (Implement with some challenges), 
and Virus/malware protection with a mean of 3.47 (Implement with some challenges). 
The 95% confidence intervals for the top three threats are 0.28 for Physical access control, 0.29 for 
Environmental standards, and 0.30 for Virus/malware protection. This indicates that with 95% 
confidence, the population mean for each of the above are Physical access control with a population 
mean of between 3.31 (mean – confidence = 3.59 – 0.28) to 3.86 (mean + confidence = 3.59 + 0.28), 
Environmental standards with a population mean of 3.19 to 3.76 and Virus/malware protection with 




























































































Very difficult to implement 
1 1 2 1 1 1 
Difficult to implement 4 4 7 6 6 12 
Implement with some challenges 15 16 20 23 14 19 
Easy to implement 19 16 10 10 16 9 
Very easy to implement 7 5 2 1 6 2 
N/A 
2 6 7 7 5 5 
Count (n-N/A) 46 42 41 41 43 43 
Mean* 3.59 3.48 3.07 3.10 3.47 2.98 
Std Deviation* 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.77 0.98 0.89 
Variance* 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.59 0.97 0.79 
Kurtosis* 0.16 0.18 0.27 0.75 -0.31 -0.13 
Skewness* -0.44 -0.33 -0.15 -0.17 -0.29 0.26 
Rank 1 2   3  
 
* The table of frequencies listed. The mean, Standard Deviation, Variance, Kurtosis, Skewness and 
Confidence Level have been calculated by removing the N/A responses. 
The bottom three most difficult controls to implement for the ICS/SCADA environment are: Systems 
hardening with a mean of 2.98 (Difficult to implement leaning highly towards Implement with some 
challenges), Remote access with a mean of 3.07 (Implement with some challenges) and 3rd party 



























































4.6.4 What type of intelligence do you rely on to detect threats aimed at your ICS/SCADA 
systems? 
This relates to Question D6 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.24 shows what type of intelligence the 
respondents rely on to detect threats aimed at their ICS/SCADA environment. 32 respondents Rely on 
staff to know when to search out events, 25 Use anomaly detection tools like SIEM/SIC to identify 
trends, 20 Review audit logs and 3 had No (none) intelligence to detect threats in their ICS/SCADA 
environment. 1 had another method.  
 
Figure 4.24: Methods/intelligence use to detect threats in ICS/SCADA environment 
4.6.5 How confident/certain are you that the implemented controls mitigating the threats and 
risks are sufficient? 
This relates to Question D7 of the questionnaire. Figure 4.25 indicates how confident/certain the 
respondents are that the implemented controls mitigating the threats and risks sufficiently. 35% of 
respondents indicated that they are Moderately confident that the implemented controls mitigate the 
threats and risks sufficiently, 29% indicated that they are Somewhat confident and 23% indicated that 
they are Confident that the implemented controls mitigate the threats and risks sufficiently, whereas 
13% respondents indicated that they are Not confident at all that the implemented controls mitigate 
the threats and risks sufficiently. No one indicated that they are Very confident that the implemented 
controls mitigate the threats and risks sufficiently. In order to generate the descriptive statistics, the 




Figure 4.25: Confidence of implemented controls 
 
Table 4.10: Frequency how confident/certain the respondents are that the implemented controls 
mitigating the threats and risks sufficiently 
 Frequency Percentage 
Not confident at all 6 13% 
Somewhat confident 14 29% 
Moderately confident 17 35% 
Confident 11 23% 
Very confident 0 0% 
Mean 2.69  
Std Deviation 0.97  
Variance 0.94  
Kurtosis -0.90  
Skewness -0.19  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.28  
From the responses, in Table 4.10, it is noted that the mean for responses of how confident/certain the 
respondents are that the implemented controls mitigating the threats and risks sufficiently for 
ICS/SCADA environment is 2.69, which is Somewhat confident leaning towards Moderately 
confident. 
The 95% confidence intervals for this is 0.28. This indicates that with 95% confidence, the population 
mean for how confident/certain the respondents are that the implemented controls mitigating the 
threats and risks sufficiently for ICS/SCADA environment is between 2.41 (mean – confidence = 2.69 
– 0.28) to 2.97 (mean + confidence = 2.69 + 0.28). This indicates that the population mean for how 
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confident/certain the respondents are that the implemented controls mitigating the threats and risks 
sufficiently for ICS/SCADA environment is between Somewhat confident leaning heavily towards 
Moderately confident. 
4.6.6 What are your top three priorities when it comes to implementing effective controls for 
the security of your control systems or ICS/SCADA systems that you have encountered? 
This relates to Question D8 of the questionnaire. The top 3 priorities when it comes to implementing 
effective controls for the security of ICS/SCADA systems are: 1. Preventing control system service 
interruption which majority 24 (50%) of the respondents selected, 2. Preventing financial 
loss/Protecting shareholder value 20 (42%) and 2. Protecting health and safety of employees 17 (35%) 
as depicted in Figure 4.26. 
 
 
Figure 4.26: Top priorities for implementing effective controls 
We can conclude from Figure 4.26 that 24 (50%) of respondents indicated that their top priority is 
Preventing control system service interruption, which aligns to Section 2.2.1 which indicated that for 
ICS/SCADA systems availability is more important than confidentiality and integrity. 
4.7 Comparisons and correlations 
This section looks at comparisons and correlations between various questions in order to determine 
groupings or clusters as well as validating the responses from earlier questions.  
4.7.1 Risk of threats  
As discussed in Section 3.4, risk is defined as Impact times Probability/Likelihood. The mean from 
the Probability/Likelihood of each threat from Section 4.3.2 was taken as well the mean from the 
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impact of the threat from Section 4.3.4. The means of each threat’s Probability/Likelihood vs the mean 
of each threat’s Impact was plotted in Figure 4.34.  
 
Figure 4.27: Risk (Impact vs Probability/Likelihood) 
From Figure 4.27 it was observed that the top three risks to ICS/SCADA environment are Malware, 
Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions and disgruntled staff. Comparing this to the top 
three threats likely to occur, it is noted that this is exactly the same with Malware being the top threat, 
Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions and disgruntled staff (intentional). Also 
comparing this to the top three threats likely to impact ICS/SCADA systems, the top three is similar 
but in a slightly different order. Malware is still the top threat to impact ICS/SCADA systems, 
secondly is disgruntled staff (intentional) and Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions. 
We can also see from Figure 4.27 that there are almost three distinct clusters. The first being the top 
three risks; Malware, Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions and disgruntled staff. The 
second cluster or grouping consists of Organised crime/Criminals, Natural disaster/environmental, 
Terrorists and Corporate intelligence/Industrial espionage, all having Probability/Likelihood above 
two (Low - Expected to occur in a few circumstances) but higher impact, above 3.6 (leaning towards 
High impact – e.g. service disruption). The third cluster consist of threats also have a 
Probability/Likelihood above two (Low - Expected to occur in a few circumstances) but lower impact 
just above three (Medium impact – e.g. some service disruption). The threats that make up this cluster 
or grouping are: Foreign intelligence services, Illegal information brokers, Protesters and activists, 
Individual Hackers/script kiddies and Social engineering.  
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4.7.2 Correlation between Probability/Likelihood and Impact of threats 
The correlation between the Probability/Likelihood of a threat occurring and the Impact of threats on 
ICS/SCADA environments were calculated. Only the components were the two variables are 
correlated are shown and the self-correlation has been removed for convenience, hence there is no 
symmetry. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From the partial correlation Matrix in Table 4.11, it was observed that there is a strong correlation 
(where the correlation coefficient, r, is greater than 0.5) between the Probability/Likelihood of the 
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threat (Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions (e.g. making changes without following 
change control process)) and the impact that the threat (disgruntled staff (intentional)) have. This 
could indicate that the respondents see Probability/Likelihood of Staff undertaking unintentional 
unauthorised actions similar to the impact that disgruntled staff (intentional) would have. 
There are also strong correlations between the Probability/Likelihood of the threat (Protesters and 
activists) with the impact of the same threat. This is similar for the Probability/Likelihood and the 
impact of the threat (Protesters and activists).  
4.7.3 Security confidence 
As previously discussed in Section 3.4, the security confidence is made up from Usability of security 
(How effective are the following controls implemented in your ICS/SCADA environment) and Ease 
of use of security (How easy is it /was it to implement the following controls implemented in your 
ICS/SCADA environment). The mean from the effectiveness of each control from Section 4.6.1 was 
taken as well the mean from the ease of implementation of each control from Section 4.6.2.  The 
mean of the effectiveness versus the mean of ease of implementation for each control was plotted in 
Figure 4.35. 
 
 Figure 4.28: Effectiveness of control vs Ease of implementation 
From Figure 4.28 the top five security confidence controls are Physical access control, Environmental 
standards, Backup and recovery, Firewalls in place, and Virus/malware protection. Comparing this 
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to the top three effective control implemented in the ICS/SCADA environments, it is noted Physical 
access control is also first followed by Firewalls and Environmental controls. (Partially 
Implemented/in progress but leaning strongly towards Implemented but requires improvement). 
Also comparing the security confidence controls with the top three easiest controls to implement for 
the ICS/SCADA environment, Physical access control is again first followed by Environmental 
standards which the same as the security confidence shown. Virus/ malware protection is third under 
easiest controls to implement for the ICS/SCADA environment, but is fifth of the security confidence 
controls.  
We can also see from Figure 4.28 that there is a distinct group of controls which have less security 
confidence. These are User awareness training, ICS/SCADA strategy, SIEM or SIC, 
Communication/encryption and Data encryption. From the effectiveness of the controls implemented 
it is noted that these controls are Partially Implemented/in progress and from ease of implementation 
the controls are Implemented with some challenges. 
4.7.4 Correlation between Probability/likelihood of threats and Vulnerabilities 
The correlation between the Probability/Likelihood of a threat occurring and the Vulnerabilities of 
ICS/SCADA environments were calculated. As before, only the components were the two variables 
are correlated are shown and the self-correlation has been removed for convenience.  
From the partial correlation matrix in Table 4.12, it is noted there is a strong correlation (where the 
correlation coefficient, r, is greater than 0.5) between the Probability/Likelihood of the threat (Staff 
undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions (e.g. making changes without following change 
control process)) and the vulnerability Patching - outdated/unpatched. This could indicate that the 
respondent sees Probability/Likelihood of Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions 
occurring where there are no patching or patches is outdated. 
Similar the Probability/Likelihood of the threat Corporate intelligence/Industrial espionage have a 
strong correlation to the following three vulnerability: Patching - outdated/unpatched, Remote access 
– authentication not secure/shared passwords for vendors and Wireless connections – overlooked and 
poorly configured. This could indicate that the respondents see Probability/Likelihood of Corporate 
intelligence/Industrial espionage occurring where there are no patching or patches is outdated, or 







Table 4.12: Partial correlation Matrix between Probability/Likelihood of threats and Vulnerabilities 
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The questions listed in Table 4.13 contained questions for which the Cronbach Alpha coefficient could 
be calculated. Questions A1 – A4, B1 – B2, C4, C8, D1 – D3 and D6 –D8 contained one variable and 
the Cronbach Alpha’s coefficient could not be calculated. Where the Cronbach Alpha coefficient is 
between 0.8 and 0.9, the internal consistency is good and where the Cronbach Alpha coefficient is 
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greater than 0.9, the internal consistency is excellent. Overall the internal consistency ranges from 
acceptable to excellent. This shows great reliability of the data. 
Table 4.13: Cronbach Alpha for each question 
Question Cronbach Alpha Description 
C2 Threats related to ICS/SCADA 0.872918615 Internal consistency is good 
C3 Impact should threats related to 
ICS/SCADA occur 
0.864274112 Internal consistency is good 




Internal consistency is excellent 
C6 Controls to mitigate the 




Internal consistency is excellent 
C7 Impact of non-governed ICS 
should these factors materialise 
0.799746473 
 
Internal consistency is acceptable bordering 
good 
D4 Effectiveness of controls in 
ICS/SCADA environment 
0.968958699* Internal consistency is excellent 
D5 Easy is it /was to implement 
controls in ICS/SCADA 
environment 
0.974722628* Internal consistency is excellent 
* There values were calculated by imputing the values. Imputed values are when the actual values are 
not available for the calculation and they are blank. For the questions, D4 and D5, there were either 
Not applicable answers or Not sure answers and hence the actual values were not available.  
4.9 Summary 
The chapter presented the results from the questionnaire survey. A third of respondents that had a poor 
or very poor visibility of threats on their ICS/SCADA environment which could indicate that these 
ICS/SCADA environments are not governed. The top three threats likely to occur as well as have an 
impact are malware, staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions and disgruntled staff. This 
was triangulated to another question where the respondents indicate the same top threats.  
The study found that the top three vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA systems are patching 
(outdated or unpatched systems), no or limited monitoring and access control (no or weak passwords).  
The top three controls mitigating vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA environments are configuration 
(default configuration, no backup of configuration), physical security and network perimeter 
(unsecure, firewall don’t exist/misconfigured, direct connections to internet) all partially 
implemented/in progress, but leaning towards implemented control requires improvement. 
It was noted the top three impacts of non-governed ICS/SCADA environments should threats and 




Almost two thirds of respondents might possibly have had a threat that occurred in their ICS/SCADA 
environment. The study found that the top three frameworks used by the respondents to govern and 
secure their ICS/SCADA environments are COBIT, ITIL and the ISO 27001 series.  
The maturity of governance and security for ICS/SCADA environments is between evolving 
(Inconsistently applied controls) leaning slightly towards established (controls in place, but there is a 
need for enhancement). 
The top three effective controls implemented in the ICS/SCADA environments are physical access 
control, firewalls in place, and environmental standards and the top three easiest controls to 
implement are physical access control, environmental standards and virus/malware protection. Only 
the virus/malware protection addresses one of the top threats. This shows a misalignment of focusing 
and implementing controls that does not mitigate the top threats and vulnerabilities. 
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Chapter 5 Secondary Data and Document Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of secondary data and documents. The documentary methods to 
collect the data from open source, security system data, reports and advisories, was analysed using 
descriptive statistics which was then summarised in order to address the Research Objectives as 
mentioned in Section 1.5. 
Data from Shodan and from security systems was obtained, sanitised and analysed. The document 
analysis was performed by selecting existing frameworks, security alerts reports and trends. The data 
from the documents was then divided into pre-determined categories, coded and summarised. Figure 






































Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of Chapter 5 outline 
85 
 
5.2 Reports and Security Alerts and Advisories 
The sample for the document analysis was chosen by selecting common and freely available security 
alert reports and trends related to Governance, Information security and ICS/SCADA. International 
reports, trends as well as one study from South Africa was used. 
5.2.1 Symantec reports 
Symantec has one of the world’s most complete vulnerability databases and has been established as 
one of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data making it ideal for information security 
threat and vulnerability information (Symantec 2016a, 2016b). Annually Symantec releases their 
Internet Security Threat Report that contain information around vulnerabilities in order to give 
consumers to enterprises necessary information to secure their systems effectively. Of particular note 
is the section on ICS/SCADA vulnerabilities which were reported on since 2010. For the analysis, the 
vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA were analysed. 
The Symantec reports were obtained for a three year period, 2013 (Symantec 2014a, 2014b), 2014 
(Symantec 2015) and 2015 (Symantec 2016a, 2016b). The vulnerabilities for ICS/SCADA were then 
categorised based on their description into the broader vulnerability type categories as displayed in 
Table 5.1. From Table 5.1, denial of service was the top vulnerability in 2013 with 37.5%, Memory 
corruption/buffer overflow second with 18.8% and information disclosure third at 15.6%. In 2014 
denial of service declining and dropped from first in 2013 to seventh place in 2014. Memory 
corruption/buffer overflow increased to 28.6% as the top vulnerability in 2014. Info disclosure second 
with 22.9% and remote code execution and privilege escalation combined third with 11.4%. In 2015 
security bypass was the top vulnerability at 22.8% followed closely by remote code execution at 
21.9%. Third place was denial of service at 14.9%.  
Combining the totals for the three years it is noted that the top combined vulnerability is security 
bypass at 17.7%, denial of service and memory corruption/buffer overflow both second with 17.1% 
each. Thirdly was remote code execution at 16.6%. The graphical representation is presented in Figure 
5.1. 
From Table 5.1, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 it is observed that the total number of vulnerabilities from 
2013 to 2014 have increased at a minimum margin, however the increase between 2014 to 2015 have 
increased significantly from 35 in 2014 to 114 in 2015. The number of Security Bypass vulnerabilities 
have significantly increase from 3 in 2014 to 26 in 2015, a 767% increase. Denial of Service 
vulnerabilities have also significantly increase by 750% from 2 in 2014 to 17 in 2015. Remote code 
execution vulnerabilities have increased by 525%, 4 in 2104 to 25 in 2015. An increase of 400% was 
seen for Code injection, moving from 1 in 2014 to 5 in 2015. There was also a 50% increase in the 
Memory corruption/buffer overflow vulnerability, 10 in 2014 to 15 in 2015. Other vulnerabilities 
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increase by 100% from 3 in 2014 to 6 in 2015. This indicates that more and more vulnerabilities are 
being discovered and the rate of new vulnerabilities almost double year on year leave ICS/SCADA 
systems more exposed. 




2013 2014 2015 
No % No % No % No % 
Cross site scripting 1 3.1% 0 0.0% 6 5.3% 7 3.9% 
Denial of service 12 37.5% 2 5.7% 17 14.9% 31 17.1% 
Info disclosure 5 15.6% 8 22.9% 9 7.9% 22 12.2% 
Memory corruption/buffer 
overflow 6 18.8% 10 28.6% 15 13.2% 31 17.1% 
Other 2 6.3% 3 8.6% 6 5.3% 11 6.1% 
Remote code execution 1 3.1% 4 11.4% 25 21.9% 30 16.6% 
Security bypass 3 9.4% 3 8.6% 26 22.8% 32 17.7% 
Code injection 2 6.3% 1 2.9% 5 4.4% 8 4.4% 
Privilege escalation 0 0.0% 4 11.4% 5 4.4% 9 5.0% 
Grand Total 32 100% 35 100% 114 100% 181 100% 
Adapted from: Symantec (2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016a, 2016b) 
 
Figure 5.2: Symantec Report years 2013 to 2015 combined 




Figure 5.3: Symantec Report 2013 to 2015 comparison 
Adapted from: Symantec (2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016a, 2016b) 
5.2.2 ICS-CERT 
As part of the Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) mandate 
to reduce risk on critical infrastructure across the US, they compile an annual report to share security 
incidents and mitigating measures. The reports for 2014 (National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center 2014) and 2015 (National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
2015) were obtained. The ICS-CERT responded to 245 incidents and to 295 incidents in 2014 and 
2015 respectively. The ICS-CERT reports for 2014 and 2015 are listed per sector in Table 5.2. 
From Table 5.2, and Figures 5.4 and 5.5, it was noted that the top sector in 2014 where incidents 
occurred were the Energy Sector with 32.2% and secondly Critical Manufacturing Sector where 26.5% 
of the incidents occurred. In 2015 there was an increase in the overall number of incidents as well as 
in the sectors, Critical Manufacturing Sector contributing 32.9% of the incidents and the Energy Sector 
experiencing 15.6% of the incidents. Combining the incidents for the two years, the top sectors 
experiencing incidents are Critical Manufacturing Sector with 30% and the Energy Sector with 23.1%. 
The other sectors all contribute less than 10% each. This shows that since the number of vulnerabilities 
increased year on year, see Section 5.2.1, so does the incidents increase. The increase in incidents in 
the Critical Manufacturing Sector, Transportation system and Water and Wastewater system sectors 






Table 5.2: ICS-CERT report 2014 and 2015 
Sector 
2014 2015 Total 
No % No % No % 
Chemical Sector 4 1.6% 4 1.4% 8 1.5% 
Commercial Facilities Sector 7 2.9% 3 1.0% 10 1.9% 
Communications Sector 14 5.7% 13 4.4% 27 5.0% 
Critical Manufacturing Sector 65 26.5% 97 32.9% 162 30.0% 
Dams Sector 0 0.0% 6 2.0% 6 1.1% 
Defence Industrial Base Sector 0 0.0% 2 0.7% 2 0.4% 
Energy Sector 79 32.2% 46 15.6% 125 23.1% 
Financial Services Sector 3 1.2% 2 0.7% 5 0.9% 
Food and Agricultural Sector 2 0.8% 2 0.7% 4 0.7% 
Government Facilities Sector 13 5.3% 18 6.1% 31 5.7% 
Healthcare and Public Health 
Sector 15 6.1% 14 4.7% 29 5.4% 
Information Technology 
Sector 5 2.0% 6 2.0% 11 2.0% 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, 
and Waste Sector 6 2.4% 7 2.4% 13 2.4% 
Transportation Systems Sector 12 4.9% 23 7.8% 35 6.5% 
Water and Wastewater 
Systems Sector 14 5.7% 25 8.5% 39 7.2% 
Unknown 6 2.4% 27 9.2% 33 6.1% 
Totals 245 100% 295 100% 540 100% 
Adapted from: National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (2014, 2015) 
 
Figure 5.4: ICS-CERT 2014 and 2015 combined 





Figure 5.5: ICS-CERT 2014 and 2015 comparison 
Adapted from: National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (2014, 2015) 
5.2.3 SANS survey 
The SANS institute report annually on the state of ICS security in the hope that the report would 
contribute towards improving the condition of ICS/SCADA security.  The SANS institute conducted 
surveys from 2013. The SANS surveys from 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 (SANS 2013, 2014, 2015, 
2016a) was obtained. 
5.2.3.1 Threat Vectors 
As part of the SANS survey, the participants were asked to list the Top 3 threat vectors. The results 
are displayed in Table.  
Table 5.3: SANS Threat Vectors 2013 to 2016 
Threat Vector 2013 2014 2015 2016 
External threat 65% 60% 73% 61% 
Internal threat  71% 71% 49% 70% 
Integration of IT into control system networks - - 46% 29% 
Malware 72% 53% 41% 41% 
Phishing scams 52% 35% 30% 34% 
Industrial espionage 32% 25% 29% 25% 
Extortion 20% 9% 19% 18% 
Cyber-security policy violations - 33% - - 
External threat from supply 
chain or partners - - - 24% 
Other 8% 6% 8% 5% 




Figure 5.6: SANS Threat Vectors 2013 to 2016 
Adapted from: SANS (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a) 
From Table 5.3 and Figure 5.6 it is noted that the top threat vectors in 2013 were Malware, Internal 
Threat and External Threat. 2014 saw Internal Threat moved to first place, External Threat second and 
Malware dropped to third. In 2015, External Threat increase to first place while Internal Threat 
dropped to second. The third place in 2015 was attributed to a new Threat, Integration of IT into 
Control System Networks. 2016 repeated the exact same pattern as 2014 with Internal Threat in first 
place, External Threat second and Malware third. 
External Threat has slightly decreased from 2013 to 2014 and then increased in 2015 just to decrease 
again in 2016 to a similar level as 2014. Internal threat remained the same for 2013/2014, decreased 
in 2015 and returned to approximately the same level in 2016 as it was in 2013/2014. Malware trend 
indicated that the threat has decreased from 2013 to 2014 and decreased again in 2015, but remained 
the same in 2016. 
Phishing Scams generally decreased as well as Industrial Espionage and Other Threats. Integration of 
IT into Control System Networks Threat was introduced in 2015 and decreased in 2016. Cyber-
security Policy Violations was a new Threat that only appeared in 2014. This implies an increase in 
internal threat as internal staff are violating policies. 






Table 5.4: SANS Top Threat Vectors 2013 to 2016 
Year Top threat 
First Second Third 
2013 Malware (72%) Internal Threat (71%) External Threat (65%) 
2014 Internal Threat (71%) External Threat (60%) Malware (53%) 
2015 External Threat (73%) Internal Threat (49%) Integration of IT into Control System 
Networks (46%) 
2016 Internal Threat (70%) External Threat (61%) Malware (41%) 
Adapted from: SANS (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a) 
The top threats overall are: Internal Threat, External Threat and Malware. All these threats could have 
an impact on the operation of ICS/SCADA systems and could lead to disruption to the operations or 
organisation. This is further discussed in Section 6.2.2. 
5.2.3.2 Security Standard/Frameworks used 
 
As part of the SANS survey, 2013 to 2015, the participants were asked to list the security standard or 
control frameworks used. The results are displayed in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5: SANS Security Standard used 2013 to 2015 
Security Standard 2013 2014 2015 
NIST Guide to SCADA and Industrial Control Systems Security (SP 800-
82) 
40% 32% 49% 
NERC CIP 30% 20% 37% 
Critical Security Controls 34% 26% 34% 
ISA99 (Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security)/IEC 62443 18% 18% 29% 
ISO 27000 series including 27001 and others  20% 28% 
Other 26% 6% 9% 
ENISA Guide to Protecting ICS - Recommendations for Europe and 
Member States 
 6% 8% 
ISA100.15 Backhaul Network Architecture  5% 7% 
Qatar ICS Security Standard  4% 6% 
Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Standards (CFATS) 6% 7% 5% 
Unsure  27%  
Adapted from: SANS (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a) 
From Table 5.5 and Figure 5.7 it was noted that the most frequent standard used in 2013 is the NIST 
Guide to SCADA and Industrial Control Systems Security (40%), followed by the 20 Critical Security 
Controls (34%) and NERC CIP (30%). The ‘Other’ category was at 26%. Like 2013, the control 
framework used the most in 2014 were the NIST Guide (32%) again followed by the Critical Security 
Controls (26%). The NERC CIP and ISO 27000 tied in third position at 20%. The Other category 
decreased from 26% in 2013 to 6% in 2014 as new frameworks/standards being selected by the 
participants. These include: ENISA Guide to Protecting ICS—Recommendations for Europe and 
Member States (6%), ISA100.15 Backhaul Network Architecture (5%), and Qatar ICS Security 
Standard (4%). There was also however 27% of participants that were unsure of what control 





Figure 5.7: SANS Security Standards used 2013 to 2015 
Adapted from: SANS (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016a) 
In 2015 similar results show NIST being the most popular at 49%, but NERC CIP moving to second 
spot from 20% in 2014 to 37% in 2015. The Critical Security Controls also made the top 3 again at 
34%.  There was an increase in the use of the ISA99 standard as it moved from 18% in both 2013 and 
2014 to 29% in 2015. 
Combining the results from all three years the top three frameworks/standards consistently used are: 
NIST, Critical Security Controls and NERC CIP. There has been a general increase in the use of NIST 
and NERC, while the use of the Critical Security Controls remained similar. 
5.2.4 Kaspersky Report 
Kaspersky conducted research about vulnerabilities by gathering information from various sources 
such as ICS-CERT, Siemens Product CERT and compiled a report, Industrial Control System 
Vulnerabilities Statistics (Kaspersky 2016). The Kaspersky report provides a summary of the present 
global condition for ICS security, to determine the vulnerabilities of ICS/SCADA systems as well as 
looking at the vulnerable ICS components exposed to the Internet. 
The Kaspersky report for 2015 was obtained and analysed. From Figure 5.8 it is noted that the top 




Figure 5.8: Kaspersky ICS Vulnerabilities 
Adapted from: Kaspersky (2016) 
5.2.5 Wolfpack 
Wolfpack Information Risk conducted a survey on Critical Information Infrastructure in South Africa 
(Wolfpack 2016). This research was conducted independently and at the same time as this study was 
being conducted and the report, Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Report, was released in 
June 2016. Although this report focused on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection in South 
Africa, only a small section was dedicated ICS/SCADA systems. Similar questions were asked 
compared to the SANS report, as discussed in Section 5.2.3. The Wolfpack survey was distributed to 
a different audience as this study and the number of participant related to the ICS/SCADA part could 
not be determined. 
From the survey conducted by Wolfpack Information Risk, as displayed in Figure 5.9 the top three 
threat vectors for ICS/SCADA systems were: Insider exploits (selected by 63%), and combined 
secondly, each selected by 56% of the participants, are External threats, Attacks originating within the 
internal network and Information security policy violations. Malware was selected by 31% of the 






Figure 5.9: Wolfpack Top Vulnerabilities 
Adapted from: Wolfpack (2016) 
 
5.2.6 Comparing reports 
This section compares vulnerabilities and threats from the Symantec, Kaspersky, SANS, Wolfpack 
and ICS-CERT reports as discussed in Section 5.2.1 to Section 5.2.5. The objective of this comparison 
is to determine the most prevalent vulnerabilities and threats in order to see if there are any similarities 
between these reports. 
5.2.6.1 Vulnerabilities: 
Table 5.6 compared the vulnerabilities reported from Symantec to Kaspersky for the year 2015. 
Security Bypass was reported as the Top vulnerability from the Symantec report, while Kaspersky 
reported the Top vulnerability as Buffer overflow, second use of hard-coded credentials compared to 
remote code execution reported by Symantec and cross-site scripting whereas denial of service was 
reported as the third biggest vulnerability by Symantec. 
Table 5.6: Comparing vulnerabilities 
Year Report Top vulnerability 
First Second Third 
2015 Symantec 
 
Security bypass (26/ 24%) Remote code (25/23%) Denial of service 
(17/15.7%) 
Kaspersky Buffer overflow 
(17/17.9%) 




Author Compiled, Source: Symantec (2015), Kaspersky (2015) 
The most prevalent vulnerabilities for 2015 are security bypass, remote code execution and buffer 




Table 5.7 compare the vulnerabilities reported from SANS to Wolfpack for the year 2016. SANS 
reported internal threat as the top threat which is similar to the top threat, insider exploits reported by 
Wolfpack. Similar external threat was reported by both SANS and Wolfpack as the second biggest 
threat, although attacks originating within the internal network and Information security policy 
violations were combined the second biggest threats as reported by Wolfpack. Malware was reported 
as third biggest threat by SANS whereas Wolfpack reported it as the fifth biggest.  
Table 5.7: Comparing threats,  
Year Report Top threat 
First Second Third 
2016 SANS Internal threat (70%) External threat (61%) Malware (41%) 
Wolfpack Insider exploits 
(63%) 
External threats;  
Attacks originating within the internal network; and 
Information security policy violations. (56% each) 
Author Compiled, Source: SANS (2016); Wolfpack (2016) 
Top three perceived threats from SANS report are Internal Threat, External Threat and Malware. The 
reports from 2013 to 2015 have similar threats appearing in various orders each year.  
The most prevalent Threats are: Internal/Insider threat, External Threat and Malware. 
5.3 Network Security Device Data 
Logs pertaining to multiple network security devices were obtained for a two-year period, 1 May 2014 
until 30 April 2016 from a large South African state owned company, wishing to remain anonymous.  
The vulnerabilities were then categorised as displayed in Table 5.8. From Table 5.8 and Figure 5.10, 
it was noted that cross site scripting is the top vulnerability for both years with 43.5% for Year 1 and 
52.7% for Year 2 and a combined Total of 46.8%. The second highest vulnerability is Information 
Disclosure also for both years with 30.7% for Year 1 and 13.7% for Year 2 with a combined total of 
24.7% for both years. The other vulnerabilities are all below 10% each for both years. 
From Table 5.1 and Figure 5.11 the total number of vulnerabilities from Year 1 to Year 2 has 
decreased. This could be due to patching and vulnerability management that were more effective. The 
percentage Cross site scripting has increased from 43.5% in Year 1 to 52.7% in Year 2, an increase of 
9.2%. Information disclosure has decreased from 30.7% in Year 1 to 13.7% in Year 2, a decrease of 
17%. Other vulnerabilities that have increased include Remote code execution which has increased 






Table 5.8: Vulnerability categorised 
Vulnerability 
Year 1 Year 2 TOTAL 
No % No % No % 
Code Injection 779 2.7% 611 3.9% 1,390 3.1% 
Cross site scripting 12,425 43.5% 8,248 52.7% 20,673 46.8% 
Denial of Service 127 0.4% 61 0.4% 188 0.4% 
Info Disclosure 8,772 30.7% 2,148 13.7% 10,920 24.7% 
Memory corruption/buffer 
overflow 34 0.1% 29 0.2% 63 0.1% 
Other 1,584 5.5% 682 4.4% 2,266 5.1% 
Privilege escalation 1,801 6.3% 1,307 8.4% 3,108 7.0% 
Remote code execution 1,081 3.8% 1,211 7.7% 2,292 5.2% 
Security Bypass 1,940 6.8% 1,355 8.7% 3,295 7.5% 
Grand Total 28,543 100% 15,652 100% 44,195 100% 
Author Compiled, Source: Network Security Device Data 
 
Figure 5.10: Vulnerabilities 
Author Compiled, Source: Network Security Device Data 
 
Figure 5.11: Comparison Year 1 vs Year 2 
Author Compiled, Source: Network Security Device Data 
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5.3.1 Comparing to other reports 
Table 5.9 compare the vulnerabilities from Symantec and Kaspersky to the network security device 
vulnerabilities. For 2014 it was noted information disclosure was the second biggest vulnerability for 
both Symantec and the network security device with memory corruption/buffer overflow being the 
top vulnerability for Symantec and cross site scripting for the network security device. Remote code 
execution and security bypass taking third largest vulnerability for Symantec and the network security 
device respectively. In 2015 it was observed security bypass being the top vulnerability from the 
Symantec report, while cross site scripting remained the top vulnerability for the network security 
device. Kaspersky reported the top vulnerability as buffer overflow, second use of hard-coded 
credentials and cross-site scripting. This is further discussed in Section 6.3.2. 
Table 5.9: Comparing vulnerabilities 
Year Report Top vulnerability 









Cross site scripting Info disclosure Security bypass 
2015 Symantec 
 
Security bypass Remote code Denial of service 






Cross site scripting Info disclosure Security bypass 
Adapted from: Symantec (2014, 2015), Kaspersky (2015) 
5.4 Framework and Standards Comparison 
This section of the study compared available frameworks, standards and international best practices 
related to Governance, Information security and ICS/SCADA. The sample for the document analysis 
was chosen by relevance. An initial document, namely COBIT was selected as it is a well-documented 
control framework aligned with other frameworks and divided into pre-determined categories based 
on Information Security controls. As more and more documents were analysed the categories 
expanded. Microsoft Excel were used for the coding and summarising process.  
A comparison between seven control frameworks and standards that could be used to protect the 
ICS/SCADA environment. The following control frameworks or standards were compared:  
 COBIT 5 (ISACA 2012);  
 NIST SP800-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security (Stouffer et al. 2015); 
 Good Practice Guide Process Control and SCADA Security (CPNI 2008); 
 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks (U.S. Department of Energy 2007); 
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 ISO 27002:2013 Code of practice for information security controls, (ISO/IEC 2013); 
 CIS 20 Critical Controls (SANS Institute 2016); and 
 NERC CIP (Knapp 2011). 
The standards were coded or rated as follows: red if nothing is mentioned about the control, orange if 
the control is briefly mentioned, yellow if the control mentioned is partially relevant to ISC/SCADA 
environment, i.e. the control cannot be implemented immediately and require modification to align to 
an ICS/SCADA environment and green is the control is relevant (i.e. no modification is required and 
can be implemented immediately) to an ICS/SCADA environment. Table 5.10 shows a summary of 
the comparisons and Figure 5.12 a graphical representation of the comparison. 
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Source: Author compiled 
In order to represent the above table on a graph, the legend was rated and the sub categories was 
averaged as follows:  
 Red/No mention to 0; 
 Orange/Briefly mentioned to 1; 
 Yellow/Partially relevant to 2; and 




Figure 5.12: Graphical representation of the comparison of Control frameworks and standards 
Source: Author compiled 
From Table 5.10 and Figure 5.12 it was noted the CPNI framework is best suited overall as it covers 
all the security areas, secondly the NIST SP800-82 and then the ISO27001/2 series. The DOE 21 steps 
are the worst suited as it is lacking in a couple of areas, including Platform security, Logical access, 
Physical security and 3rd party and vendor management. From a governance perspective the COBIT 
framework (ISACA, 2012) is the best suited as it covers the governance areas substantially. The NERC 
CIS and SANS’s 20 Critical controls are the worst suited in terms of Governance as it fails to cover 
areas such as Strategy, Policies, standards, Project and Risk Management. 
5.5 Default passwords 
We noted in Section 2.2.1.4 the security concerns for ICS/SCADA from a password perspective. The 
list of default passwords from SCADA Strangelove (2015), was obtained and summarised. There are 
around 234 known ICS/SCADA default passwords. The results were summarised by device type and 
are displayed in Figure 5.13. It was noted that network devices and PLCs contained the majority of 




Figure 5.13: ICS/SCADA Device type with known default passwords 
Adapted from: SCADA Strangelove (2015) 
The ICS/SCADA vendors with the most known default passwords are Schneider Electric with 24, 
Siemens with 22 and Emerson with 21. Table 5.11 gives a summary of the vendors and know default 
passwords. 
Table 5.11: ICS/SCADA Vendor with known default passwords 
Vendor No of known default 
passwords 




Rockwell Automation/Allen-Bradley 15 
Tecomat  10 
Wago 10 
Wonderware 10 
Others  106 
Total 234 
Adapted from: SCADA Strangelove (2015) 
It was noted from the analysis the type of account that was listed. Although it was not possible to 
determine what type of accounts some of the default passwords and accounts were, it is evident that 
around 85% of the accounts belonged to an administrator type of account as displayed in Figure 5.14. 




Figure 5.14: ICS/SCADA Account type with known default passwords  
Adapted from: SCADA Strangelove (2015) 
It can be concluded that the most common known default password would be a Network device from 
the Vendors, Schneider Electric, Siemens or Emerson, which would have administrator type access. 
This would make these the most vulnerable devices in the ICS/SCADA environment should the default 
password not have been changed.  
5.6 Shodan 
Project SHINE (2014) released a report in 2014 that contained information of ICS/SCADA devices 
that are directly connected to the Internet. This was partly replicated, but made specific for South 
Africa. From Section 2.3.1.2, the five most common protocols and ports are Modbus (Port 502), 
Siemens/ICCP (Port 102), DNP3 (Port 20000), Ethernet/IP (Port 44818) and BACNet (Port 47808). 
The open source search engine, Shodan (www.shodan.io), was used to search for these protocols and 
port in order to determine the number of ICS/SCADA devices in South Africa are exposed to the 
internet. There were 2,213 ICS/SCADA devices in South Africa exposed to the internet. Table 5.12 
gives a summary of the results and Figure 5.15 to Figure 5.19 the results from the Shodan searches.  
The 2,213 ICS/SCADA devices in South Africa that are exposed to the internet poses a huge risk. This 
means they are easy accessible to hackers and do not have effective controls in place, such as 






Table 5.12: List of ICS/SCADA device exposed to the internet 
Protocol Port Description No of ICS/SCADA 
in South Africa 
exposed to the 
internet 
Modbus Port 502 
Modbus is commonly used for communication 
between PLCs and HMIs 
57 
Siemens/ICCP Port 102 
The ICCP is a protocol used for communication 
between control centers within the energy industry 
6 
DNP3 Port 20000 
DNP3 us mainly used for communication between 
master control stations and remote or slave devices 
2,097 
Ethernet/IP Port 44818 










Source: Author Compiled 
 














Figure 5.18: Shodan results for Port 44818 
Source: Shodan 
 
Figure 5.19: Shodan results for Port 47808 
5.7 Summary 
The document analysis was conducted on alert reports and trends based on international studies as 
well as one local study relevant to South Africa. There is consistency across all sets of analysis and 
results showing high levels of confidence. From the document analysis, it was observed that the most 
prevalent vulnerabilities are Security Bypass, Remote code execution and Buffer Overflow while the 
most prevalent Threats are: Internal/Insider threat, External Threat and Malware. The top sectors 
where incidents occurred were the Energy Sector and Critical Manufacturing Sector.  
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Comparing international best practices, it was determined that the CPNI framework is best suited 
overall as it covers all the security areas, and the COBIT framework is the best suited from a 
governance perspective.  
The most common known default password would be a Network device from the Vendors, Schneider 
Electric, Siemens or Emerson, which would have administrator type access. This would make these 
the most vulnerable devices in the ICS/SCADA environment should the default password not have 
been changed. It was noted that 2,213 ICS/SCADA devices in South Africa that are exposed to the 
internet. These do not have effective controls in place, such as segregation of ICS/SCADA via a well 
configured firewall.  
The next chapter discusses the results from the survey and the document analysis and link them back 




Chapter 6 Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 presented the results and outcomes of the online survey and Chapter 5 the findings from 
document analysis. This chapter revisits the study’s objectives and discusses the findings and results 
per research objective. The results are also triangulated and discussed in line with the results from the 
document analysis in order to draw meaningful implications and comparisons to international studies.  
Figure 6.1 is a graphical representation of the outline of this chapter and overall structure. The research 
objectives are listed in Table 6.1 and the study’s outcomes in line with each objective follow. 
 







































Table 6.1: Summary of Research objectives 
 Research objective Section 
RO1 To determine the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing ICS security in 
South Africa 
6.2 
RO2 To determine what the best mitigating controls to govern and secure ICS/SCADA 
systems in South Africa are. 
6.3 
RO3 To determine the impact of non-governed ICS 6.4 
RO4 To determine how ICS in South Africa are secured and governed 
 
6.5 
RO5 To establish if the confidence levels of implemented controls/measures mitigating 
the threats and risks are sufficient 
6.6 
RO6 To develop a control framework addressing the shortfalls for ICS security in South 
Africa 
6.7 
6.2 Research Objective 1 – To determine the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) 
influencing ICS security in South Africa 
This objective aimed to determine the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing ICS security in 
South Africa. Results from the survey, document analysis, and network device analysis are discussed 
in the section below. 
6.2.1 Vulnerabilities 
It was noted in Section 4.3.5 from the questionnaire that the top three vulnerabilities related to 
ICS/SCADA systems are outdated or unpatched systems, no or limited monitoring, and access control 
(no or weak passwords), all three listed as a medium vulnerability. 
Looking at technical vulnerabilities, in Section 5.3 from the network security device data, it was 
evident that cross site scripting is the top vulnerability, second highest vulnerability is information 
disclosure and third security bypass. These technical vulnerabilities take priority above the perceived 
vulnerabilities as they are actual measured data. 
From the document analysis in Section 5.2.6.1, it was evident that the most prevalent vulnerabilities 
are security bypass, remote code execution and buffer overflow. Others include denial of service, use 
of hard-coded credentials and cross-site scripting. 
The document analysis was conducted on reports based on international studies as well as one local 
study relevant to South Africa. The document analysis found security bypass as the prevalent 
vulnerability, as discussed in Section 5.2.6.1 while from the network security device in South Africa 
it was found as the third highest vulnerability. Cross site scripting is the highest vulnerability from the 
network security device in South Africa while internationally it is in the Top 6. Cross-site scripting 
vulnerability may be used by attackers to bypass access controls, the categorisation of the international 
reports could list a cross-site scripting vulnerability under security bypass.  
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There is a challenge that each report categorise the vulnerabilities differently. This might have a small 
implication on the study as there are no consistency between categories and this could lead to some 
bias towards certain vulnerabilities and threats. Also this might impact someone in the industry when 
trying to use various reports to determine the top vulnerabilities and could wrongly place emphasis on 
controls for vulnerabilities that are not really the most prevalent.   
It was also noted that no or weak passwords, as listed by the respondents, as the third highest 
vulnerability coincide with the third highest vulnerability found from the analysis of the network 
security devices. With outdated or unpatched systems and no or limited monitoring being the top two 
vulnerabilities as indicated by the respondents, there are big gaps in terms of securing and having an 
overview of vulnerabilities for ICS/SCADA in South Africa.  
From the document analysis in Section 5.5, it was determined that there are at least 234 known 
ICS/SCADA default passwords with most having privilege access in the form of administrator or root 
accounts. This strengthens and align with the third highest vulnerability of no or weak passwords from 
the survey and third highest vulnerability from the document analysis on the network security devices.  
It was determined from the analysis in Section 5.6 that a number of ICS/SCADA devices in South 
Africa are exposed to the internet. At least 2,213 ICS/SCADA devices in South Africa are exposed to 
the internet and poses as a huge risk. The implication is that they are easy accessible to hackers as 
these ICS/SCADA device do not have effective controls in place. There is a lack of appropriate 
segregation of ICS/SCADA networks and IT or corporate networks via a well configured firewall 
leaving them exposed and easily accessible via the internet.  
The vulnerability factors influencing ICS/SCADA in South Africa are outdated or unpatched systems, 
no or limited monitoring and access control while the technical vulnerabilities are security bypass, 
cross-site scripting and remote code execution.  
6.2.2 Threats 
The results in Section 4.3.2 illustrated that the top three threats likely to occur are:  
1. Malware (medium - expected to occur in some circumstances),  
2. Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions (leaning towards medium - expected to 
occur in some circumstances) and  
3. Disgruntled staff (intentional) (also leaning towards medium - expected to occur in some 
circumstances).  
This was triangulated to the question in Section 4.3.3 as the respondents listed the top 3 threats as: 
Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions (e.g. making changes without following change 
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control process) which 67% of the respondents selected, malware (worms/viruses/Trojans/spyware) 
63% and disgruntled staff (intentional) 48%.  
From the document analysis of SANS report in Section 5.2.3 it was noted that the top three perceived 
threats from an international perspective are internal threat, external threat and malware. This relates 
to the top threats selected by the respondents in Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Internal threats can be directly 
linked to staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised action as well as disgruntled staff, and malware 
remained in the top three.  
From a local perspective, from the Wolfpack report discussed in Section 5.2.5, it was evident the Top 
threats are: Insider exploits, and combined secondly, external threats, attacks originating within the 
internal network and information security policy violations. Malware was in the top 5. This also relates 
to the top threats selected by the respondents in Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Internal threats and 
information security policy violation can be directly linked to staff undertaking unintentional 
unauthorised action as well as disgruntled staff while malware remained the in the top three. Apart 
from malware, the results are consistent between the local survey conducted by Wolfpack and this 
study. The survey performed by Wolfpack might have targeted a different audience which perceived 
malware as top 5 threat and not top 3. This is a small deviation and no material impact on the results.   
This suggests that from both an international and local perspective the threats are similar and the 
following three threats are perceived as the Top threats: staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised 
actions, disgruntled staff and malware. There is consistency across all sets of analysis and results 
showing high levels of confidence. 
6.2.3 Risks 
As discussed in Section 3.4, risk is defined as impact times probability/likelihood (Boehm, 1991). The 
probability/likelihood of threat vs the impact of threat was plotted in Figure 6.2.  
The top three risks to ICS/SCADA environment are:  
 Malware 
 Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions and 




Figure 6.2: Risk (Impact vs Probability/Likelihood) 
Source: Author compilation 
This aligns to the threats discussed in Section 6.2.2 and strengthen consistency across all sets of 
analysis and results showing high levels of confidence. 
6.2.4 Summary 
There are three factors influencing ICS/SCADA in South Africa. They are vulnerabilities, technical 
vulnerabilities and threats. The vulnerability factor influencing ICS/SCADA in South Africa are 
outdated or unpatched systems, no or limited monitoring and access control while the technical 
vulnerabilities are security bypass, cross-site scripting and remote code execution. A number of 
ICS/SCADA devices are exposed to the internet indicating that there is a lack of appropriate controls 
to effectively segregate the ICS/SCADA network from IT or corporate network. The threat factor 
influencing ICS/SCADA in South Africa are staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions, 
disgruntled staff and malware. These factors could potentially influence the availability of 
ICS/SCADA systems by causing distribution to operations and the business and ultimately financial 
loss. There is also a bigger risk if these factors influence the operation of ICS/SCADA systems 




6.3 Research Objective 2 – To determine what the best mitigating controls to govern 
and secure ICS/SCADA systems in South Africa are. 
In order to determine the best mitigating controls to govern and secure ICS/SCADA systems, the 
vulnerabilities and threat related to ICS/SCADA needs to be taken into account. The controls should 
be implemented based on vulnerability and threat priority. Control preference should be given to these 
technical vulnerabilities as these were detected and not perceived as in the case of the top perceived 
vulnerabilities and threats. 
6.3.1 Controls for vulnerabilities and threats 
The results in Section 4.3.6 from the questionnaire illustrated that the top three controls mitigating 
vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA environments are configuration (default configuration, no backup 
of configuration), physical security and network perimeter (Unsecure, firewall does not 
exist/misconfigured, direct connections to internet) of which the average of responses all indicated 
these controls were partially implemented/in progress, but leaning strongly towards implemented 
control requires improvement.  
It was also noted the bottom three controls mitigating vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA environments 
as selected by respondents in the questionnaire are: monitoring, patching and wireless connections all 
partially Implemented/in progress as indicated by the respondents.  
Looking at the vulnerabilities discussed in Section 6.2.1, the top three vulnerabilities related to 
ICS/SCADA systems are patching (outdated/unpatched), monitoring (no or limited), and access 
control (no or weak password). The controls to govern or mitigate the vulnerability for 
outdated/unpatched is by implementing patching control, which are neither top or bottom three, but 
the respondents indicated that patching control is partially implemented/in progress.  
Similarly, for the vulnerability in no or limited monitoring, the control to govern or mitigate it is to 
implement a monitoring control, which are the bottom control implemented as respondents indicated 
this is partially implemented/in progress. The third top vulnerability is in access control (No or weak 
password), and the control to govern or mitigate is to implement effective access controls like 
passwords and user account management. This control is neither top nor bottom three, but the 
respondents indicated that access control is partially implemented/in progress, but leaning strongly 
towards implemented control requires improvement.  
Although this is a slightly lesser risk than the other two top vulnerabilities, this is still a risk as the 
control should be implemented and operating effectively in order to successfully govern or mitigate 
the vulnerability. This shows a clear gap in governing/mitigation of all three the top vulnerabilities.  
Table 6.2 show a summary of Top vulnerabilities and the status of controls. 
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Table 6.2: Summary of Top vulnerabilities and status of relevant controls 
Top vulnerability Control to mitigate Status of controls 
Patching - 
outdated/unpatched 
Patching control Partially implemented/in progress 
Monitoring – no or 
limited 
Monitoring control Partially implemented/in progress 
Access control - no or 
weak password 
Access control Partially implemented/in progress, but leaning strongly 
towards implemented control requires improvement 
 
The best mitigating controls to govern and secure the top perceived vulnerabilities for ICS/SCADA 
systems in South Africa are to patch ICS/SCADA systems, to monitor them and to ensure appropriate 
access control in the form of user account management is in place.  
From the discussion in Section 6.2.2 it was noted that the threat factor influencing ICS/SCADA in 
South Africa are staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions, disgruntled staff and malware. 
In order to adequately mitigate these, effective access control and anti-virus software needs to be 
implemented. 
6.3.2 Controls for technical vulnerabilities 
It was evident from the network security device data in Section 5.3 that the top three technical 
vulnerabilities are cross site scripting, being the top vulnerability, second highest vulnerability is 
information disclosure and third security bypass.  
The controls to govern or mitigate the technical vulnerability for cross site scripting and information 
disclosure is configuration management, which are the top control implemented as indicated by the 
respondents. They indicated that the configuration control was leaning very strongly towards the 
category of Implemented control requires improvement. Although the focus is on mitigating the 
technical vulnerabilities, the implemented control was still not at optimum level, which were 
implemented and operating effectively. 
Similar for the technical vulnerability, security bypass, the control to govern or mitigate it is to 
implement effective access controls such as passwords and user account management. This control is 
neither top nor bottom three, but the respondents indicated that access control is partially 
implemented/in progress, but leaning strongly towards implemented control requires improvement.  
Although all three of these technical vulnerabilities have a slightly less risk than the other 
vulnerabilities mentioned in Section 6.3.1, there are still a risk as the controls should be implemented 
and operating effectively in order to successfully govern or mitigate the vulnerabilities. This shows a 
clear risk in governing and mitigation of all three the top vulnerabilities. 
Below is a summary of the technical vulnerabilities and the status of controls: 
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Table 6.3: Summary of Top technical vulnerabilities and status of relevant controls 
Top Technical vulnerability Control to mitigate Status of controls 
Cross site scripting Configuration Leaning strongly towards implemented 
control requires improvement 
Information disclosure Configuration Leaning strongly towards implemented 
control requires improvement 
Security bypass Access control Partially implemented/in progress, but 
leaning strongly towards implemented 
control requires improvement 
 
From the document analysis in Section 5.2.6.1, the international reports indicated that the most 
prevalent vulnerabilities are security bypass, remote code execution and buffer overflow. Others 
include denial of service, use of hard-coded credentials and cross-site scripting. 
As noted above, security bypass, requires access controls such as passwords and user account 
management, to govern or mitigate it. This control is neither top nor bottom three, but the respondents 
indicated that access control is partially implemented/in progress, but leaning strongly towards 
implemented control requires improvement. For the technical vulnerability remote code execution, the 
control, remote access is neither top nor bottom three, but the respondents indicated that remote access 
control is partially implemented/in progress.  
The third top technical vulnerability, memory corruption/buffer overflow requires effective 
configuration management, which although is the top control implemented, the implemented control 
is still not at optimum level, which are implemented and operating effectively. Respondents indicated 
that configuration control is leaning very strongly towards the category of implemented control 
requires improvement. This shows a clear gap in governing/mitigation of all three the top international 
technical vulnerabilities. 
Table 6.4 provides a summary of the most prevalent international technical vulnerabilities from the 
document analysis with the status of controls. 
Table 6.4: Summary of Top international technical vulnerabilities and status of relevant controls 
Top Technical vulnerability Control to mitigate Status of controls 
Security bypass Access control Partially implemented/in progress, but 
leaning strongly towards implemented 
control requires improvement 
Remote code execution Remote access Partially implemented/in progress 
Memory corruption/buffer overflow Configuration Partially implemented/in progress, but 
leaning strongly towards implemented 
control requires improvement 
 
The focus is wrongly placed on the implementation of physical security and network perimeter 
controls. These controls do not however address the technical vulnerabilities in security bypass, being 
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the third top vulnerability from the local network security device, and the top technical vulnerability 
from an international perspective. The focus should also be on the other top two international technical 
vulnerably (remote code execution and memory corruption/buffer overflow) as they might come or 
become relevant to South Africa at a later stage.  
From Section 4.6.5 it was noted that the Top 3 priorities when it comes to implementing effective 
controls for the security of ICS/SCADA systems are: Preventing control system service interruption, 
preventing financial loss/protecting shareholder value and protecting health and safety of employees. 
The top threats and vulnerabilities discussed will cause system service interruption and possible 
financial loss, thus strengthening the need to shift the focus towards mitigating the top threats and 
vulnerabilities as a priority.  
6.3.3 Summary 
The state of ICS/SCADA is one of ungoverned and unsecure systems. The best mitigating controls to 
govern and secure the top perceived vulnerabilities and threats for ICS/SCADA systems in South 
Africa are to patch ICS/SCADA systems, to monitor them and to ensure appropriate access control in 
the form of user account management is in place as well as appropriate anti-virus software.  
The best mitigating controls to govern and secure the technical vulnerabilities are the implementation 
of appropriate access control, implementation of appropriate and secure configuration as well as 
implementing controls to govern and secure remote access. Preference is given to these technical 
vulnerabilities as these were detected and not perceived as in the case of the top perceived 
vulnerabilities and threats.  
6.4 Research Objective 3 – To determine the impact of non-governed ICS. 
In Section 4.3.4 it was observed that the top three threats likely to impact ICS/SCADA systems are 
malware which had a medium impact – e.g. some service disruption, but also leaning towards high 
impact – e.g. service disruption), second disgruntled staff (intentional) also medium impact (expected 
to occur in some circumstances, but also leaning towards high impact – e.g. service disruption), and 
staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions with another medium impact (expected to occur 
in some circumstances but also leaning towards high impact – e.g. service disruption). 
We also saw that the bottom three threats likely to have less impact on ICS/SCADA systems should 
they occur are: illegal information brokers, foreign intelligence services and social engineering 
(phishing emails etc.) all leaning strongly towards low (Expected to occur in a few circumstances).  
In Section 4.4 it was indicated top three impacts of non-governed ICS/SCADA environments should 
threats and vulnerabilities materialise, are loss of availability/denial of service, secondly loss of 
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integrity and unauthorised control all having a moderate impact which could lead to some service 
disruption/potential for adverse publicity. 
The author observed in Section 4.4.1 that 37% of respondents did not have a threat occurrence in their 
ICS/SCADA environment.  It was not that 25% of respondents indicated that a threat did occur, 15% 
cannot disclose, 13% are not sure while 10% indicated maybe. From this it could be concluded that 
only 37% did not have a threat occurrence in their ICS/SCADA environment, while the remaining 
63% might possibly have had a threat that occurred in their ICS/SCADA environment. From the 
respondents that had a threat occurring in their ICS/SCADA environment, it was noted that 42% of 
respondents indicated that the threat/event occurred ‘2 – 4’ times in the past 12 months, 41% of 
respondents had a threat/event occurred once and 17% of respondents had a threat/event occurred ‘5 
– 10’ times in the past month. 
The top perceived threats and vulnerabilities is expected to occur in some circumstances and 
potentially lead to loss of availability or denial of service, loss of integrity and unauthorised control. 
This impact could cause some service disruption or potential for adverse publicity. 
6.4.1 Summary 
The impact of non-governed or unsecure ICS/SCADA is loss of availability or denial of service. The 
top perceived threats and vulnerabilities could potentially lead to service disruption which could cause 
distribution to operations and the business and ultimately lead to financial loss. There is also a bigger 
risk if these factors influence the operation of ICS/SCADA systems whereby human life could be at 
stake. This could also have a potential for adverse publicity. 
6.5 Research Objective 4 – To determine how ICS in South Africa are secured and 
governed 
In Section 4.5.1 it was noted that the majority of the respondents (69%) have control frameworks in 
place. 17% of respondents indicated that ICS/SCADA is regulatory monitored, 8% were unsure how 
ICS/SCADA systems are secured and governed, 4% indicated that ICS/SCADA systems are not 
governed while 2% indicated other.  
The effectiveness of controls is discussed in more detail in Section 6.6.1 and indicate the 
implementation levels of controls which also have an influence on how ICS/SCADA systems are 
secured and governed. 
We also saw in Section 4.5.2 that the top three frameworks used by the respondents to govern and 
secure their ICS/SCADA environments are COBIT, ITIL and the ISO 27001 series. The three 
frameworks that are used the least by the respondents to govern and secure their ICS/SCADA 
environments are ISA99, ENISA and CPNI. 
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From the document analysis in section 5.4 it was observed that the CPNI framework is best suited 
overall as it covers all the security areas, secondly the NIST SP800-82 and then the ISO27001/2 series. 
From a governance perspective the COBIT 5 framework (ISACA, 2012) is the best suited as it covers 
the governance areas substantially 
From this it was established that the majority of respondents in South Africa have control frameworks 
in place that mostly govern the ICS/SCADA environment. As the majority indicated they use COBIT, 
which is the best suited from a governance perspective. However, what is lacking is the security aspect. 
As per the document analysis the best suited framework, the CPNI, is one of the least used frameworks 
by respondents in South Africa. This shows a gap in the securing ICS/SCADA systems or 
environments in South Africa.  
In order to fully determine how ICS in South Africa are secured and governed the maturity of 
governance and security of an ICS/SCADA environment in South Africa was looked at. In Section 
4.6 it was noted that 38% of respondents indicated that the maturity of governance and security in 
their ICS/SCADA environment is established, 25% indicated the maturity of their environment is 
evolving and 25% also indicated their environment is basic. It was also note that 10% of the 
governance and security of ICS/SCADA environments are advanced and only 2% leading. From the 
responses, it was noted the mean for the responses of the maturity of governance and security for 
ICS/SCADA environment is 2.40 and that, with 95% confidence, the population mean for the maturity 
of governance and security for the ICS/SCADA environment is between 2.10 to 2. 70. This indicates 
that the population mean for the maturity of governance and security for ICS/SCADA environments 
is between evolving (Inconsistently applied controls) leaning slightly towards established (Controls in 
place, but there is a need for enhancement). 
The desired state for ICS/SCADA environments are at minimum advanced or leading (refer to Section 
2.2.3.4), however it can be concluded that although a majority of respondents have control frameworks 
in place to govern the ICS/SCADA environment, the maturity of the controls is between evolving 
(Inconsistently applied controls) and established (Controls in place, but there is a need for 
enhancement) as indicated in Figure 6.3. 









Figure 6.3: ICS/SCADA maturity 
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6.6 Research Objective 5 – To establish if the confidence levels of implemented 
controls/measures mitigating the threats and risks are sufficient 
In order to establish if the confidence levels of the implemented controls/measures mitigating the 
threats and risks are sufficient the effectiveness of controls as well as the ease of implementation of 
controls needs to be look at, which gives us the security confidence as discussed in Section 3.4 and as 
depicted in Figure 3.2. 
6.6.1 Effectiveness of controls 
In Section 4.6.1 it was noted the top three effective controls implemented in the ICS/SCADA 
environments are:  
 Firstly, physical access control, implemented but requires improvement; 
 Secondly firewalls, implemented but requires improvement; and  
 Thirdly environmental standards, partially Implemented/in progress but leaning strongly 
towards implemented but requires improvement.  
The bottom three effective controls or less effective controls implemented in the ICS/SCADA 
environments are: strategy of ICS/SCADA, SIEM or security intelligence centre and data encryption 
which all relates to partially implemented/in progress. 
Looking at the vulnerabilities from Section 6.2.1, the top three vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA 
systems are patching (outdated/unpatched), monitoring (no or limited), and access control (no or weak 
password). The controls to govern or mitigate the vulnerability for outdated/unpatched is by 
implementing patch management, which are neither top or bottom three, but the respondents indicated 
that patch management is partially implemented/in progress.  
Similar for the vulnerability, no or limited monitoring; the control to govern or mitigate it is to 
implement a SIEM or security intelligence centre, which are the second least effective control 
implemented. The respondents indicated this is partially implemented/in progress. The third top 
vulnerability is in access control (no or weak password), and the control to govern or mitigate is to 
implement effective user access management. This control is neither top nor bottom three, but the 
respondents indicated that user access management is partially implemented/in progress, but leaning 
strongly towards implemented control requires improvement. Although the control, user access 
management is a slightly lesser risk than the other two top vulnerabilities, this is still not sufficient as 
the control should be implemented and operating effectively in order to successfully govern or mitigate 
the vulnerability. This shows a clear gap in governing and mitigating of all three the top vulnerabilities. 
The threats influencing ICS/SCADA security as discussed in Section 6.2.2, were malware, staff 
undertaking unintentional unauthorised action and disgruntled staff as the top three threats. Looking 
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at controls to govern or mitigate these threats, the control to govern or mitigate malware is 
virus/malware protection. The respondents indicated that anti-virus/malware control is partially 
implemented/in progress, but leaning towards implemented control requires improvement. This shows 
a risk in governing and mitigation of the top threat, namely malware. Similar gap for the threat, staff 
undertaking unintentional unauthorised action, the control to govern or mitigate it is policies, 
procedures, standards and frameworks. Respondents indicated this is partially implemented/in 
progress. For the third top threat, disgruntled staff, the control to govern or mitigate this is to 
implement effective user access management in order to remove the user’s account should they be 
terminated. Effective policies, procedures, standards and frameworks is also required to mitigate 
disgruntled staff. For both these controls the respondents indicated that the controls are partially 
implemented/in progress, but leaning strongly towards implemented control requires improvement for 
user access management. Although this is a slightly lesser risk than the other two top threats, this is 
still a risk as the control should be implemented and operating effectively in order to successfully 
govern or mitigate the threat, disgruntled staff. 
For both the threats and vulnerabilities, the focus might be wrongly placed on the implementation of 
physical security and network perimeter controls, and does not however fully address the above threats 
and vulnerabilities. Although physical security might prevent disgruntled staff to do physical damage, 
more emphasis should be placed access control, the focus should be shifted towards the threats and 
vulnerabilities that are relevant to the ICS/SCADA environment.  
6.6.2 Ease of implementation of controls 
We noted in Section 4.6.2, the top three easiest controls to implement for the ICS/SCADA 
environment are physical access control (implement with some challenges), environmental standards 
(implement with some challenges), and virus/ malware protection all implement with some challenges. 
The bottom most difficult controls to implement for the ICS/SCADA environment are: systems 
hardening (difficult to implement leaning highly towards implement with some challenges), secondly 
remote access and 3rd party remote access both control listed as implement with some challenges.  
Looking at the vulnerabilities from Section 6.2.1, the top three vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA 
systems are patching (outdated/unpatched), monitoring (no or limited), and access control (no or weak 
password). The controls to govern or mitigate the vulnerability for outdated/unpatched systems is by 
implementing patch management, which are neither top or bottom three, but the respondents indicated 
that patching control as implement with some challenges.  
Similar for the vulnerability, no or limited monitoring, the control to govern or mitigate it is to 
implement a SIEM or security intelligence centre, which respondents indicated this as implement with 
some challenges. The third top vulnerability is in access control (No or weak password), and the 
control to govern or mitigate is to implement effective user access management. This control is neither 
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top nor bottom three easiest to implement, but the respondents indicated that user access management 
as implement with some challenges. 
This indicates that the mitigating controls for the top vulnerabilities are not difficult to implement nor 
is it easy, but that it can be implemented with some challenges. This shows that some effort has been 
made to implement these controls. 
The threats influencing ICS/SCADA security from Section 6.2.2, were malware, staff undertaking 
unintentional unauthorised action and disgruntled staff as the top three threats. Looking at controls to 
govern or mitigate these threats, the control to govern or mitigate malware is virus/malware 
protection. The respondents indicated that anti-virus/malware control is the third easiest control to 
implement and indicated as implement with some challenges. This shows that some effort has been 
made to implement the control to mitigate one of the top three threats, malware. Similar risks for the 
threat, staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised action, the control to govern or mitigate it is 
policies, procedures, standards and frameworks. Respondents indicated this as implement with some 
challenges. For the third top threat, disgruntled staff, and the control to govern or mitigate this 
implement effective user access management in order to remove the user’s account should they be 
terminated as well as effective policies, procedures, standards and frameworks. For both these 
controls the respondents indicated that the controls as implement with some challenges. Similar to the 
vulnerabilities, this indicates that the mitigating controls for the top threats are not difficult to 
implement nor is it easy, but that it can be implemented with some challenges. This shows that some 
effort has been made to implement these controls. 
6.6.3 How confident/certain are you that the implemented controls mitigating the threats and 
risks are sufficient? 
In Section 4.6.4 it was noted how confident/certain the respondents were that the implemented controls 
mitigating the threats and risks sufficiently. The average of respondents indicate that they are 
somewhat confident leaning towards moderately confident that the implemented controls mitigate the 
threats and vulnerabilities sufficiently. This indicates that the confident levels are lower than it should 
be. 
From Section 4.7.3, the security confidence is made up from usability of security and ease of use of 
security, as depicted in Figure 6.3. The top five security confidence controls are: physical access 
control, environmental standards, firewalls in place, backup and recovery and virus/malware 
protection. These controls should be focused on or prioritised when developing a control framework. 




Figure 6.4: Effectiveness of control vs Ease of implementation 
Source: Author compilation 
6.6.4 Summary 
Although focus is placed on certain controls to mitigate the perceived threats and vulnerabilities, more 
emphasis should be placed on controls that address the threats and vulnerabilities that are relevant to 
the ICS/SCADA environment. 
The perception is that the mitigating controls for the top threats and vulnerabilities are not difficult to 
implement nor is it easy, but that it can be implemented with some challenges. This shows that some 
effort has been made to implement these controls. The confident levels of the respondents are lower 







6.7 Research Objective 6 – To develop a control framework addressing the shortfalls 
for ICS security in South Africa 
The research framework was discussed in Section 3.4, and is populated with the relevant data and 



















Figure 6.5: Research Framework (unpopulated with results) 
Source: Author compilation 
In Section 6.7.1 to Section 6.7.8 following, the top results that was used as input into the Research 
framework listed. The red blocks are represented from Sections 6.7.1 to 6.7.5. 
6.7.1 Probability 
From the discussion in Section 6.2.2, the top three threats likely to occur are:  
 Malware;  
 Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions; and  
 Disgruntled staff (intentional). 
6.7.2 Impact 




 Disgruntled staff; and 
 Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions.  
6.7.3 Risks 
As discussed in Section 6.2.3, the top three risks to ICS/SCADA environment are:  
 Malware; 
 Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions; and 
 Disgruntled staff. 
6.7.4 Threats and Vulnerabilities 
6.7.4.1 Threat  
From the discussion in Section 6.2.2, the top three threats likely to occur are:  
 Malware;   
 Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions; and 
 Disgruntled staff (intentional). 
6.7.4.2 Vulnerabilities 
The discussion in Section 6.2.1, indicated that the top three vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA 
systems are  
 Outdated/unpatched systems; 
 No or limited Monitoring;  
 ICS/SCADA not appropriately segregated; and 
 No or weak password. 
The top three technical vulnerabilities related to ICS/SCADA systems are  
 Security Bypass; 
 Cross site scripting; and  
 Remote code execution.  
6.7.5 Perceived susceptibility 
The significant perceived susceptibility of ICS/SCADA environments in South Africa are the 
following risks, threats and vulnerabilities: 
 Malware; 
 Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions; 
124 
 
 Disgruntled staff; 
 Security Bypass; 
 Cross site scripting; 
 Remote code execution; 
 Outdated/unpatched systems; 
 No or limited Monitoring;  
 No or weak password; and 
 ICS/SCADA not appropriately segregated. 
The green blocks are represented from Sections 6.7.6 to 6.78 and relate to the TAM model. 
6.7.6 Usability of security 
From the discussion in Section 6.6.1, the top three effective controls implemented in the ICS/SCADA 
environments are: 
 Physical access control; 
 Firewalls in place; and 
 Environmental standards. 
6.7.7 Ease of use of security 
The discussion in Section 6.6.2 indicated that the top three easiest controls to implement for the 
ICS/SCADA environment are 
 Physical access control; 
 Environmental standards; and  
 Virus/ malware protection. 
6.7.8 Security Confidence 
From Figure 6.4 the top five security confidence controls are:  
 Physical access control; 
 Environmental standards; 
 Firewalls in place; 
 Backup and recovery; and 
 Virus/malware protection. 
The research framework has been populated with the list of all the relevant input from Sections 6.7.1 
to Section 6.7.8. Note that the blocks inside the black dotted line (Probability, Impact, Threats and 
Risk) have the same list, namely malware, staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions and 
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Figure 6.6: Research Framework populated with results 
Source: Author compilation 
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6.7.9 Coping response (Propose ICS/SCADA framework) 
Taking the perceived susceptibility from Section 6.7.5 and the Security Confidence from Section 6.7.8 
as in put into the coping response, the framework for protection of ICS/SCADA in South Africa can 
be developed.  
6.7.9.1 Process of framework development 
As discussed in Section 2.5.4, the process to develop a control framework is illustrated in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.7: Framework Development Methodology 
Adapted from: CPNI (2008)  
Each of the framework development steps are discussed in Sections A to F. 
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A. Understand the system 
As discussed in Section 2.5.4.1, an organisation or company needs to conduct a formal inventory and 
analysis of the ICS/SCADA systems and components in the environment. This was excluded as there 
were various organisations from different industries consisting of multiple ICS/SCADA systems.  
B. Understand the threats 
Under this step, the organisation needs to assess the threats to the organisation. The threats for 
ICS/SCADA systems in South Africa was determined, as discussed in Section 6.2.2 and populated in 
Section 6.7.4.1. The threats are malware, staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions, and 
disgruntled staff.  
C. Understand the impact 
The impact of the risks, threats and vulnerabilities of non-governed or unsecure ICS/SCADA as 
discussed in Section 6.4 is loss of availability or denial of service. 
D. Understand vulnerabilities 
The vulnerabilities affecting the organisation needs to be assessed under this step. The vulnerabilities 
for ICS/SCADA systems in South Africa was determined, as discussed in Section 6.2.1 and populated 
in Section 6.7.4.2.  
E. Development of framework 
A SCADA control framework was developed taking into account the relevant risks, threats and 
vulnerabilities to the South African ICS/SCADA environment. From the document analysis in Section 
5.4, the CPNI framework is best suited overall as it covers all the security areas and the COBIT 
framework is best suited from a governance perspective and was also used by most respondents as 
discussed in Section 6.5. The high level framework is listed in Table 6.5 with prevalent controls to 
implement based on the Perceived susceptibility, as discussed in Section 6.7.5. The time frame for 
each control is based on priority. Priority 1 controls need to be implemented within three months, 
priority 2 within six months and priority three within a year. The details of each control is discussed 
in Section 6.7.9.2 to Section 6.7.9.27 
F. Review and monitoring 
Regular review of the South African ICS/SCADA environment needs to take place, to identify any 
new systems changes, threats, vulnerabilities and corresponding update of the control framework 
should take place at minimum annually. Ongoing testing of the framework in other ICS/SCADA 
environments will need to be conducted to ensure generalisation and applicability of the framework. 
Future work will need to include detailed breakdown of the controls as well as analysis of the 
practicality of implementation and further alignment to South African government legal requirements 
and international frameworks. 
128 
 
Table 6.5: ICS/SCADA controls prioritised  
Control Justification Threat/Vulnerability Priority  Timeframe 
Virus/Malware Protection 
Top threat 
Malware 1 0 – 3 months Top 5 security 
confidence 
Monitoring (SIEM or 
Security Intelligence Centre 








 1 0 – 3 months 
Top vulnerability 
No or limited 
Monitoring 




Disgruntled staff  
(intentional)  
 
1 0 – 3 months 
 Top technical 
vulnerability 
Security Bypass 




1 0 – 3 months 





Cross site scripting  1 0 – 3 months 
Remote Access and 3rd 










1 0 – 3 months 
Password Policies Top vulnerability No or weak password  1 0 – 3 months 
Segregation from other 
networks and Firewalls in 
place 
Top 5 security 
confidence, 
ICS/SCADA 
exposed to internet 
Firewalls in place  2 3 – 6 months 
Physical Access control 
 
Top 5 security 
confidence 
Physical access control 2 3 – 6 months 
Environmental Standards 
 




2 3 – 6 months 
Backup and Recovery, 
Redundancy/resilient 
infrastructure and Business 
Continuity and Disaster 
recovery plans 
Top 5 security 
confidence 
Backup and recovery 2 3 – 6 months 
     
Policies, procedures, 
standards, and frameworks  
  3 6 – 12 months 
Vulnerability 
Management/audits 
  3 6 – 12 months 
Risk Management   3 6 – 12 months 
Incident Response   3 6 – 12 months 
User Awareness Training   3 6 – 12 months 
Third Party Management   3 6 – 12 months 
Project Management   3 6 – 12 months 




Bottom 3  3 6 – 12 months 
Strategy of ICS/SCADA Bottom 3  3 6 – 12 months 
Data encryption Bottom 3  3 6 – 12 months 
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6.7.9.2 Virus/Malware Protection 
To ensure that the ICS/SCADA environment is protected against malware and external threats by 
implementing vendor accredited and configured anti malware software. Where anti malware software 
cannot be deployed, other protection measures should be implemented, such as gateway anti-virus 
scanning or manual media checking. 
6.7.9.3 Monitoring (SIEM or Security Intelligence Centre and Audit logs) 
Ensure that regular system monitoring of ICS/SCADA infrastructure (processes, network, and field 
devices) is performed. This includes network traffic and user access to detect anomalies, and external 
threat intelligence to receive early warnings of potential threats or newly discovered vulnerabilities. 
SIEM or SIC can be used to assist. At minimum Audit logs should be reviewed. 
6.7.9.4 User and Device Access Management 
To ensure that new employees and terminated employees are managed in the ICS/SCADA 
environment, this include access to systems, applications, databases, device, switches and PLCs. 
Ensure the access is minimised to specific job-functions. 
6.7.9.5 System Change Control 
To ensure that changes to the ICS/SCADA systems are managed and all data conversions are formally 
managed in accordance with the System Development Lifecycle Methodology, and Change and 
Release Management Procedure. 
6.7.9.6 Systems hardening and security features 
Ensure that the ICS/SCADA systems have been hardened: security features activated, unused services 
and ports have been disabled in the operating systems and applications to prevent unauthorised use, 
and the use of removable media (such as CDs and USB drives) is restricted where possible. Where 
use of removable media is necessary, procedures are in place to ensure these are checked for malware 
prior to use.  
6.7.9.7 Configuration Management 
Ensure that configuration of ICS/SCADA systems have been documented in a configuration 
management database (CMDB). No changes are made to the ICS/SCADA configuration without a 
corresponding update to the CMDB. 
6.7.9.8 Remote Access and 3rd party remote access 
To ensure that remote access to ICS/SCADA systems is restricted, remote access is managed and 
regularly reviewed. Appropriate authentication mechanisms (e.g. strong authentication) should be 
implemented for any remote connections. Security reviews of all third parties having remote access to 
the ICS/SCADA are performed and managed on a regular basis. 
130 
 
6.7.9.9 Patch Management 
To ensure that vendor certified security patches are implemented. Thoroughly test all patches on a 
test-bed prior to installing on production systems. Where security patching is not possible or practical, 
alternative appropriate protection measures are considered. 
6.7.9.10 Password Policies 
To ensure that password policies for ICS/SCADA systems are defined and implemented: applicable 
users, strength of passwords and expiration times are specified, default vendor passwords are changed 
where possible from the default settings, and for systems or functions where passwords may not be 
deemed necessary (such as view only mode) compensating controls are documented (e.g. for control 
room staff). 
6.7.9.11 Segregation from other networks and Firewalls in place 
To ensure that ICS/SCADA network is protected or segregated from other networks by appropriately 
installed, configured and managed firewalls (where connections exist). For extremely sensitive 
networks, an air gap can be used to separate the ICS/SCADA network from the enterprise network. 
Email and Internet access from ICS/SCADA systems is minimised and restricted to protect 
environment from external threats. 
6.7.9.12 Physical Access 
To ensure that adequate physical security measures are in place to restrict access to areas housing 
ICS/SCADA equipment and devices. 
6.7.9.13 Environmental Standards 
Ensure that a resilient infrastructure with necessary facilities are installed to protect the ICS/SCADA 
systems. Equipment should reside in environmentally controlled areas at appropriate ambient 
conditions to ensure its proper and sustainable operation. 
6.7.9.14 Backup and Recovery 
To ensure that effective backups and recovery procedures are in place to safeguard critical data and 
that the integrity of backups is regularly tested. 
6.7.9.15 Redundancy/resilient infrastructure 
Redundancy are in place for critical ICS/SCADA systems or ICS/SCADA equipment and 
components. These include redundant networks, switches, servers, workstation and PLCs. 
6.7.9.16 Business Continuity and Disaster recovery plans 
A Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) and Business Continuity Plan (BCP) is developed in cooperation 
with business process owners and based on risk based approach and should clearly define the roles 
and responsibilities of the recovery team members. The DRP and BCP should be tested and kept up 
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to date to ensure recovery of ICS/SCADA systems in a way to minimise business impact in the event 
of a major disruption.  
6.7.9.17 Policies, Procedures Standards and Frameworks 
To ensure that an effective framework is implemented and communicated to all relevant stakeholders, 
to govern the ICS/SCADA environment.  
6.7.9.18 Vulnerability management 
To ensure that vulnerabilities to ICS/SCADA systems are managed and minimised. 
6.7.9.19 Incident Response 
Ensure that response capabilities to ICS/SCADA system incidents are understood and managed. These 
include a helpdesk system to prioritise and track incidents and escalation of long outstanding incidents. 
Procedures should be in place to escalate an incident to a disaster and revert to BCP or DRP should 
require. 
6.7.9.20 User Awareness Training 
To ensure that awareness and skills are improved by performing ongoing training for ICS/SCADA 
system staff. All information security staff who may be required to work with ICS/SCADA should 
receive the relevant training to do so. 
6.7.9.21 Third Party Management 
To ensure that third parties applicable to ICS/SCADA systems are managed and security clauses are 
detailed in all contracts prior to agreements. 
6.7.9.22 Project Management 
To ensure that the ICS/SCADA projects are managed using recognised methodology. 
6.7.9.23 Vendor Management 
To ensure that relationship with ICS/SCADA vendors are managed in accordance with organisational 
policies and procedure that governs the ICS/SCADA. This includes management of contracts, 
software licenses and employees who work in ICS/SCADA environment. 
6.7.9.24 Communication/Encryption 
To ensure that critical and confidential communication of the ICS/SCADA network, whether wired or 
wireless are appropriately encrypted and are regularly monitored and reviewed. 
6.7.9.25 Communication: Wireless and mobile 
To ensure that wireless networks are minimised and wireless connections are regularly monitored and 
reviewed. All mobile enabled systems (GSM) must conform to RICA act. 
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6.7.9.26 Strategy of ICS/SCADA 
To ensure that the ICS/SCADA strategies and organisational strategies are aligned. 
6.7.9.27 Data Encryption 
To ensure that critical and confidential data of the ICS/SCADA environment, whether stored in a 
database, Operating System or Application are appropriately encrypted and are regularly monitored 
and reviewed. 
6.7.10 Application to defence in depth 
The controls mentioned in Section 6.7.9.2 to Section 6.7.9.27 have been arranged into a defence in 
depth approach from the prioritisation in Table 6.5. This is visualised in Figure 6.8. Of the 26 controls 
listed, a number are relevant to multiple layers in the defence-in-depth model. The purpose of this 
approach is for the different layers to provide protection against threats which other layers may not 
protect against. For example, the malware discussed above can circumvent air gaps, therefore 
additional protection is required in the form of malware, and monitoring for unusual traffic or 
behaviour. In this way, if the preventative controls (the network segregation and malware protection) 
fail to prevent the malware infecting, the detective control (monitoring) will then record unusual traffic 
indicating that a malware infection has occurred. At least one control should be implemented for each 
layer in Figure 6.8, however more controls will have a higher likelihood of preventing cyber-security 
incidents. Of the 26 controls listed above, a number are relevant to multiple layers in the defence-in-
depth model. 
 
Figure 6.8: Defence in depth approach 




The factors influencing ICS/SCADA in South Africa are: vulnerabilities, namely, outdated or 
unpatched systems, No or limited monitoring and Access control; technical vulnerabilities such as 
Security Bypass, Cross-site scripting and Remote code execution; and threats which include Staff 
undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions, disgruntled staff and Malware. These factors could 
potentially cause distribution to operations and the business and ultimately lead to financial loss or 
possibly human life. 
The best mitigating controls to govern and secure the top perceived vulnerabilities and threats for 
ICS/SCADA systems in South Africa are to patch ICS/SCADA systems, to monitor them and to ensure 
appropriate access control in the form of user account management is in place as well as appropriate 
Anti-virus software. While the best mitigating controls to govern and secure the technical 
vulnerabilities are the implementation of appropriate Access control, implementation of appropriate 
and secure Configuration as well as implementing controls to govern and secure remote access.  
The impact of non-governed or unsecure ICS/SCADA is Loss of Availability or Denial of service. 
The top perceived threats and vulnerabilities could potentially lead to service disruption to operations 
and business, financial loss, loss of human life and adverse publicity. 
More focus was placed on certain controls to mitigate the perceived threats and vulnerabilities that are 
relevant to the ICS/SCADA environment. The perception is that the mitigating controls for the top 
threats and vulnerabilities can be implemented with some challenges. A control framework consisting 
of governance and security controls, was develop to take into account these perceived threats and 
vulnerabilities in order to mitigate the risk of ICS/SCADA in South Africa. Priority was given to 
controls that mitigate the perceived threats, risk and vulnerabilities. The controls were rearranged into 







Chapter 7 Conclusions and recommendations 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter interpreted and discussed the results of the analysis of the data gathered by means 
of the online questionnaire, and secondary data analysis. This chapter concludes the study and 
examines whether the research objectives were achieved. This dissertation consisted of seven chapters 
(including this chapter).  
Chapter 1 introduced the study and described the research approach. The aim of the study was to assess 
the current practices of ICS/SCADA in SA, and to develop a consolidated framework aligned to South 
Africa taken into account new and existing legislation. Chapter 2 presented a literature review on 
ICS/SCADA. Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology and the research design that guided this 
study, while Chapter 4 presented the quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Chapter 5 looked at 
various documents from local and international as well as network security device data, analysed and 
compared these. Chapter 6 presented a discussion based on the quantitative and qualitative data 
analysed and in relation to the secondary data analysis. 
This chapter concludes the study by presenting the conclusions, the limitations, proposes areas for 
future research and a final conclusion. Figure 7.1 is a graphical representation of the outline of this 






































Figure 7.1: Graphical representation of Chapter 7 outline 
7.2 Conclusions 
The research objectives were met and are discussed further in the section below. 
7.2.1 Research Objective 1 – To determine the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing 
ICS security in South Africa 
The study found that the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing ICS/SCADA environments 
in South Africa are Patching, Monitoring, and Access control for vulnerabilities and Cross site 
scripting, Information Disclosure and Security Bypass as technical vulnerabilities. The other factors 
(threats) that influence ICS/SCADA in South Africa are Malware, Staff undertaking unintentional 
unauthorised actions and disgruntled staff. Figure 6.1 shows the Risks related to ICS/SCADA. The 
Top risks are the matching the top threats. Comparing this with analysis of reports from both an 
international and local perspective it was noted this coincides with the top threats as found by the study 
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showing consistency in the results. These factors could potentially cause distribution to operations and 
the business and ultimately lead to financial loss or possibly human life.  
7.2.2 Research Objective 2 – To determine what the best mitigating controls to govern and 
secure ICS/SCADA systems in South Africa are 
The study found that the top three controls mitigating vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA environments 
as indicated by the respondents were Configuration Management, Physical security and Network 
perimeter. The respondents indicated these controls were Partially Implemented/in progress. This 
however does not address the top threats and vulnerabilities in the ICS/SCADA environment. It was 
also noted the controls mitigating the top threats and vulnerabilities were at best Partially 
Implemented/in progress. This shows there are still risks as the controls should be Implemented and 
operating effectively in order to successfully govern or mitigate the top threats and vulnerabilities. The 
state of ICS/SCADA is one of ungoverned and unsecure systems. The controls need to be prioritised 
to focus on the top risks, threats and vulnerabilities.  
7.2.3 Research Objective 3 – To determine the impact of non-governed ICS. 
The respondents indicated the impacts of non-governed  ICS/SCADA environments should threats 
and vulnerabilities materialise, are Loss of Availability/Denial of service, Loss of Integrity and 
Unauthorised control all having a Moderate impact which could lead to Some service 
disruption/potential for adverse publicity. 
The threats (Malware, disgruntled staff (intentional) and Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised 
actions) likely to impact ICS/SCADA systems all have a Medium impact, which indicate the threats 
are expected to occur in some circumstances but could also have a Higher impact like service 
disruption. 
7.2.4 Research Objective 4 – To determine how ICS in South Africa are secured and governed 
The study found that the majority of the respondents in South Africa have control frameworks in place. 
These frameworks however mostly focus on the governance aspect and not so much on the security 
aspect of an ICS/SCADA environment. There is a clear gap in securing ICS/SCADA systems or 
environments in South Africa.  
Furthermore, the respondents indicated that the maturity of the controls are between Evolving, i.e. 
inconsistently applied controls, and Established i.e. Controls in place, but there is a need for 
enhancement. It was concluded that although a majority of respondents have a governance framework 
in place, the controls are not consistently applied or operating effectively.  
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7.2.5 Research Objective 5 – To establish if the confidence levels of implemented 
controls/measures mitigating the threats and risks are sufficient 
The study found that the confidence levels of implemented control/measures mitigating the threats 
and risk are low as the respondents are only somewhat confident that the implemented controls 
mitigating the threats and risk are sufficient. 
The effectiveness of controls as well as the ease of implementation of controls were also investigated. 
The top three perceived as effective controls implemented in the ICS/SCADA environments (Physical 
access control, Firewalls and Environmental standards) were at best implemented but requires 
improvement. This further strengthen the results in Section 7.2.4 which indicates the controls are not 
consistently applied or operating effectively. Figure 6.3 shows the effectiveness of control versus the 
ease of implementation. It was observed that the top three easiest controls to implement for the 
ICS/SCADA environment (Physical access control, Environmental standards and Virus/ malware 
protection) were at best implemented with some challenges. This indicates that not only are the controls 
difficult to implement, but even if controls are implemented, there still requires improvement as they 
are not operating effectively. 
The confident levels of the respondents are lower than it should be for the controls that have been 
implemented to mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities sufficiently. From the discussion, the controls 
that should be prioritised or focused on are: Virus/malware protection, Physical access control, 
Environmental standards, Firewalls in place, and Backup and recovery. 
7.2.6 Research Objective 6 - To develop a control framework addressing the shortfalls for ICS 
security in South Africa 
The ultimate and final objective was to develop a control framework for ICS/SCADA in South Africa 
addressing the shortfalls. A SCADA control framework was developed taking into account the COBIT 
and CPNI frameworks. The high level framework is listed in Section 6.7.9 with prevalent controls to 
implement based on the Perceived susceptibility.  
The process for the development of the control framework was discussed in Section 6.7.9.1. The 
controls were prioritised to focus and address the top risks, threats and vulnerabilities based on the 
Perceived susceptibility. The control framework was developed with the high priority controls first. 





Figure 7.2: Defence in depth model for ICS/SCADA 
Source: Author compilation 
7.3 Recommendations 
7.3.1 Misalignment of controls 
From the discussion in Section 6.6.1, it was determined that there is a misalignment between the 
controls implemented and the ones addressing the Top Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities. Priority 
should be given to those addressing the current Top Risks, Threats and Vulnerabilities. These should 
also be regularly reviewed and ensured it is current. International threats should not be ignored, and 
should be considered for future as they might come or become relevant to South Africa at a later stage.  
7.3.2 Risks and threats 
In order to reduce or mitigate the Top three risks and threats to ICS/SCADA environment, the 
following are recommended as discussed in Section 6.3.  
7.3.2.1 Malware 
In order to effectively protect the ICS/SCADA environment against malware and external threats, 
vendor accredited and configured anti-malware software should be implemented and regularly 
updated. Where anti-malware software cannot be deployed, other protection measures should be 
implemented, such as gateway anti-virus scanning or manual media checking. 
7.3.2.2 Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions 
To mitigate staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions, first comprehensive Security, 
Governance, Risk and compliance policies, frameworks and standards must be successfully 
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implemented. These should also be communicated to all relevant stakeholders. In addition, regular 
system monitoring of the ICS/SCADA infrastructure (including processes, network, and field devices) 
should be performed. This includes network traffic and user access to detect anomalies, and external 
threat intelligence to receive early warnings of potential threats or newly discovered vulnerabilities as 
well as anomalies caused by internal staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions. 
7.3.2.3 Disgruntled staff 
Out-going employees should be managed, this includes removing all access, both physical and logical.  
This will mitigate the risk of disgruntled staff who have left the organisation. In order to minimise 
internal disgruntled staff, a similar mitigating action in terms of monitoring should be implemented. 
This include regular system monitoring of the ICS/SCADA infrastructure, network traffic and user 
access to detect anomalies of actions performed by disgruntled staff. 
7.3.3 Vulnerabilities 
In order to reduce or mitigate the vulnerabilities to ICS/SCADA environment, the following are 
recommended as discussed in Section 6.3:  
7.3.3.1 Patching 
Implement vendor certified security patches. Thoroughly test all patches on a test-bed prior to 
installing on production systems. Where security patching is not possible or practical, alternative 
appropriate protection measures are considered 
7.3.3.2 Monitoring 
Regular system monitoring of the ICS/SCADA infrastructure (processes, network, and field devices) 
should be performed. This includes network traffic and user access to detect anomalies, and external 
threat intelligence to receive early warnings of potential threats or newly discovered vulnerabilities. 
7.3.3.3 Access control 
Implement mitigating controls to ensure that new employees and out-going employees are managed 
in the ICS/SCADA environment. Also ensure the access is minimised to specific job-functions, by 
applying the principle of least privilege access.  
Appropriate password policies for ICS/SCADA systems should be defined and implemented. This 
should include the applicable users, strength of passwords and expiration times, changing of default 
vendor passwords, and for ICS/SCADA systems or functions where passwords may not be deemed 




7.3.4 Technical vulnerabilities  
The following mitigating actions would reduce the following technical vulnerabilities, as discussed in 
Section 6.3: 
7.3.4.1 Cross site scripting  
To mitigate cross site scripting ICS/SCADA systems should be hardened. This include activating 
security features, disabling unused services and ports in the operating systems and applications to 
prevent unauthorised use.  
7.3.4.2 Information Disclosure 
Similar to preventing cross site scripting, to mitigate Information Disclosure, ICS/SCADA systems 
should be hardened as mentioned in Section 7.3.4.1. 
7.3.4.3 Security Bypass 
To prevent Security bypass, ICS/SCADA systems should have effective user access management and 
password policies defined and implemented. These should include new users joining and removing 
users who have left the organisation, strength of passwords and expiration times, and changing of 
default vendor passwords.  For systems or functions where passwords may not be deemed necessary 
(such as view only mode) compensating controls are documented (e.g. for control room staff).  
In addition, security features should be activated, unused services and ports in the operating systems 
and applications should be disabled. The use of removable media (such as CDs and USB drives) 
should be restricted. Where use of removable media is necessary, procedures are in place to ensure 
these are checked for malware prior to use.  
7.3.5 Consistency in reporting 
From the discussion in Section 6.2.1, it was determined that security vendors should endeavour to 
improve the consistency of how vulnerabilities and threats are classified and reported. Reports from 
different years for the same vendor have different naming of vulnerabilities/threats. There are also 
different naming of vulnerabilities/threats between vendors, making it hard to summarise and 
correlate. There should be a standard in naming and reporting across security vendors. 
7.4 Research outcomes 
The research outcome was to address the gap that there is no or limited information available as to the 
current state of ICS in South Africa including the factors influencing ICS and how they are governed. 
The mixed methods were used, a survey as well as secondary data pertaining to multiple network 
security devices. There are contributions are discussed below. 
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7.4.1 Contribution to Theory 
This research developed a conceptual model from two existing models or methodologies which 
assisted the researched in development of a Security and Governance control framework. The model 
takes elements from TAM and PMT to develop a model that will take into account Risk, Threats and 
Vulnerabilities to determine the Perceived susceptibility. The usability of control and the ease of use 
of the controls will form the Security confidence which will assist together with the Perceived 
susceptibility to develop and Coping response or Propose ICS/SCADA framework. 
7.4.2 Contribution to Global Knowledge 
Aspects of this study was published as an academic journal in the International Journal of Cyber 
Warfare and Terrorism (IJCWT) in July 2016 (Pretorius & Van Niekerk, 2016) and the 10th 
International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ICCWS) on 24 and 25 March 2015 
(Pretorius & Van Niekerk, 2015).  
7.4.3 Contribution to Practice 
This research also assessed the current practices of ICS/SCADA in South Africa, and developed a 
consolidated Security and Governance control framework aligned to threats, risks and vulnerabilities 
relevant to South Africa. The control framework will assist organisations in South Africa to mitigate 
the risks, threats and vulnerabilities related to their ICS/SCADA environments. Aspects of this study 
was presented at a practitioner conference, namely at the ISACA South Africa Annual Conference in 
August 2015 and well as at a KMPG CIO Agenda in June 2016.  
7.5 Future work 
From this stage, future work will include detailed breakdown of the controls as well as analysis of the 
practicality of implementation and further alignment to South African government legal requirements 
and international frameworks. Ongoing testing of the framework in other ICS/SCADA environments 
will be conducted to ensure generalisation and applicability of the framework. Repeat studies should 
also be performed at minimum every two years to monitor the progress or lack thereof. As mentioned 
in Section 7.3.5, security vendors need to improve the consistency of how vulnerabilities and threats 
are classified and reported. Future research on this could elaborate as to why different vendors use 
different terminology as well as how these terms can be grouped together for easy interpretation.  
7.6 Limitations of the study 
It was difficult to determine the exact population. The questionnaire was sent out to the broader 
community to see the responses. There might be an issue with convenience sampling as the implication 
would be that other respondents that could have responded have not been fully identified.  There is 
inconsistency of report analysis from the various security vendors discussed in Section 5.2. This 
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included inconsistency between categories which could lead to some bias towards certain 
vulnerabilities and threats and complicated the overall analysis. Although this might have a small 
implication on the study, this might impact someone in the industry trying to use various reports to 
determine the top vulnerabilities. They might wrongly place emphasis on controls for vulnerabilities 
that are not really the most prevalent. 
7.7 Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 
This research explored the threat, vulnerabilities, risks and challenges related to the ICS/SCADA 
environment in South Africa. The study found that the factors (vulnerabilities and threats) influencing 
ICS/SCADA environments in South Africa are Patching, Monitoring, and Access control for 
vulnerabilities and Cross site scripting, Information Disclosure and Security Bypass as technical 
vulnerabilities. The other factor (threats) that influence ICS/SCADA in South Africa are Malware, 
Staff undertaking unintentional unauthorised actions and disgruntled staff. These factors could 
potentially cause distribution to operations and the business and ultimately lead to financial loss or 
possibly human life. 
The state of ICS/SCADA is one of ungoverned and unsecure systems. Controls needs to be prioritised 
to focus on the top risks, threats and vulnerabilities. Although a majority of respondents have a 
governance framework in place, the controls are not consistently applied or operating effectively. The 
confident levels of the respondents are lower than it should be for the controls that have been 
implemented to mitigate the threats and vulnerabilities sufficiently.  
A SCADA control framework was developed taking into account the COBIT and CPNI frameworks. 
The control framework gave prevalent controls to implement based on the Perceived susceptibility. 
The controls were prioritised to focus and address the top risks, threats and vulnerabilities based on 
the Perceived susceptibility. The control framework was developed with the high priority controls 
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Appendix B Additional Tables: Effectiveness of controls 
































































































































































3 2 2 4 12 4 3 4 7 3 
Plan to 
implement in 
the next year 















16 21 11 9 12 13 11 7 10 13 
Unsure/Unk
nown 
1 0 2 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 
N/A 





46 47 45 44 47 47 47 47 48 47 
Mean* 3.74 4.00 3.64 3.43 3.19 3.77 3.62 3.38 3.40 3.77 
Std 
Deviation* 
1.20 1.12 1.07 1.23 1.56 1.18 1.11 1.13 1.32 1.09 
Variance* 1.44 1.26 1.14 1.51 2.42 1.40 1.24 1.28 1.73 1.18 
Kurtosis* -0.27 0.32 -0.03 -0.61 -1.43 0.53 0.07 -0.24 -0.67 0.69 
Skewness* -0.68 -0.96 -0.51 -0.51 -0.33 -1.08 -0.65 -0.54 -0.61 -0.89 



























































































































































































4 12 7 2 4 5 6 3 4 5 
Plan to 
implement in 
the next year 















11 9 17 21 19 15 15 17 16 17 
Unsure/Unk
nown 
1 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 0 
N/A 





47 48 47 48 46 47 47 48 46 48 
Mean* 3.51 3.15 3.64 4.04 3.91 3.66 3.66 3.88 3.74 3.77 
Std 
Deviation* 
1.23 1.46 1.39 1.09 1.24 1.31 1.36 1.14 1.24 1.28 
Variance* 1.52 2.13 1.93 1.19 1.55 1.71 1.84 1.30 1.53 1.63 
Kurtosis* -0.56 -1.21 -0.51 0.80 0.46 -0.40 -0.42 0.54 -0.09 0.05 
Skewness* -0.57 -0.39 -0.78 -1.11 -1.13 -0.79 -0.87 -1.00 -0.80 -0.96 







































































































































































6 3 11 9 6 6 5 6 4 3 
Plan to 
implement in 
the next year 















12 13 7 6 13 5 9 8 8 9 
Unsure/Unk
nown 
2 0 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3 
N/A 





46 48 47 45 47 47 46 46 45 44 
Mean* 3.48 3.58 3.09 3.07 3.51 3.19 3.52 3.41 3.49 3.55 
Std 
Deviation* 
1.33 1.20 1.40 1.36 1.32 1.17 1.19 1.22 1.14 1.11 
Variance* 1.77 1.44 1.95 1.84 1.73 1.38 1.41 1.49 1.30 1.23 
Kurtosis* -0.68 -0.57 -1.14 -1.15 -0.57 -0.47 0.08 -0.19 0.04 0.05 
Skewness* -0.60 -0.51 -0.36 -0.30 -0.62 -0.47 -0.80 -0.71 -0.69 -0.60 
Rank           
 
* The table of frequencies listed. The mean, Standard Deviation, Variance, Kurtosis, Skewness and 




Appendix C Additional Tables: Ease of implementation 

































































































































































0 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Difficult to 
implement 




20 19 20 23 17 14 19 15 19 21 
Easy to 
implement 
10 12 10 10 9 16 9 15 11 12 
Very easy to 
implement 
4 3 2 1 2 6 2 3 3 3 
N/A 
5 6 7 7 13 5 5 5 7 4 
Count (n-
N/A) 
43 42 41 41 35 43 43 43 41 44 
Mean* 3.21 3.24 3.07 3.10 3.17 3.47 2.98 3.23 3.22 3.20 
Std 
Deviation* 
0.89 0.85 0.91 0.77 0.82 0.98 0.89 0.95 0.85 0.88 
Variance* 0.79 0.72 0.82 0.59 0.68 0.97 0.79 0.90 0.73 0.77 
Kurtosis* -0.38 -0.43 0.27 0.75 -0.22 -0.31 -0.13 -0.49 -0.37 0.12 
Skewness* 0.42 0.26 -0.15 -0.17 0.34 -0.29 0.26 -0.14 0.32 0.01 




























































































































































































0 0 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 0 
Difficult to 
implement 




22 13 13 15 16 23 24 20 23 19 
Easy to 
implement 
13 12 17 19 16 10 8 13 11 10 
Very easy to 
implement 
1 2 3 7 5 3 5 5 2 4 
N/A 
4 12 6 2 6 5 5 4 6 6 
Count (n-
N/A) 
44 36 42 46 42 43 43 44 42 42 
Mean* 3.16 3.19 3.31 3.59 3.48 3.16 3.28 3.34 3.19 3.21 
Std 
Deviation* 
0.75 0.89 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.96 0.80 0.90 
Variance* 0.56 0.79 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.73 0.93 0.65 0.81 
Kurtosis* -0.41 -0.85 -0.44 0.16 0.18 0.66 -0.02 0.31 0.78 -0.45 
Skewness* 0.08 0.11 -0.32 -0.44 -0.33 -0.13 0.62 -0.26 -0.07 0.40 




































































































































































1 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 
Difficult to 
implement 




19 18 15 20 17 16 18 19 21 19 
Easy to 
implement 
9 16 11 8 12 11 12 12 10 10 
Very easy to 
implement 
5 3 2 2 3 4 4 4 3 4 
N/A 
9 7 10 10 5 7 7 8 7 7 
Count (n-
N/A) 
39 41 38 38 43 41 41 40 41 41 
Mean* 3.31 3.44 3.13 3.11 3.14 3.15 3.29 3.38 3.20 3.20 
Std 
Deviation* 
0.95 0.78 0.88 0.80 0.94 1.06 0.93 0.84 0.87 0.98 
Variance* 0.90 0.60 0.77 0.64 0.88 1.13 0.86 0.70 0.76 0.96 
Kurtosis* 0.01 -0.26 -0.71 0.09 -0.41 -0.30 -0.05 -0.33 0.35 0.07 
Skewness* 0.10 0.04 0.24 0.48 0.07 -0.17 -0.04 0.28 0.07 -0.08 
Rank           
 
* The table of frequencies listed. The mean, Standard Deviation, Variance, Kurtosis, Skewness and 
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